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ABSTRACT
QUANTIFYING THE SECURITY RISK OF DISCOVERING AND EXPLOITING
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES
Most of the attacks on computer systems and networks are enabled by vulnerabilities in a
software. Assessing the security risk associated with those vulnerabilities is important. Risk mod-
els such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) and Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) have been used to qualitatively
assess the security risk presented by a vulnerability. CVSS metrics are the de facto standard and
its metrics need to be independently evaluated.
In this dissertation, we propose using a quantitative approach that uses an actual data, math-
ematical and statistical modeling, data analysis, and measurement. We have introduced a novel
vulnerability discovery model, Folded model, that estimates the risk of vulnerability discovery
based on the number of residual vulnerabilities in a given software. In addition to estimating the
risk of vulnerabilities discovery of a whole system, this dissertation has furthermore introduced a
novel metrics termed time to vulnerability discovery to assess the risk of an individual vulnerability
discovery.
We also have proposed a novel vulnerability exploitability risk measure termed Structural
Severity. It is based on software properties, namely attack entry points, vulnerability location,
the presence of the dangerous system calls, and reachability analysis. In addition to measure-
ment, this dissertation has also proposed predicting vulnerability exploitability risk using internal
software metrics.
We have also proposed two approaches for evaluating CVSS Base metrics. Using the availabil-
ity of exploits, we first have evaluated the performance of the CVSS Exploitability factor and have
compared its performance to Microsoft (MS) rating system. The results showed that exploitability
metrics of CVSS and MS have a high false positive rate. This finding has motivated us to conduct
ii
further investigation. To that end, we have introduced vulnerability reward programs (VRPs) as a
novel ground truth to evaluate the CVSS Base scores. The results show that the notable lack of
exploits for high severity vulnerabilities may be the result of prioritized fixing of vulnerabilities.
iii
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This chapter introduces the problem description, research motivations, and dissertation out-
lines.
1.1 Problem Description and Research Motivation
Most of the attacks on computer systems and networks are enabled by vulnerabilities in a soft-
ware. A vulnerability is a software defect which might be exploited by malicious users causing loss
or harm [2]. The number of reported discovered software vulnerabilities, as shown in Figure 1.1,
shows that software is vulnerable in spite of the recent advances in practice to intensify software
security such as vulnerability avoidance, vulnerability removal, and intrusion blocking.
Figure 1.1: Number of reported vulnerabilities (year 2008 2015, [1])
The number of security Studies have also shown that the time gap between the vulnerability
public disclosure and the release of an automated exploit is getting smaller [3] as shown in Figure
1.2. Thus, assessing the risk associated with those vulnerabilities is critical. Risk models such as
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [4], Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) [5] and Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) [6] have been used to qualitatively
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Figure 1.2: Time gap between public disclosure and the release of an exploit
assess the security risk presented by a vulnerability. CVSS metrics have become a de facto stan-
dard that is commonly used to assess the severity of a vulnerability. Thus, its metrics need to be
independently evaluated.
The research on quantitative assessment of software vulnerability risk seeks to forecast how
likely a vulnerability is to be discovered and then exploited based on actual data, using mathemati-
cal and statistical modeling and measurement. Quantitative assessment of software vulnerabilities,
however, is in its infancy status and it is considered challenging because the full nature of what
should constitute an appropriate measure of software security is yet to be established. The main
research questions in this dissertation are:
• RQ1: What are the factors that can be used to assess:
– Likelihood of discovery
– Likelihood of exploitation
– Impact of exploitation
• RQ2: How can we objectively derive them?





• RQ4: How can we evaluate CVSS Base metrics?
Besides, quantitative security is challenged by the availability of data. Recently data and stan-
dards have been introduced by security community. Figure 1.3 shows the standards and data
sources used in this dissertation. More details about them can be found in chapter 2. It should
be noted that the Bugzilla has been used to map vulnerabilities to their location in the source code.
Figure 1.3: Software Vulnerabilities Data
1.2 Research Objectives and Contribution
The main objective of this research is to propose a framework that can address the challenging
questions discussed in the problem description. Here, we mainly focus on reducing subjectivity and
minimize human involvement. To meet these objectives, Figure 1.4 shows the main three layers
of the proposed framework. It should be noted that in addition to building a model, measuring
and analyzing vulnerability discovery and exploitation risk have been conducted as well but not
explicitly mentioned in the Figure 1.4.
To address the risk of vulnerabilities discovery risk, this dissertation proposes a novel vulner-
ability discovery model, Folded model. It is a time based model that uses known reported vul-
nerabilities data to estimate the total number of the remaining vulnerabilities in a software. This
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Figure 1.4: Proposed Framework
reported vulnerabilities from a predicted total number of vulnerabilities. In addition to estimating
the risk of vulnerabilities discovery of the whole system, this dissertation propose a metric to assess
an individual software vulnerability discovery termed Time To Vulnerability Disclosure (TTVD).
TTVD is the time taken from when the version containing the vulnerability was first released until
the time a vulnerability is discovered and hence disclosed to the public.
For addressing vulnerabilities exploitability risk, this dissertation proposes a novel vulnerabil-
ity exploitability risk measure, Structural Severity. It is based on software properties, namely attack
entry points, vulnerability location, the presence of the dangerous system calls, and reachability
analysis. These properties represent metrics that can be objectively derived from attack surface
analysis, vulnerability analysis, and exploitation analysis. In this dissertation, internal software at-
tributes (metrics) that can be used to predict vulnerability exploitability risk have been examined.
We characterize the vulnerable functions that have no exploit and the ones that have an exploit
using eight metrics: Source Line of Code, Cyclomatic complexity, CountPath, Nesting Degree,
Information Flow, Calling functions, Called by functions, and Number of Invocations. We first test
the discriminative power of the individual selected metrics using the Welch t-test. Then we select
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a combination of the metrics using three feature selection methods and evaluate their predictive
power using four classifiers.
For validating CVSS Base metrics, this dissertation used two approaches. First, using the avail-
ability of exploits we evaluated the performance of the CVSS Exploitability factor and compared
its performance to Microsoft (MS) rating system measures. The results showed that exploitability
metrics in CVSS and MS do not correlate strongly with the existence of exploits (ground truth),
and have a high false positive rate. The high false positive rate result makes me think about ex-
ploring different ground truth to explain why too many vulnerabilities have no exploit for them.
To address this challenge, we introduced the vulnerability reward programs (VRPs) as a novel
ground truth to evaluate the CVSS Base scores. Having more eyes on the code means that VRPs
uncovered many more vulnerabilities and that makes finding and exploiting vulnerabilities more
difficult for malicious actors. The fact that there are more number of vulnerabilities with a high
CVSS scores and have no exploits or attacks is may be because vulnerabilities that are discovered
by VRPs result in prioritized fixing.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces software vulnera-
bilities and their related topics such as vulnerabilities standards and databases, exploit database,
open source software, and bug repositories. Chapter 3 presents the assessment of vulnerabilities
discovery risk for the whole system. Chapter 4 describes the risk assessment of individual vulnera-
bilities. Chapter 5 explores the relationship between attack surface metric and vulnerabilities den-
sity. In Chapter 6, a measure for vulnerability exploitability is introduced. Chapter 7 investigates
the characteristics and the models for prediction vulnerabilities exploitability. Chapter 8 evaluates
CVSS Exploitability factor using the the availability of exploits vulnerabilities and compared its
performance to Microsoft (MS) rating system exploitability measure. Chapter 9 introduces the
vulnerability reward programs as a novel ground truth to evaluate the CVSS Base scores. Chapter
10 presents the conclusions and Chapter 10 outlines directions for future work.
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1.4 Publication History
The materials in this dissertation have previously been presented at conferences ( [7], [8], [9],





This chapter describes the concepts and topics related to software vulnerabilities.
2.1 Software Vulnerability Definition
A software vulnerability is defined as a defect in software systems which presents a consider-
able security risk [2]. A subset of the security related defects, vulnerabilities, are to be discovered
and become known eventually. The vulnerabilities are thus a subset of the defects that are se-
curity related. The finders of the vulnerabilities disclose them to the public using some of the
common reporting mechanisms available in the field. The databases for the vulnerabilities are
maintained by several organizations such as National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [16], Open
Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [17], BugTraq [18], as well as the vendors of the soft-
ware. Vulnerabilities are assigned a unique identifier using MITRE Common Vulnerability and
Exposure (CVE) service.
2.2 Software Vulnerabilities Standards
There are several commonly used vulnerability standards by researchers to make vulnerability
measurable. In this section, three popular vulnerability standards to vulnerability researchers are
introduced: CVE, CWE, and CVSS.
2.2.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a publicly available and free to use list or
dictionary of standardized identifiers for common computer vulnerabilities and exposures [19].
It is a dictionary of publicly known information of security vulnerabilities and exposures. CVEs
common identifiers enable data exchange be- tween security products and provide a baseline index
point for evaluating coverage of tools and services.
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CVE was launched in 1999 when most information security tools used their own databases with
their own names for security vulnerabilities which make hard to communicate among the security
vendors and security advisories. CVEs stan- dardized identifiers enable to solve this problems.
Currently, CVE is treated as de facto industry standard for vulnerability and exposure names.
Originally, in 1999, there were 321 CVE entries, and now there are more than 46,000 CVE entries
as of June 2011. Each CVE identifier includes:
• CVE identifier number (i.e., CVE-2010-0034).
• Indication of entry or candidate status.
• Description of the security vulnerability or exposure.
• pertinent references (i.e., vulnerability reports, mailing list postings and advi- sories).
Not all the discovered vulnerabilities receive CVE entry position automatically from the start.
After the discovery, the information is assigned a CVE identifier with candidate status by a CVE
Candidate Numbering Authority (CNA), and proposed to the CVE editorial board by the CVE
editor. The board talks over the CNAs and votes on whether it should become a CVE entry. If the
candidate is accepted, its status is updated to entry on the CVE list. If not, the reason for rejection
is noted in the editorial board archives posted on the CVE Web site.
The assignment of a candidate number is not a guarantee that it will become an official CVE
entry. Usually, it takes one day to one month to assign a candidate number. Then it takes another a
year or more for the candidate to become an official CVE entry. In some cases, it takes much longer
due to the obscure or insufficient issues, or unstabilized CVE editorial policies. All of the datasets
speculated in the dissertation are from NVD database which is based upon and synchronized with
the identifiers on the CVE List. Therefore, all the vulnerabilities in the dissertation are assigned
with CVE identifiers.
2.2.2 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a list of software weakness types, and is sponsored
by the National Cyber Security Division in the US Department of Homeland Security [20]. It
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aims to be a complete dictionary for software weaknesses. It provides a unified, measurable set
of software weaknesses that is enabling more effective discussion, description, selection, and use
of software security tools and services that can find these weaknesses in source code and oper-
ational systems as well as better understanding and management of software weaknesses related
to architecture and design. In short, a unique number is assigned to each weakness type. Since
CWE provides fine detail classifications, the CWE Web site contains the information for more than
860 programming, design, and architecture error types that can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities.
Since around September 2007, National Vulnerability Database have provided some selected CWE
names in the vulnerability database.
2.2.3 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
In July 2003, National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) commissioned a project to ad-
dress the problem of multiple and incompatible IT related vulnerability scoring systems. As a
result, the CVSS has been adopted by many vendors since its first launch in 2004 such as appli-
cation vendors, vulnerability scanning and compliance tools, risk assessment products, security
bulletins, and academics. The scoring system is now on its second version which is finalized its
design in June 2007, and currently maintained by CVSS Special Interest Group (CVSS-SIG) at
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) [21] .
CVSS defines a number of metrics that can be used to characterize vulnerability. The measures
termed scores are computed using assessments, called metrics, of vulnerability attributes based on
the opinions of experts in the field. For each metric, a few qualitative levels are defined and a
numerical value is associated with each level. CVSS is composed of three major metric groups:
Base, Temporal and Environmental as shown in Figure 2.1. The Base metric represents the intrinsic
characteristics of vulnerability, and is the only mandatory metric. The optional Environmental
and Temporal metrics are used to augment the Base metrics, and depend on the target system
and changing circumstances. The Base metrics include two sub-scores termed exploitability and
impact. The CVSS scores for known vulnerabilities are readily available in the majority of public
9
Figure 2.1: Three CVSS Metric Groups
vulnerability databases on the Web. A score is a number in the range [0.0, 10.0]. The value for
f(Impact) is zero when Impact is zero otherwise it has the value of 1.176.
The base metric group, range of [0.0, 10.0], represents the intrinsic and fundamental character-
istic of a vulnerability, so the score is not changed over time. The base metric has two sub-scores
of exploitability and impact sub-scores. The two sub-scores are also ranges of [0.0, 10.0]. The ex-
ploitability sub-score captures how a vulnerability is accessed and whether or not extra conditions
are required to exploit it while the impact sub-score measures how a vulnerability will directly
affect an IT asset as the degree of losses in confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The exploitability sub-score is composed of the three elements: access vector (AV), access
complexity (AC), and authentication (Au). The access vector reflects how the vulnerability is
exploited in terms of local (L), adjacent network (A), or network (N). The access complexity mea-
sures the complexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerability once an attacker has gained
access to the target system in terms of High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L). The authentication
counts the number of times an attacker must authenticate to a target in order to exploit a vulnera-
bility in terms of Multiple (M), Single (S), or None (N).
The impact sub-score is composed of the three key aspects in information security components:
confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A). The impact attributes are all assessed in terms
of None (N), Partial (P), or Complete (C). Before CVSS scores are entered into NVD, security ex-
perts analyze the vulnerabilities and assign one of the qualitative letter grades mentioned above on
the vulnerabilities. Since the central goal of CVSS is producing comparable vulnerability scores,
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Table 2.1: Vulnerability Databases on the Web
Vulnerability Database URL
National Vulnerability Database,( NVD) http://nvd.nist.gov/
Open Source Vulnerability Database,(OSVDB) http://osvdb.org/
IBM Internet Security Systems,(X-Force) http://xforce.iss.net/
DragonSoft Vulnerability Database http://vdb.dragonsoft.com/
US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database,(CERT) http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls





analyzers are allowed to rate the vulnerabilities only with those letters. Finally, scoring is the
process of combining all the metric values according to the specific formulas from.
The optional environmental and temporal metrics are used to augment the Base Score metrics
and depend on the target system and changing circumstances.
2.3 Public Vulnerability Databases
One of the first things to do for the vulnerability analysis is collecting the datasets to be ana-
lyzed. Fortunately, there are many publically available vulnerability databases on the Web; Table
1 shows some of them. Usually, they are overlap and complement each other, so there is no one
best source. Many of them provide CVE identifiers, severity, CVSS scores, and published date.
If it is available, they also provide vulnerability patch date, discovery date, vulnerability type, etc.
There are many vulnerability databases and security advisories in the web. Some of them are freely
available, others are not. Some of them are managed by governments and others are run by private
security companies.
2.4 Exploit Database
EDB records exploits and vulnerable software [22]. It is used by penetration testers, vulnera-
bility researchers, and security professionals. It reports vulnerabilities for which there is at least
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a proof-of-concept exploit. EDB is considered as a regulated market for the exploits. EDB con-
tains around 24075 exploits as the time of writing this paper. Most of its data are derived from
Metasploit Framework, a tool for creating and executing exploit code against a target machine. It
provides a search utility that uses a CVE number to find vulnerabilities that have an exploit.
2.5 Open Source Software
Open source software is software whose source code is available for modification or enhance-
ment by anyone [23]. Source code is the part of software that most computer users don’t ever see.
The open source codes that are used in the dissertation are Apache HTTP server, Linux Kernel,
and Firefox.
2.6 Bug Repositories
A bug repository is a vital database in modern software development. Many software projects
create and maintain bug repositories for storing and updating the information of problems or sug-
gestions about projects. The widely available bug repositories have provided an important platform
for investigating the quality of software. With the growth in scale, developers in large projects must
handle a large number of bugs in bug repositories. For example, as for April 2015 the Linux repos-
itory has over 400, 000 commits. Bugzilla is a bug or issue tracking system [24]. Bug-tracking
systems allow individual or groups of developers effectively to keep track of outstanding problems
with their product [25].
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Chapter 3
Assessing Software Vulnerability Discovery
Risk
This chapter proposes a novel vulnerability discovery model, Folded model. This model ad-
dress the risk of vulnerabilities discovery for the whole software when the pattern of the data is
linear. It is a time based model that uses known reported vulnerabilities data to estimate the to-
tal number of the remaining vulnerabilities in a software. This number is then used to quantify
the residual vulnerabilities by subtracting the number of known reported vulnerabilities from a
predicted total number of vulnerabilities.
3.1 Vulnerability Discovery Risk Estimation at Software Level
Vulnerability discovery risk can be measured at the software level by estimating the number of
the residual vulnerabilities in the system as shown in the following:
RVD = V D −KVD
RVD stands for residual vulnerabilities density, VD stands for vulnerabilities density, and KVD
stands for known vulnerabilities density. Whereas know vulnerabilities can be determined from
one of the vulnerabilities databases such as NVD, determining the total number of vulnerabilities
of a system is hard. Recently, a few vulnerabilities discovery models (VDMs) have been proposed
to estimate the number of total vulnerabilities in a given system. They include Rescorlas expo-
nential model [26], Andersons thermodynamic model [27], and Alhazmi Malaiya Logistic (AML)
model [28], each of them is based on its own assumptions and is characterized by its specific
parameters.
Investigating the prediction capability and accuracy of these models has been studied by Al-
hazmi and Malaiya [29]. It has been found that the AML model generally fits the data for several
software systems better than other models. The AML model is obtained using the assumption that
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as the market share of a software increases, the rate of vulnerability discovery also increases. When
the software starts losing its market share, or when there are a few vulnerabilities remaining to be
found, the vulnerability discovery rate decreases [28]. Thus, the motivation of the vulnerability
finders, both white hat and black hat, is driven by the market share. The AML model is logistic,
and thus the increase and decrease in the discovery process is assumed to be symmetric around the
peak. However, it has been noted [30, 31] that the discovery rate may not be necessarily symmet-
rical. This limitation of the AML model can possibly be addressed using alternative models that
capture asymmetric behavior.
Kim [30], and Joh and Malaiya [32] have shown that asymmetric VDMs are feasible and have
better performance than the symmetric models in some cases. In this dissertation, we examine
the Folded model suggested by Kim [30], as an alternative VDM. Kim however did not examine
the model using actual datasets. Here, we examined the applicability of the Folded VDM using
actual vulnerability discovery data for four popular software systems. Specifically, we compare
the Folded and AML models using goodness of fit and prediction capabilities for these datasets.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, the AML model is discussed and its
potential limitations are identified. In section 3.2, the Folded VDM will be introduced. Section 3.3
presents the results of the comparison of the AML and Folded models using goodness of fit tests
and prediction capabilities. Finally, the concluding comments are given along with the issues that
need further research.
3.2 The Vulnerability Discovery Models
The VDMs proposed recently are somewhat analogous to software reliability growth model
(SRGM), but there are significant differences. VDMs are probabilistic models for modeling the
discovery rate of vulnerabilities in software systems [33]. These models use the historical data
such as release date, the discovery date of vulnerabilities and possibly the system usage data. While
the vulnerabilities are security related defects, they tend to be treated differently compared with
ordinary software defects [34, 35]. Normal defects found after release are frequently ignored and
not fixed until the next release because they do not represent a high degree of risk. On the other
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hand, software developers need to patch vulnerabilities right after they are found, due to the high
risks they represent. The security issues can greatly impact not only organizations such as banks,
brokerage houses, on-line merchants, government offices but also individuals.
Quantitative risk analysis of systems with a continual vulnerability discovery has only re-
cently started to be investigated. A few VDMs proposed by researchers include Anderson [27],
Rescorla [26], Kim [30], Alhazmi and Malaiya Logistic model [36], Alhazmi and Malaiya Effort
based model [37], Ozment and Schechter [38], and Chen et al. [39]. Figure 3.1 shows classi-
fication of vulnerability discovery models. Each model has its own mathematical representation
and parameters. As a result, different VDMs can make somewhat different projections using the
same data. No specific guidance is currently available about which models should be used in
a given situation. Rescorla [26] has introduced quadratic and exponential VDMs. He fitted the
Vulnerability Discovery Models























Figure 3.1: Taxonomy for Vulnerability Discovery Models
proposed models but did not evaluate their predictive accuracy. Anderson [27] proposed a thermo-
dynamic vulnerability discovery model, but did not apply the model to any actual data. Alhazmi
and Malaiya [28] proposed the logistic vulnerability discovery model, termed the AML model.
The AML model presumes a symmetric software vulnerability discovery process. This model has
shown a good statistically significant goodness-of-fit for the wellknown operating systems such as
Windows and Red Hat Linux, and some Internet applications such as browsers and HTTP servers.
Its predictive capability was tested by Alhazmi and Malaiya [29] and it has shown good results. In
another study [36], they found that the AML model provides a better goodness-of-fit compared to
Rescorla and Anderson models.
Alhazmi and Malaiya [36] have also proposed an effort-based model which utilizes the number
of system installations as the independent factor instead of calendar time. They argued that it is
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much more rewarding to discover a vulnerability in a system which is installed on a large number
of computers. However, the effort-based model requires the number of users for a target product
in market share which is not always easy to be obtained. Woo et al. [40] have examined the
goodness-of-fit as well as the prediction capability for the effort-based model.
Joh et al. [31] have studied Weibull VDM, which was first proposed by Kim [30]. They argued
that the assumption made by the AML model that the rate of discovering vulnerability is symmetric
around the peak value is not always true. They used Weibull distribution to capture the asymmetric
behavior as an alternative to the AML model. However, the Weibull model did not always provide
a good fit.
3.3 The Symmetrical AML VDM
The AML VDM [28] is a time-based model. It assumes that at the release of the software the
vulnerability discovery rate increases gradually. This is known as the learning phase in which the
software gains market-share and installed bases remain small. After the learning phase, the system
starts to attract more users and the number of vulnerabilities grows linearly. In this phase, which
is known as the linear phase, the maximum vulnerability discovery rate is obtained by finding the
slope. The learning phase is considered as the most important phase because most of the vulnera-
bilities will be discovered during this phase. However, when the system starts to be replaced by a
newer version and users start to switch to the next version and as a result the vulnerability finders
start to lose interest in finding vulnerabilities in the older version. As a result, the vulnerability
discovery rate drops. Therefore, the cumulative number of vulnerabilities becomes stable. The
three phases are shown in Figure 3.2(a).
The AML model assumes that the vulnerability discovery processes are controlled by the mar-
ket share of the soft-ware and the number of the undiscovered vulnerabilities. The model assumes
that the vulnerability discovery rate is given by the differential equation:
dΩ
dt







































































Figure 3.2: Vulnerability discovery process and rates for AML and Folded VDMs
Equation ( 3.1) has two factors. The first factor AΩ, where A is a constant, increases as the market
share increases, and (B − Ω), where B represents the total number of vulnerabilities, decreases as






Note that Ω(t) approaches B as the calendar time t approaches infinity. The parameters A and C
determine the shape of the curve. C is a constant introduced while solving Equation (3.1).
AML model assumes a symmetrical vulnerability discovery rate as shown by the dotted curve
in Figure 3.2 (a). Although the AML model has been found to fit real data of many software
systems, there is no compelling reason why the rise and fall should be symmetric since they may
be controlled by different factors. Some datasets do show a noticeable asymmetry [32]. These
findings violate the symmetric assumption made by this model. Thus, looking for alternative
VDMs that can deal with this trend is needed.
Actual data can show a departure from the s-shape assumed by the logistic model. In many
cases, a software system gradually evolves as code is modified or patched or additional code is
added. This will inject new vulnerabilities into the system which will delay the onset of saturation.
In many cases, a new version is widely anticipated and is adapted by many users soon after its
release. This will result in the learning period to shrink or even disappear. In the next section we
consider the Folded VDM that offers the capability of modeling the behavior when the learning
period is very small.
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3.4 Asymmetrical Folded VDM
The normal distribution is symmetric around its mean and is defined for a random variable that
takes values from −∞ to +∞. In some cases, a distribution is needed that has no negative val-
ues. Daniel [41] had proposed a half-normal distribution that folds the normal distribution at the
mean that now corresponds to value zero. A more general version of it was proposed by Leone et
al. [42] which is termed a Folded normal distribution that is defined for a random variable taking
values between 0 and +∞. It is obtained by folding the negative values into the positive side of
the distribution. Whenever measurements of a normally distributed random variable are taken and
the algebraic sign is discarded, the resulting distribution will be a Folded distribution. The folded
distribution has been found usable in industrial practices such as measurement of flatness, straight-
ens, and determination of the centrality of the sprocket holes in motion picture film [42]. The
probability density function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the distribution
are both derived from their counterparts in the normal distribution, pdf and cdf.
The Folded distribution, as applied to vulnerability discovery, is illustrated in Figure 3.2 (b).
The vulnerability discovery starts at time t = 0 which corresponds to the release time of the soft-
ware. Since the initial value is non-zero because of the contribution of folding, the learning period
is minimized as shown in Figure 3.2. Hence, here, we propose the Folded VDM as an asymmet-
rical model as suggested by Kim [30]. The proposed vulnerability discovery rate of the Folded













 , t > 0 (3.3)
Here, t represents the calendar time, τ is a location parameter, is a scale parameter, and γ repre-
sents the number of vulnerabilities that will be eventually discovered. The second term in Equation
(3.3) represents the part of the distribution folded to the positive side as shown in Figure 3.2 (b)
which shows the discovery process for the Folded VDM. The cumulative number of vulnerabilities
















, t > 0 (3.4)
where erf() is the error function which is used to calculate the integral from zero. Figure 3.3
shows the cumulative Folded vulnerability discovery process along with the behavior of AML.
Figure 3.3 also shows the lack of the learning phase for the Folded model. Compared to AML, the
Figure 3.3: General cumulative vulnerability discovery trends
Folded VDM has shorter learning phase or missing learning phase which makes the normal distri-
bution asymmetric. It results in a higher discovery rate at the beginning which may be especially
applicable to the cases where Ω(t) plot is linear even at the beginning.
3.5 Model comparisons and observations
We have fitted the AML and Folded VDMs to the four datasets: Windows 7, OSX 5.x, Apache
Web Server 2.0.x, and Internet Explorer 8. Table 3.1 shows released dates, market shares and the
number of vulnerabilities in each system. These software systems have been chosen because they
have relatively short learning phase, and thus they can be used to test whether the proposed Folded
model is capable of capturing the learningless vulnerability discovery trend. Figure 3.3 shows
model fittings for the two VDMs on the four datasets. While visually both models appear to fit
well, in the next section we analyze the goodness of fit by evaluating the p-values.
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Table 3.1: Datasets Used
Released *Vuln. Share(%)
Win 7 2009-JUL 80 **25.11
OSX5.x 2007-OCT 211 **1.30
Apache 2.0.x 2000-MAR 68 ***62.71
IE 8 2009-MAR 72 **33.06
*http://nvd.nist.gov/ on JAN 2011. Only after the released date.
**http://marketshare.hitslink.com/ on APR 2011.
***http://news.netcraft.com/ on May 2011. For total version.
Table 3.2: χ2 Goodness of fit tests
AML Folded
A B C p-value τ σ γ p-value
Win 7 2.52E-03 96.75671 0.148963 0.6970 0.063742 11381.63 64427.18 0.9673
OSX5.x 7.49E-04 206.8057 0.064464 0.9845 0.063742 1969.209 15029.21 0.9428
Apache 2.0.x 9.88E-04 62.69023 0.113327 1.0000 0.065227 47.81145 66.26354 1.0000
IE 8 3.22E-03 73.39949 0.185473 0.7337 0.065227 97.30989 407.1494 0.9839
3.5.1 Goodness of Fit analysis
Table 3.2 shows the model parameters along with the p-values of χ2 goodness of fit tests. The






where oi and ei are the observed and expected values at i
th time point respectively. The null
hypothesis for the test is that the actual distribution is well described by model fittings. Hence, in
Table 3.2, p-value close to 1 means good model fitting whereas less than 0.05 is considered as not
being statistically significant when we select the level as 0.05.
Figure 3.4 suggests that all the datasets show linear discovery trends for the period examined
and either do not have a learning phase or it is very short. The main reason for linearity in the
early part can be because of quick adoption of the version considered as a result of the anticipation
of the release. Both the users and the vulnerability finders are not waiting for the software to
become sufficiently popular, they take it for granted that it will be. During the later part, the linear
behavior could be that since the systems are continually evolving, new code is being injected time
to time which introduces additional vulnerabilities. The saturation phases would not be seen in the
20
vulnerability discovery process for such systems until they stop evolving. In general, we observed




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Model fitting for AML and Folded VDMs
P-values in Table 3.2 indicate that all the model fittings are statistically significant since p-
value is greater than 0.05. Windows 7 and Internet Explorer 8 fit the Folded model better whereas
AML fits OSX 5.x slightly better. Apache 2.0.x data fits both models very well with p-value 1.
However, visual inspection tells that Folded model performs better at the beginning and the end
of the time period. Folded model provides p-values which are consistently greater than 0.9 while
AML has a lower value in the two cases.
3.5.2 Prediction capabilities
The main use of a model is predicting the future trends based on the available data, rather
than reviewing the past behavior. In that sense, prediction capability should be considered more
important than model fitting. Models having good fitting results may not necessarily possess good
prediction abilities of the process behavior changes with time.
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We use two normalized prediction capability measures [43], Average Error (AE) and Average
Bias (AB), as given in Equation (3.5) and (3.6) respectively. AE is a measure of how well a model
predicts throughout the time period, and AB indicates the general bias of the model which assesses















In the equations, n is a total number of time points (in months in this case), and Ω is the actual
number of total vulnerabilities. Ωt is the estimated number of total vulnerabilities at time t. The
normalized prediction error values for each time point are plotted in Figure 3.5. The x-axis rep-
resents the time as a percentage where 0% and 100% correspond to the release date and the final










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Prediction errors for AML and Folded VDMs
The error plots in Figure 3.5 show that the Folded model provides a more stable prediction
with a significantly less error in most situations. In Table 3.3, the AB and AE values show that
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Table 3.3: Average Bias and Average Error (% Time: 0% ∼ 100%)
AB AE
AML Folded AML Folded
Win 7 -0.45222 -0.13405 0.452221 0.134048
OSX5.x -0.14514 0.081817 0.145141 0.096575
Apache,2.0.x -29.6239 -17.7062 29.62394 28.87495
IE 8 -0.27722 -0.09876 0.320391 0.121494
the Folded model almost always performs better than AML. For Windows 7, OSX 5.x and Internet
Explorer 8, Folded model outperformed the AML. For Apache 2.0.x, the two models result in
somewhat similar outcomes for the AE value.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This research examines a new vulnerability discovery model based on the folded normal dis-
tribution and evaluates its applicability using real datasets for four major software products. It also
compares the new proposed model with the symmetrical AML vulnerability discovery model.
Software developers need to estimate the resources needed for development of patches for the
vulnerabilities that are likely to be found in future. A quick patch release after the discovery of a
vulnerability will significantly reduce the security risk to the organizational and individual users.
An organization needs to assess the resources needed to address future vulnerabilities; including
the patch application effort and reserve resources needed to alleviate the impact of possible intru-
sions. Both of these require the use of a vulnerability discovery model that can make sufficiently
accurate vulnerability discovery rate projections.
The AML model is the only model that has been formulated to specifically describe the discov-
ery process. The fitting and prediction capability of the AML model has been found to be better
than other models for most datasets. However, it has also been found that the discovery trends can
be different in different circumstances. In one hand, for the software systems that has been in the
market for long period of time, their behavior has been found to be better described by symmetric
models such as AML logistic model which exhibits both learning and a saturation phases in addi-
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tion to the linear phase. On the other hand, some systems have a vulnerability discovery rate that
tends to be linear from the beginning and thus lack a learning phase.
In this research, we have formally defined and investigated the Folded vulnerability discovery
model based on folded normal distribution which is asymmetric by definition and can represent a
learningless discovery process. Its model fitting and prediction capabilities have been tested and
com-pared with the AML model for four popular software systems. While both Folded and AML
models have been found to fit the vulnerabilities datasets of Windows 7, OSX 5.x, Apache Web
server 2.0.x and Internet Explorer 8 well, they differ significantly in the prediction capability. The
short learning phase is apparently captured by the Folded model much better than the AML logistic
model for the four datasets. The folded model consistently outperforms the AML model in terms
of the prediction capabilities for the datasets with no learning phase.
The Folded model needs to be further investigated by applying it to as many software systems as
possible and comparing it with other competing models. That will allow development of guidelines






This chapter shows how the risk of individual vulnerability discovery can be assessed. As dif-
ferent vulnerabilities have different opportunity of being discovered based on their properties such
as access complexity, in this chapter we proposes a novel approach to estimate time to discovery
using Time To Vulnerability Disclosure (TTVD). TTVD is the time taken from when the version
containing the vulnerability was first released until the time a vulnerability is discovered and hence
disclosed to the public. TTVD can be influenced by extrinsic factors such as discoverers’ skills and
effort and/or intrinsic attributes of a vulnerability and types. We investigate 799 reported vulner-
abilities of Google Chrome. The vulnerabilities rewards program (VRP) data of Google Chrome
provide us insight into the effect of effort and skills on the TTVD. We also consider 156 reported
vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server that does not use VRP. We examine the relationship of
TTVD with CVSS Base metrics and vulnerabilities’ types to capture the intrinsic characteristics
of a vulnerability. We assess the individual and the combined relationships of those metrics with
TTVD using Spearman correlation and machine learning models such as decision trees, neural
networks, support vector regressions, relevance vector machines, and Gaussian processes.
4.1 Introduction
Assessing the risk presented by a software vulnerability is very important for decision makers
(including development, assurance, and business) to prioritize their actions. Risk models such as
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [5] and Common Weakness Scoring System
(CWSS) [6] assess a vulnerability risk based on the likelihood of vulnerability discovery and ex-
ploitation and the impact. However, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [4] Base
score does not consider the likelihood of vulnerability discovery and it assumes the vulnerability
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as already being discovered and it only considers the likelihood of vulnerability exploitation and
the impact. Considering the likelihood of vulnerability discovery, however, is important when the
vulnerability is only known to developers at the time of discovery and the developers may choose
to increase the priority of vulnerabilities that are most likely to be discovered. OWASP and CWSS
subjectively estimate the likelihood of vulnerability discovery based on discoverers’ needed skills
and effort and the availability of source code.
In this research, we propose a quantitative metric termed Time To Vulnerability Disclosure
(TTVD). TTVD is the time taken from when the software has first been released until the time a
vulnerability is disclosed to the public. Arbaugh et al. [44] have proposed a vulnerability lifecycle
model and have identified all possible states (from birth:after software is released, to death: after
the vulnerability is patched) that a vulnerability can enter during its lifetime. Frei et al. in [45, 46]
have extended the proposed model in [44] and have used it to quantify the risk of vulnerability
exposure period in three levels: black, gray and white. However, neither Arbaugh nor Frei have
investigated or measured the TTVD.
TTVD can be influenced by extrinsic factors such as discoverers’ skills and effort and/or in-
trinsic attributes of a vulnerability and types. We examine 799 reported vulnerabilities of Google
Chrome. The vulnerabilities rewards program (VRP) data for Google Chrome can provide us
insight into the effect of effort and skills on the TTVD. Besides, we consider 156 reported vul-
nerabilities of Apache HTTP server that does not use VRP. We also examine the relationship of
TTVD with CVSS Base metrics (Base metrics capture the intrinsic characteristics of a vulnerabil-
ity [4]) and with vulnerabilities’ types. We assess the individual and the combined relationships of
those metrics and the types with TTVD using Spearman correlation and machine learning models
such as decision trees, neural networks, support vector regressions, relevance vector machines, and
Gaussian processes.
TTVD depends on the likelihood of a vulnerability being discovered. Thus, knowing TTVD
can be used in quantitatively assessing the likelihood of vulnerability discovery. The actual dis-
covery date, however, is not usually reported to the public. According to [45], few sources such
as Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) and the security bulletins of commercial vul-
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nerability markets provide information, such as time of vendor notification and time of purchase,
that can be used to derive the disocvery date. First, OSVDB is no longer supported and second,
the security bulletins of commercial vulnerability markets only contain the time a vulnerability is
reported to the vendor and not the actual discovery date [47]. Besides, our source of the studied
data, NVD, does not provide information about the vulnerability discovery date.This requires us
alternative approaches to find the date of discovery. In most of the cases, the disclosure date will be
around 60 days after the vendor notifaction date. Frei et al. in [46] have stated that the vulnerability
disclosure date implies its discovery.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, the related work are discussed. In the
next section, the TTVD and its related topics such as vulnerability lifecycle, software release date,
vulnerability disclosure date, and influential factors of TTVD are introduced . In Section 4.3, the
evaluation and the results of the TTVD are presented. Section 4.4 presents the discussion. Finally,
concluding comments is given along with the issues that need further research.
4.2 Related Work
Schneier [48] have identified the window of exposure that a vulnerability presents when exists
in a software. Arbaugh et al. [44], have suggested a vulnerability lifecycle model and using
three vulnerabilities, they measured the number of intrusions during vulnerability lifecycle. Frei
et al. [45, 46], extended Arbaugh et al.’s model and using more than 80000 vulnerabilities, they
identified and measured three types of risk exposures in black, gray, and white. However, None of
these previous works consider investigating or measuring TTVD.
McQueen et al. [47] have defined 0-Day vulnerability and analyzed its lifespans. They have
defined the 0-Day lifespan as the time from the vulnerability discovery date to the public disclosure
date. They were only able to identify the actual vulnerability discovery dates for 15 vulnerabili-
ties that were provided to them by a researcher. They also compared CVSS Base score to mean
lifespan. However, in this study, we consider TTVD starting from the vulnerability birth date and
we do not only correlate TTVD with CVSS Base score but also with the individual CVSS Base
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metrics and the vulnerability type. We also study the effect of the vulnerability reward programs
on the TTVD.
Joh and Malaiya [49] formally defined a risk measure. They utilized the vulnerability lifecycle
and applied Markov stochastic model to measure the likelihood of vulnerability exploitability.
They also used the impact related metrics of CVSS to estimate the exploitability impact. However,
Joh and Malaiya did not take into consideration of TTVD.
Sommestad et al. [50], and Holm et al. [51], studied the effort required to discover a software
vulnerability. They used expert estimates on vulnerability discovery effort using Cook’s classical
method. Finifter et al. [52], examined the characteristics of Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox
vulnerability reward programs (VRPs). The authors found that VRPs improved the likelihood of
finding latent vulnerabilities. Younis et al. [10], used VRPs as a ground truth to assess the CVSS
Base metrics. In this study, however, we examine VRP data of Google Chrome to have an insight
into the effect of the discoverers’ effort and skills on the TTVD.
OWASP [5] and CWSS [6] consider assessing the likelihood of vulnerability discovery. Both
of them assess the likelihood of vulnerability discovery subjectively based on the attacker skills,
effort, and the availability of the source code. In this research, we propose a quantitative measure
for the likelihood of vulnerability discovery using TTVD.
4.3 Time-To-Vulnerability-Disclosure (TTVD)
TTVD is the time taken from when the software has first been released until the time a vulner-
ability is disclosed to the public. Our approach of measuring TTVD is based on the vulnerability
lifecycle. A vulnerability is created as a result of a coding or specification mistake. A vulnerability
lifecycle is a model that describes the states that a vulnerability can enter during its lifetime [44].
Figure. 4.1 shows a vulnerability lifecycle states: birth, discovery, and a discovery may be fol-
lowed by any of following: internal disclosure, patch, exploit/script or public disclosure. More
details about the vulnerability lifecycle can be found in [44] and [45]. The birth of the vulnerabil-
ity is defined to start after the software is released or deployed. TTVD can be measured as shown
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Figure 4.1: Vulnerability Lifecycle
below:
TTV D = V ulnerabilityDisclosureDate−
ReleaseDateoftheF irstAffectedV ersion (4.1)
Therefore, measuring TTVD requires determining the first affected software release date and the
vulnerability discovery date. The following subsections will explain this in details.
4.3.1 Software Release Date
Frei et al. [45] indicated that the time of a vulnerability birth can be determined by looking
back at the history of the vulnerability after its discovery or disclosure. However, the authors
did not take that into consideration. In this work, we determine the vulnerability birth date and
use it to measure TTVD. The vulnerability birth date is determined by finding the release date
of the first affected software version. In order to find the release date, we first find the affected
software versions. After that, we determine the release date of the first affected version. The
National vulnerability DataBase (NVD) [16] records the version information of the software that is
affected by a vulnerability. We have noticed, however, that some vulnerabilities do not have version
information. Table 4.1 shows a list of Chrome versions affected by CVE-2014-1702 vulnerability
provided by NVD. Due to the page limitation, we only show 3 affected versions out of a 107.
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Table 4.1: Products Affected By CVE-2014-1702
# Vendor Product Version
1 Google Chrome 33.0.1750.0
2 Google Chrome 33.0.1750.38
3 Google Chrome 33.0.1750.146
After sorting this list, we have found out that the Chrome version 33.0.1750.0 is the first af-
fected one. However, until the date of this paper, NVD does not provide information about the date
of the affected software versions. To determine the date of the affected version, we used the release
date information found in [53] and [54] for Chrome and in [55] and [56] for Apache HTTP server.
Table 4.2 shows some samples of how the date of the affected software has been determined.
Table 4.2: First Affected Software Release Date






4.3.2 Vulnerability Disclosure Date
Vulnerability disclosure date (VDD) is the date on which the vulnerability is first released to
the public [45]. Acording to the Orginzation for Internet Safety [57], the disclosure time can
take 30 calendar days after the notification date. Besides, CERT (Computer Emergency Readiness
Team) [58] has stated that vulnerabilities reported to them will be disclosed to the public 45 days
after the initial report (regardless of the existence or availability of patches or workarounds from
affected vendors). CERT also has stated that for difficult vulnerabilities to remediate, extension
may be granted. In addition, Google [59] suggests that 60 days is a reasonable upper bound for a
genuinely critical issues in widely deployed software. In most of the cases, the disclosure date will
be around 60 days after the vendor notification date.
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4.3.3 Influential Factors of TTVD
TTVD can be influenced by extrinsic factors such as discoverers’ skills and efforts and/or
intrinsic attributes of a vulnerability and types. To capture the effects of the discoverers’ skills and
effort, we use vulnerabilities rewards program (VRP). VRPs are programs adopted by software
vendors to pay security researchers, ethical hackers and enthusiasts for exchange of discovering
vulnerabilities in their software [52]. Zhao et al. [60], found a significant positive correlation
between the monetary incentive and the number of vulnerabilities reported. The VRP data for
Google Chrome has been used so an insight into the effects of efforts and skills on the TTVD may
be provided. Besides, to examine the effects when the VRP is not used on TTVD, we consider
Apache HTTP server data.
To capture the effects of intrinsic attributes of a vulnerability, we use CVSS Base score [4].
The Base score captures the intrinsic and fundamental characteristic of a vulnerability. CVSS
Base score measures severity based on exploitability (the ease of exploiting a vulnerability) and
impact (the effects of exploitation). Here, we use the overall Base score values and the values of
the Base score individual metrics. The Base score individual metrics include the exploitability and
impact metrics. The exploitability metrics are access vector, access complexity, and authentication.
Whereas the impact metrics are confidentiality (CI), integrity (II), and availability (AI) metrics.
The CVSS Base score assigns a score in the range between 0.0 and 10.0. CVSS score from 0.0
to 3.9 corresponds to Low severity, from 4.0 to 6.9 to Medium severity and 7.0 to 10.0 to High
severity.
Hafiz and Fang [61] showed that some types of the vulnerabilities are harder to detect and
require more efforts than the others. To capture the effects of vulnerability types on TTVD, we
identify vulnerabilities types for every vulnerability using the Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) [20] provided by the NVD.
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4.4 Evaluation and Results
In this section, we present the results of measuring and analyzing TTVD. To measure and
analyze TTVD, 799 reported vulnerabilities of Google Chrome during the period 2007 to Februrary
2016 and 156 reported vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server during the period 1999 to Februrary
2016 were collected from NVD [16] as shown in Table 4.3. It should be noted that we were not
able to find the release date for 369 vulnerabilities of Chrome. Besides, we could not find rewards
information for 72 vulnerabilities of Chrome because of the unauthorized access permission, “you
are not authorized to access this data.” Besides, we could not find the release date and version
information for 27 vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server.







Chrome 1240 2007 - Feb 2016 799
Apache 183 1999 - Feb 2016 156
Table 4.4 shows the data used to measure the TTVD. From the NVD, we obtained the vulner-
ability release date and the affected software version. As the NVD does not provide information
about the release dates for the affected versions, we used the release date data found in [53] and
[54] for Chrome and in [55] and [56] for Apache HTTP server. Using the YEARFRAC function
in [62], we calculated the TTVD.




























Table 4.5: The Attributes of the Examined Vulnerabilities
For every vulnerability that has its TTVD measured, we collected its CVSS Base score and
individual metric values and types from the NVD for the both selected software. However, the
rewards data for Chrome were collected as follows. For every existing link in NVD to Chrome bug
database, we collected the assigned vulnerability’s rewards data from Chrome bug repository [63].
We have found that the VRP data in the Chrome bug database have started to be recorded starting
2010. Table 4.5 shows a part of the attributes of the selected vulnerabilities (the first two vulnera-
bilities are for Apache and the second two are for Chrome). CVSS Base score is the severity score
of a vulnerability. The exploitabiloity metrics are access vector (AV), access complexity (AC), au-
thentication (AU). The impact metrics are confidentiality (C), integrity (I), and availability (AV).
The CWE assigns a number for the vulnerabilities’ type.
4.4.1 Datasets Analysis
Figure. 4.2 shows the description of the CVSS Base score data and the access complexity. We
have found that the access vector and authentication values are almost constant for Chrome and
Apache and thus we did not show their descriptions. For Chrome, only four vulnerabilities out of
799 require local access and the rest requires network access whereas one vulnerability requires
a single authentication. For Apache, 23 vulnerabilities out of 156 require local access and the re-
maining requires network access whereas only three vulnerabilities require a single authentication.
As can be seen from Figure. 4.2, there are more medium severity vulnerabilities for Apache
and almost the same number of medium and high severity vulnerabilities for Chrome. Besides, for
both software, there are more ease to access vulnerabilities (low access complexity) and few hard
to access vulnerabilities (high access complexity) for both software. We have noticed that when the
access complexity is low, the low and high impact percentage for both software are almost the same
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whereas the medium impact percentage for Chrome is 64.63% compared to 22.22% for Apache.
In addition, when the access complexity is medium, the low impact percentage for Apache is about
68.75% whereas in Chrome the low and medium impact percentage are almost the same and the

































Figure 4.2: CVSS Base scores and Access Complexity Values
This observation can be also captured when considering the individual metrics values of the
impact as shown in Figure. 4.3. As can be seen, there are more partial impact values for Chrome
vulnerabilities than none values whereas there are almost the same number of partial and none val-
ues for Apache vulnerabilities. However, we have also noticed that the majority of the exploitabil-




None	 88 83 57
Partial	 56 61 78
Complete 12 12 21
Imapct:	Apache	 HTTP	Server
C I A
None 182 158 147
Partial 508 534 543
Complete 109 107 109
Impact:	Chrome
Figure 4.3: Impact Metrics Values for C, I, and A
Figure. 4.4 shows the vulnerability types for both datasets. Only 41.66% (65 out of 156) of
the Apache vulnerabilities have been assigned CWE type by NVD, whereas only 75.46% (603
out of 799) of the Chrome vulnerabilities have CWE number assigned. We have noticed that all
vulnerability types of Apache dataset are similar to the vulnerability types of Chrome. On the other
hand, there are 19 different types of vulnerabilities in Chrome. It should be noted that the types
in Figure. 4.4 are ordered from bottom to top. The following vulnerability types are just found
in Chrome: CWE-17: Code,CWE-19: Data handling, CWE-22: Path traversal, CWE-59: Link
following, CWE-254 : Security feature, CWE-287: Improper authentication, CWE-289: Improper
access control. However, we have noticed that the vulnerabilities types CWE-399, CWE-20, CWE-
264, CWE-119, CWE-189, and CWE-79 are the commonly found types in both datasets.
Figure. 4.5 shows the amount of the reward and their frequency. Out of the 799 vulnerabilities,
335 vulnerabilities have been rewarded. It should be noted that the not rewarded vulnerabilities are
most likely have been discovered by internal discoverers (41.92%) whereas the rewarded vulnera-
bilities have been discovered by external discoverers (58.07%) [52]. As can be seen, around 195
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Figure 4.5: Chrome Rewarded Vulnerabilities
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4.4.2 TTVD Relationships Analysis and Evaluation
In this subsection, we present the relationships analysis of the TTVD with the considered at-
tributes. We first assess the individual relationships of CVSS Base metrics and types with TTVD
using Spearman correlation. The reason we chosen to use Spearman is that one variable (TTVD)
is continuous whereas the other variables are either on an ordinal or categorical scales. The re-
sult of the correlation measurement is represented by r an p values. The r value represents the
strength of the correlation whereas the p value shows the significant of the correlation. The corre-
lation is considered significant if the p value is less than 0.05. We then us machine learning models
such as decision trees, neural networks, support vector regressions, relevance vector machines, and
Gaussian processes to examine the selected attributes relationships when they are combined. The
decision trees have been selected because they provide information about each factor’s contribution
on predictions and this helps to interpret a tree to make different levels of predictions. We have
chosen the other regression models because they provide a relatively higher predictive accuracy
with nonlinear approximation. After that, we examine the relationships between vulnerabilities
types and TTVD and analyze the effects of the VRP on the TTVD.
Individual Attributes
We expect to find the vulnerabilities that have a high CVSS Base score severity (easy to exploit
and has a sever exploitation impact) to have a significant short TTVD with a p value less than 0.05.
The results show that the overall Base score values do not have a significant correlation with TTVD
for both datasets, Apache (r= -0.085, p= 0.288) Chrome (r= 0.007, p= .834). We have also looked
at the differences in the means of the Base score and the TTDV. The results show no noticeable
difference, Apache (mean when the score is L= 3.275, M= 4.674, High= 4.484), Chrome (mean:
L= 0.6243, M= 0.2356, High= 0.2465).
We also examined the correlation between the exploitability and the impact individual val-
ues and TTVD. We also expect to find a vulnerability with a high exploitability or impact values
to have a significant short TTVD. The overall impact values have no significant correlation with
TTVD, Apache (r= 0.112 ,p= 0.165), Chrome (r= 0.02557355, p= 0.4704). On the other hand, the
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results show a significant negative correlation between the explotability and TTVD for both soft-
ware, Apache ()r= -0.2711113, p= 0.000619), Chrome (r= -0.163, p= 0.00000369). The negativity
explains that the higher the exploitability value, the easier the exploitation of the vulnerability.
After looking at the exploitability factor data, we have found that the authentication and ac-
cess vector metrics are constant whereas the access complexity shows variability. Therefore, we
only examine the correlation between the access complexity and the TTVD. We expect to find a
vulnerability with a low access complexity to have a significant short TTVD. The results show
a significant positive correlation between the access complexity and TTVD for both software,
Apache (r= 0.307, p= 0.0000973) and Chrome (r= 0.1767618, p= 0.000000495).
We also examined the correlation between the impact factor metrics and TTVD. We expect
to find a vulnerability with a partial or complete values of the confidentiality, integrity, or avail-
ability to have a significant short TTVD. The results show only a significant positive correlation
between the confidentiality and TTVD for Chrome dataset (r= 0.0729 , p= 0.000000495) and a
significant positive correlation between the integrity and TTVD for Apache dataset (r= 0.1826154
, p= 0.0.0225).
Figure. 4.6 shows the relationship between every vulnerability type and TTVD. The vulnera-
bilities types of Chrome are numbered from 1 to 19 based on the order in Figure. 4.4 from bottom
to top. Looking at the Chrome Boxplot, we can see that vulnerabilities types (1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11,
and 13 to 19) are found in a very short time. On the other hand, the other 6 types (2, 4, 5, 6, 9, and
12) have more noticeable TTVD variability. Figure. 4.6 also shows the relationship between every
vulnerability type and TTVD of Apache HTTP server dataset. The vulnerability types of Apache
are also numbered based on the order in Figure. 4.4 from bottom to top. Vulnerabilities of types 1
to 4 have been found in a relatively short time compared to the others, whereas vulnerabilities of
type 7 and 12 have the most TTVD variability. We have noticed that the same vulnerabilities types
that takes more TTVD in Apache are taking less TTVD in Chrome.
Figure. 4.7 shows the TTVD for Apache and Chrome. It should be noted that Chrome has
been using vulnerability reward program (VRP) since 2010. The effect of the VRP is noticeable
on TTVD. The mean for Apache TTVD is 4.512 and the maximum TTVD is 17.570, whereas the
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Figure 4.6: Chrome and Apache HTTP Server Vulnerabilities Types and TTVD
mean TTVD for Chrome is 0.2438 (around three months, 0.2438 * 12(months)) and the maximum
TTVD is 3.6580. Due to the difference in the release dates (Apache in 1998 and Chrome in
2008) and the date the Chrome starts using of the VRP, we also compared the TTVD of the two
datasets only from 2010 onward. The Boxplot looks very similar to the one in Figure. 4.7 and the
descriptive statics are as follows. The mean for Apache TTVD is 7.157 and the maximum TTVD
is 13.230, whereas for Chrome the mean and the the maximum TTVD are respectively 0.2173 and
3.6580.
We have also considered the difference between the TTVD for rewarded vulnerabilities and
not rewarded vulnerabilities and the results are shown in Figure. 4.8. We have noticed that the
rewarded vulnerabilities have smaller TTVD. The mean and the maximum TTVD for rewarded
and rewarded vulnerabilities are respectively 0.1 and 1.7 and 0.2, 3.7.
Combined Attributes
To examine the correlation between the considered attributes and TTVD, we apply the men-
tioned above regression models. It should be noted that we are using the machine learning models
to assess the correlation of the selected attributes when they are combined and for now, we are not
focusing on building a model or making a prediction. The regression test uses eight features: CVSS





































Figure 4.8: Comparing TTVD for Rewarded and Not Rewarded Vulnerabilities
and on availability, and the type of vulnerabilities. Each categorical input is transformed corre-
sponding discrete numerical values for mathematical regression models. It should be also noted
that there are overlaps on the inputs (109 unique inputs out of 799 samples in Chrome dataset and
63 unique inputs out of 156 samples in Apache dataset). In other words, there are multiple out-
puts (TTVD) for the same inputs (the selected features). In addition, we did not include the VRP
(which repents the discoverers’ individual expertise or efforts). Table 4.6 shows the 10-fold cross
validation result on Chrome and Apache data sets. Decision tree and Gaussian process show the
best performance for both datasets.
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Table 4.6: The Best Testing RMSE with Each Algorithm
Tree NNet RVM SVR GP
Chrome 12.09 12.58 12.3 12.81 12.38
Apache 33.56 37.76 35.74 37.4 31.94
Interestingly, simple decision tree (CART) can make an equivalent prediction to other algo-
rithms. As can be seen from the residual plots in Figure. 4.9, the large error is produced because of
the outliers and it captures majority of points with mean prediction over evenly distributed residual
space.
Apache Chrome
Figure 4.9: Residual Plots of the Decision Tree Fit on Chrome and Apache Datasets.
Figure. 4.10 shows the generated decision trees that give us a further reasoning analysis. First,
the decision tree shows us that trees are split majorly by CVSS Base score and the type of vulnera-
bilities with a bit contribution from access complexity and integrity impact. Interestingly, when the
CVSS Base score was considered individually, it did not show a significant correlation. Chrome
TTVD estimation tree uses the Base score as a root to determine the TTVD while Apache esti-
mation tree uses the vulnerability type as a root node. It should be noted that whenever the types
lees or great then is encountered, that means less or greater than the order of the vulnerabilities
types mentioned in Figure. 4.6. Based on the CEW number, the type in the decision tree can be
determined.
Figure. 4.11 shows the neural network and its weights. The row index from 0 to 7 represents
















































































































Figure 4.10: Top 3 Levels of the Decision Trees
impact on confidentiality (C), impact on integrity (I), impact on availability (A), and the type of
vulnerabilities respectively. The 2 columns and 5 columns represent corresponding hidden units.
We observe similar factoring from neural network weights. In Chrome data, the weights for the
CVSS Base score (first row in the image) have the higher value than the other attributes and the
weights for the vulnerability type have a relatively strong values. Here, we observe higher weight
values in 1st and 4th hidden units, although it is not presented here, the output layer enforces more
on 2nd and 3rd layer. Thus, eventually the Base score contributes more on the final prediction.
4.4.3 Threat to validity
In this paper, we have considered the datasets for only two products, the Apache HTTP server
and Google Chrome. However, they are both very significant examples. The Apache HTTP server
has 183 vulnerabilities belonging to different categories. Besides, the lines of the code varies be-
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Apache Chrome
Figure 4.11: First layer neural network weights
tween 50,712 LOC to 358,633 LOC. Chrome has larger number of vulnerabilities, more than 1200.
Its size in the lines of the code is 4,490,488 LOC. It also has a greater variety of vulnerabilities.
We are aware that the vulnerabilities release date provided by NVD does not reflect the actual
disclosure date to the public. We are not aware of any other data sources that provide reliable and
complete date on the actual disclosure or the discovery date.
4.5 Discussions
We noticed that many vulnerabilities have a low access complexity values and few have a high
access complexity values. The low access complexity value can be explained by two facts. First,
the vulnerabilities discoverers and the techniques they use are able to find the low hanging fruit
first (easy to access vulnerabilities). Second, base on our work [10], we realized that more rewards
are paid when a proof of concept about exploiting a vulnerability is provided and thus the low
access complexity vulnerabilities are relatively easier to be proved. For having a few high access
complexity vulnerabilities, it could be explained by the fact that there are just a few of them or the
current techniques’ coverage levels are not yet ready to reach a deeper to reach vulnerabilities.
We have also noticed that there are more types of vulnerabilities in Chrome than in Apache
HTTP server. One possibility could be because of the VRP. As more eyes are in the code, there is
a higher chance that not only the number of the vulnerabilities will be discovered but also varieties
of types. However, further research is required to investigate this observation. We have also
observed that a specific type of vulnerabilities have a shorter TTVD. Looking at the CEW detailed
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description found in [20], we have found that most of these vulnerabilities have either more than
one methods of detection or have a medium or a high likelihood of exploitability (provided by
CWSS measure [6]). Besides, some vulnerability types have longer TTVD. We have realized that
these vulnerabilities are very popular, so it could be that the developers or testers are aware of them
enough to avoid them during the development phase.
We have also observed that the rewarded vulnerabilities have smaller TTVD. This could be
explained by the fact that VRPs have a larger and diverse groups of security researchers and con-
tributors that outperformed the internal security teams or penetration testing teams [60]. Besides,
we have noticed that almost half of the rewarded vulnerabilities have been paid either 500$ or
1000$. Looking at the point number 3 to 5 under the reward amounts section in [64], we can see
that establishing exploitability or providing a Proof of Concept (PoC) or with a poor quality of
PoC could be the reason. In other words, establishing exploitability worth more than discovering
the vulnerability. We have noticed that there are more medium and high impact percentage for low
and medium access complexity of Chrome dataset. This could be driven by the rewards paid by
Google for more impactfull vulnerabilities.
We have also observed that the CVSS Base scores did not correlate with the TTVD when
considered individually. The authors in [47] have observed the same thing when they compare 0-
Day vulnerability lifespan with CVSS Base score. However, when the CVSS score was combined
with other correlated attributes such as types, access complexity, and some impact metrics, CVSS
Scores have been found indicative. According to Forman [65], a feature (or two features) that is
completely useless by itself (themselves) can be useful when taken with others (together).
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we have introduced a new metric named Time To Vulnerability Disclosure.
We have also examined its relationships with CVSS Base score and its individual metrics as well
as the vulnerabilities types. We have also studied the affect of the presence and the absence of
vulnerability reward program on the TTVD. The results show the importance of the metrics in ex-
plaining the effects of vulnerability rewards program and its potential to be characterized by some
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intrinsic attributes. The machine learning analysis shows that relying on measuring the correlation
of the individual attributes alone is a good thing to be performed first, however, combing several
attributes together could provide insightful results. The results have also open up an avenue for a
future work.
First, the NVD should enhance its data about version information and release dates. The rec-
ommendation provided by Glanz et al. in [66] should be taken into consideration by the NVD.
Even though the vulnerabilities types have shown a great insight, finding a way to order them in a
particular manner is very important for assessing the risk of vulnerability disclosure and discovery.
Third, considering other type of software that use VRPs, such Firefox, and finding a way to include
the VRPs as an attribute is very helpful. Finally, looking for other attributes that can be related to
the TTVD is in the top of the list of our priority.
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Chapter 5
Relationship Between Attack Surface And
Vulnerability Density
This chapter explorers the relationship between attack surface and vulnerability density met-
rics. Finding a relationship could help in assessing the risk of vulnerabilities exploitability risk.
5.1 Introduction
Measurement is considered as powerful technique that can be used to evaluate security to an
optimal level [67]. The Measurement to some security aspect of a system is realized by a metric. A
security metric is a quantifiable measurement that indicates the level of security for a system [67].
Lately, several software security metrics have been proposed, and are still under improvement,
by researchers in academia, industry, and government. Some of those are: relative vulnerability,
static analysis tool effectiveness, attack surface, vulnerability density, flaw severity and severity-to-
complexity, security scoring vector for web applications, and etc. [68]. Each of them is based on its
specific perspective, target, and assumptions and measures different characteristics and properties
of software security. They are mainly used to help decision makers in resource allocation, program
planning, risk assessment, and product and service selection. They also make certain that decisions
are not only based on subjective perceptions.
Essentially, quantifiable security metrics, as in the physical science, are supposed to provide
precise knowledge to decision-makers. However, software is not obedient with the law of physics
and has its own challenges [40]. As security is a software attribute, its measurement is not a
trivial task [69]. According to [70], the lack of validation and comparisons between such metrics
is considered a main challenge, which in turn makes their usability risky. Moreover, there is no
single security metric that can quantify all aspects of security, and hence having a framework that
combines different metrics is an important step toward measuring multiple aspects of security [70].
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The main objective of this research is to understand the nature of those challenges by studying
the relationship between two security metrics namely: attack surface and vulnerability density.
Our choice of these two metrics is based on the following factors. Firstly, the former is already in
use by Microsoft and applied by other major software companies, such as Hewlett-Packard (HP)
and SAP. On the other hand, the latter is selected due to the fact that vulnerability density, as a
normalized metric, allows subsequent releases of varying size to be compared [71]. Thus, this
metric satisfies our objective of comparing the number of vulnerabilities of two different releases
of the same system, Apache HTTP server. Apache has been chosen in particular because it is a
major software component of the internet, has the highest market share among the Http servers
[40], and availability of source code.
P. Manadhata et al. in [72] have investigated the validity of the attack surface metric by relating
the number of vulnerability reports with the attack surface for two FTP Daemons, ProfFTPD and
Wu-FTPD, along the method dimension. They have found that the attack surface of Wu-FTPD
and ProfFTPD related to their reported vulnerabilities, i.e., the former attack surface is larger
than the latter and thus the number of vulnerabilities of the former is larger than the latter. In
their investigation, they applied the attack surface metric to compare the security of two different
systems with the same functionality and then related it to the reported number of vulnerabilities.
However, in our study we apply the attack surface metric to compare the security of two different
versions of the same system and then relate it to their vulnerability density.
Vulnerability density metric was introduced and applied to major operating systems, namely
Microsoft Windows and Read Hat Linux, in [71]. Besides, S. Woo et al in [40] have compared
the vulnerability density of two HTTP web servers: Apache and IIS (Internet Information Service).
In both studies the vulnerability density metric has been found significant and useful. However,
vulnerability density metric has not been applied to subsequent releases of the same system. More-
over, it has not been compared with another security metric. In this study, we compare vulnerability
density metric with the attack surface metric along the method dimension. Besides, we investigate
the visibility of how these two metrics can complement each other.
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5.2 Attack Surface Metric
A systems attack surface is the subset of the systems resources that are used by an adversary
to attack the system [69]. The resources are referred to as methods (e.g., API), channels (e.g.,
sockets), and data items (e.g., input strings). This means that more number of available resources
indicate larger attack surface and hence the system is less secure [73]. Notably, only some of these
resources are considered as part of the attack surface. Moreover, their contribution to the attack
surface measurement is not equal. To the relevant resources to be identified, the entry point and
exit point framework is used [69]. Besides, the resource contribution is estimated using damage
potential and effort ratio [69].
5.2.1 Entry Point and Exit Point Framework
The entry point and exit point framework is a formal framework that defines the set of entry
points and exit points (methods), the set of channels, and the set of untrusted data items from the
source code of a system [69]. Entry and Exit points are the methods that an attacker uses to
either send or receive data from the system [2]. Channels are the means that used by an attacker to
connect to the system [69]. Untrusted data items are the data that the attacker can either send or
receive from the system [69].
A method can be either a direct or indirect entry point and/or a direct or indirect exit point [69].
In one hand, a method is a direct entry point if it receives data directly from the environment; read
method defined in unistd.h in C library is an example [72]. Besides, a method is indirect entry
point if it receives data from direct entry point [69]. On the other hand, a method is a direct exit
point if it sends data directly to the environments system [69]; fprintf method defined in C library
is an example [72]. Moreover, a method is indirect exit point if it sends data to direct exit point
[69].
5.2.2 Damage Potential and Effort Ratio
Damage potential and access effort ratio is an informal means that are used to estimate damage
potential and effort in terms of resources attributes [69]. The damage potential depends on the
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methods privilege, the channels type, and the data items type [74], whereas, the effort depends on
the rights of the resource that the attacker needs to acquire to use a resource in an attack [74]. The










where ac() is the attackability. The user of this metric is responsible for assigning a numeric values
for privilege levels, types of the channel, and types of data items [74]. However, the following
should be taken in considerations: the higher the privilege, channel type, or data item, the higher
the damage potential, whereas the higher the access right the higher the effort [74].
5.2.3 Attack Surface Measurement Method
A system attack surface, for a given system, is measured along three dimensions: method,
channel, and data items as follows:
• The entry and exit points framework is used to identify the set of methods (M), channels (C),
and untrusted data items (I).
• Damage potential and effort ratio means, der(), is used to estimate the total contribution of
the method: derm(m), channel: derc(c), and data items: derd(d).
• The systems attack surface is the triple:
< Σm ∈ Mderm(m),Σc ∈ Cderc(c),Σd ∈ iderd(d) >
5.3 Vulnerability Density Metric
5.3.1 Vulnerability Classification
Distinction among vulnerabilities is advantageous, especially when examining the nature and
extent of the problem is required. It also helps in determining the most effective kinds of protective
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actions. Vulnerability classification is a growing field of research. Several methods of classifica-
tions have been proposed [40]. A vulnerability classification should be considered ideal if it poses
desirable properties such as mutual exclusiveness, clear and unique definition, and coverage of
all software vulnerabilities [40]. Vulnerabilities can be classified based on type, cause, severity,
impact and source, etc. [40].
Nonetheless, the type and severity of vulnerabilities will be the focus of this study. In [40], it
has been observed that the high severity vulnerabilities tend to be discovered and patched earlier
than the medium and low vulnerabilities. On the other hand, two types of vulnerabilities namely:
Authentication Issues and Permission, Privilege, and Access control; are believed to reduce the
attack surface measurement if they are patched [69]. However, we believe not only the type but
also the severity of vulnerabilities might have an effect on the attack surface measurement.
Vulnerability Based on Severity
Severity level of vulnerability indicates how serious the impact of exploitation can be. Three
severity levels are often defined; high, medium and low. However, some other organizations use
three to five levels and use their own definition for severity [40]. The NVD of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology has used Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) metric for
vulnerability severity with ranges from 0.0 to 10.0 [10]; CVSS uses many factors to determine the
severity where the range from 0.0 to 3.9 corresponds to low severity, 4.0 to 6.9 to medium severity
and 7.0 to 10.0 to high severity. The NVD (2010) describes three severity levels as follows:
• High Severity: vulnerabilities make it possible for a remote attacker to violate the security
protection, or permit a local attack that gains complete control, or are otherwise important
enough to have an associated CERT/CC advisory or US-CERT alert.
• Medium Severity: vulnerabilities are those not meeting the definition of either high or low
severity.
• Low Severity: vulnerabilities typically do not yield valuable information or control over a
system but may provide the attacker with information that may help him find and exploit
other vulnerabilities or may be inconsequential for most organizations.
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Vulnerability Based on Type
Vulnerability type in National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is assigned using the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) maintained by the MITRE Corporation [19]. CWE is used as a
classification method to distinguish CVEs by the type of vulnerability they represen. As in the
[16], the type of vulnerabilities that are related to attack surface can be classified into:
• Authentication Issues: failure to properly authenticate users.
• Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control: failure to enforce permissions or other access
restrictions for resources, or a privilege management problem.
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): failure of a site to validate, filter, or encode user input before
returning it to another users web client.
• Format String Vulnerability: the use of attacker-controlled input as the format string param-
eter in certain functions.
• SQL Injection: when user input can be embedded into SQL statements without proper filter-
ing or quoting, leading to modification of query logic or execution of SQL commands.
• OS Command Injections: allowing user-controlled input to be injected into command lines
that are created to invoke other programs, using system () or similar functions.
• Information Leak / Disclosure: exposure of system information, sensitive or private infor-
mation, fingerprinting, etc.
The other CWE types of vulnerabilities which might not be as relate as the above to the attack
surface are: Credentials Management, Buffer Errors, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Crypto-
graphic Issues, Path Traversal, Code Injection, etc. [16].
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5.3.2 Vulnerability Density Metric
Vulnerability density is a measure of the total number of known vulnerabilities, per thousand




Vulnerability density is a normalized measure, given by the number of vulnerabilities per unit
of code size. The size is typically measured either in Lines of Code or the installed system in
bytes. The former has been chosen due to its simplicity and its correspondence to defect density
metric in the software engineering domain. Vulnerability density is used to compare software
systems that come under the same category. It can also be used to estimate the number of residual
vulnerabilities. Assessing the risk can also be achieved by using vulnerability density. Besides,
deciding when to stop testing as well as maintenance planning can be realized using vulnerability
density metric [40].
5.4 Apache HTTP Server
Apache HTTP server is a Web server. It is developed and maintained by an open community
of developers under the auspices of the Apache Software Foundation. Apache HTTP server is
simply a piece of software that responds to requests for information sent by web browsers [75].
It provides information using static HTML pages as well as dynamic and interactive services to
the clients using database queries, executable script, etc. It also supports functions such as serving
streaming media, email, etc. In the presence of the cloud computing systems, it can also support
virtual implementations of applications and operating systems. Apache can support variety of
operating systems such as UNIX, Windows, Linux, Solaris, Novell NetWare, FreeBSD, Mac OS
X, etc.
Apache HTTP server has gone through a number of improvements after its initial launch, which
led to the release of several versions: 1.3.x, 2.0.x, 2.2.x, 2.3.x, and 2.4.x. This verity of releases
has been one of the drivers for choosing it to be our case study. This diversity enables us to observe
the improvement of the security among some of the subsequent releases. Besides, the availability
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Table 5.1: Market share of the top web servers on the Internet
Product Vendor Web Sites,Hosted Percent
Apache Apache 378,267,399 64.91%
IIS Microsoft 84,288,985 14.46%
nginx Igor Sysoev 56,087,776 9.63%
GWS Google 18,936,381 3.25%
of it source code and its usage share were also a choosing factors. According to [76], Apache web
server is used by over 64%, Table 5.1. As Apache HTTP server releases 2.2.x takes more than
88% of the usage share among Apache releases, according to [77], and as there is a reasonable
gap between the releases 2.2.x and 1.3.x, which might help in observing security improvement,
both releases have been chosen for this study. The two main components of Apache web server are
Apache Core and Apache Modules [75]. The former provides the main functionality of Apache
HTTP server such as allocating requests and maintaining and pooling all the connections. On the
other hand, the latter handle the other types of processing the server has to provide; performing
user Authentication.
Apache Core consists of several small components that manage the essential implementation
of Apache web server main functionality. Figure 5.1 depicts the main elements of the Apache
Core and how they interact with each other to provide the required functionalities.
Figure 5.1: Apache HTTP Server Core Components
These components are explained as follows:
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• http protocol.c: it handles the routines that communicate directly with the client by using
the HTTP protocol. It handles the socket connections that the client uses to connect to the
server and it manages data transfer.
• http main.c: it is in charge for the startup of the server, contains the main server loop that
waits for and accepts connections, and manages timeouts.
• http request.c: it deals with the flow of request processing, passing control to the modules
as needed in the right order, and error handling.
• http core.c: it implements serves documents.
• alloc.c: it manages allocating resource pools and keeps track of them.
• http config.c: it provides tasks for other utilities such as reading configuration files, man-
aging the information collected from those files, and aid for virtual hosts.
However, on the other hand, Apache Modules provide additional functionality that extend and
implement the functionality of the Apache HTTP server. Basically, each module is connected to
the Apache core, HTTP REQUEST component, and provides separated functionality. Thus,
no module can progress without sending the information to the HTTP REQUEST component
which in turn checks and handles errors.
5.5 Measuring System Vulnerability
The vulnerability datasets of Apache HTTP server 1.3.x and 2.2.x releases are from NVD. NVD
is maintained by National Institute of Standers and Technology and sponsored by the department
of Home Land Security. Therefore, the unreliability of the datasets is unlikely. The collected
discovered vulnerabilities were of a period from 1999 to 2012. Some of those vulnerabilities were
found to be applicable to two different platforms namely MS-Windows and Linux. Only few were
found to specific to Mac OS.
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Table 5.2: Apache Releases Vulnerabilities
Release Number of Versions New Vulnerabilities Inherited Vulnerabilities Total
1.3.x 47 51 932 983
2.2.x 23 23 415 438
5.5.1 Number of Known Reported Vulnerabilities
The known reported vulnerabilities of Apache web server 1.3 and 2.2 versions are presented in
Figure 5.2. In version 1.3, the numbers of the new vulnerabilities, which have been introduced in
this version, are 18 whereas the number of the inherited vulnerabilities, which have been inherited
from another releases and versions, are 11. However, the total numbers of the new and inherited
vulnerabilities in version 2.2 are 11 for the two of them. As it has been observed in Figure 5.2,
the numbers of the new vulnerabilities of version 1.3 are larger than its counterpart, version 2.2.


























Figure 5.2: Apache HTTP Server Version 1.3 & 2.2 Vulnerabilities
Table 5.2 presents values of number of versions, new and inherited vulnerabilities, and over
all vulnerabilities for two Apache web server releases 1.3.x and 2.2.x. The table shows that the
numbers of the new and inherited vulnerabilities of Apache 1.3.x release are more than half of
2.2.x release. Moreover, the numbers of the inherited vulnerabilities of 1.3.x release and the 2.2.x
release are way larger than the numbers of new vulnerabilities. This could be attributed to the share
of code between successive versions and releases as it has been stated by Kim et al in [78].
The number of the new and inherited vulnerabilities for all versions of Apache release 1.3.x
and 2.2.x are presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. There are forty seven versions for
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Apache 1.3.x release while twenty three for Apache 2.2.x release. It has been noted that the first
two versions for both releases have more new vulnerabilities than the other versions. This is due to
the fact that the data available are for the beta versions. As it can be seen, the successive versions
had significantly less new vulnerability. However, it has been noted that half of the versions in
both releases did not have any new vulnerabilities. This could be due the truth that their market
shares are not as high as the others. Woo et al in [40], have pointed out that higher market share is
one of the most important factors impacting the effort spent in exploring and exploiting potential
vulnerabilities. Surprisingly, it has been observed that some of the inherited vulnerabilities affect





































































































































































































































Figure 5.4: Apache HTTP Server Release 2.2.x Vulnerabilities
Table 5.3 presents known vulnerability density VKD for two versions 1.3 and 2.2 of Apache
web server from two different releases, 1.3.x and 2.2.x. Since the Apache web server is an open-
source project, the source code for the two chosen versions was downloaded from Apache HTTP
server archive download site [79]. The code size for the two selected versions was determined
using SLOCCount tool; a software metrics tool for counting physical source lines of code [80].
The major fractions of the source code of the two versions are C based and this was resolved
using the SLOCCount tool. This is considered helpful since the attack surface metrics is capable
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Table 5.3: New Known Vulnerabilities Density
Application Ksloc Known,vulnerabilities VKD
Apache 1.3 50,712 18 0.000354946
Apache 2.2 222,029 11 4.95E-05
of measuring a C base code as well as Java base code. However, the known vulnerabilities column
gives a recent count of the vulnerabilities found since the release date. Despite having smaller
size than version 2.2, version 1.3 had more number of known vulnerabilities as well as known
vulnerabilities density. Vulnerability Based on Severity and Type
5.5.2 Vulnerability Based on Severity and Type
Figure 5.5 shows the number of vulnerabilities based on their severity for Apache 1.3 and 2.2
versions. While the former had eight vulnerabilities of high severity, the latter did have any. Both
versions had the same number of vulnerabilities of medium severity. However, vulnerabilities of
low severity were not found in version 1.3 whereas only one was found in version 2.2. Overall,
version 1.3 had more fractions of high and medium severity vulnerabilities. This presents a signif-





























Figure 5.5: Apache HTTP Server version 1.3 & 2.2 Vulnerability Severity
Vulnerabilities based on type for Apache HTTP server version 1.3 and 2.2 are presented in Fig-
ure 5.6. Majority of the vulnerabilities for both versions are of types Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
and Information leak. The existence of more vulnerabilities of the type XSS is due to the fact that
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all web servers, application servers, and web application environments are susceptible to it. Even
though DoS vulnerabilities are the most type found in all Apache HTTP version and releases, ver-
sion 1.3 and 2.2 had lesser numbers of them. However, among the discovered vulnerabilities four
DoS vulnerabilities in version 1.3 are high severity vulnerabilities, while three DoS vulnerabilities





























Figure 5.6: Apache HTTP Server version 2.2 Vulnerability Type
The data collected for Apache HTTP server versions, 1.3 and 2.2, and releases 1.3.x and 2.2.x
suggest that the 1.3 version and its release had more vulnerabilities, vulnerability density, and
severity than the version 2.2 and its entire release. Based on this fact, we expect the attack surface,
which we are going to calculate in the next section, for both versions to follow the same patterns.
5.6 Measuring System Attack Surface
In this section, we will measure the attack surface along the method dimension for Apache HTP
Server 1.3 and 2.2 versions. Choosing the method dimension in particular is due to the fact that
attackers can only exploit vulnerability in a method if they can invoke that method either directly
or indirectly. However, measuring the attack surface requires looking at the code base and finding
all places which could be part of the attack surface. By finding such places what is needed next is
classifying each one of them into an attack class. The code bases of the two chosen versions were
obtained from [75].
The entry and exit points along the method dimension have been defined using cflow tool. It
analyzes a code base written in C programming language and produces a graph charting dependen-
cies between various functions [81]. Figure 5.7 shows some sample cflow output from Apache
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HTTP Server version 1.3.0. Before counting each method, functions reachable from the main(), in
the attack surface, the privilege level and access right level of the entry and exit points needed to
be determined and marked.





6					parse_byterange()	<*support	code	 ...	*/int parse_byterange (char	
*range,long clength,long *start,long *end)	at	http_protocol.c:85>
7	 ap_pstrdup()
Figure 5.7: Fractional cflow output from Apache Web Server 1.3.0
Firstly, the privilege of a process runs on a UNIX system can change from one level to the
other using one of uid-setting system call such as setuid. If a process drops it privilege, then every
method that are invoked before the drop of the privilege will have that level of privilege whereas
every method invoked after the drop of the privilege will have the new privilege. Thus, a method
might be counted multiple times, once per each privilege level. The methods in the Apache HTTP
Server version 1.3 and 2.2 run with a root and nobody, www-data, manager.sys, or apache privilege.
Secondly, in order to the access right of a method to be determined, we need to define the
code base where the authentication is presented. Based on that, every method invoked before user
authentication performed has unauthenticated access right while those methods invoked after user
authentication take place has authenticated access right.
As it can be seen in Table 5.4, a value to each privilege level and access right level is assigned
based on our knowledge of Apache HTTP server and Linux (Ubuntu). The number of the direct
entry point and the direct exit point are shown in Table 5.5. Nonetheless, using Tables 5.4 and
5.5, the attackability along the method direction considering the effect of the resources Damage
Potential-Effort Ratio was calculated as shown in Table 5.6. The measure of Apache 1.3 attack
surface along the method dimension is 235.3 whereas the measure of Apache 2.3 along the same
dimension is 207.3.
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Table 5.4: Numeric Values of Privilege & Access Rights
Method Privilege Value Access Rights Value
Root 5 root 5
apache or (www-data or nobody) 3 authenticated 3
authenticated 3 unauthenticated 1
manager.sys 3 anonymous 1
Table 5.5: Direct Entry and Exit Points
Apache 1.3
Privilege Access Right Direct Entry Point Direct Exit Point
root root 4 7
root authenticated 11 6
apache authenticated 10 18
apache unauthenticated 9 15
apache anonymous 2 17
manager.sys authenticated 1 12
Apache 2.2
Privilege Access Right Direct Entry Point Direct Exit Point
root root 1 5
root authenticated 9 14
apache authenticated 7 16
apache unauthenticated 5 23
apache anonymous 3 14
Table 5.6: Attackability Measurements
Code Base Total Contribution of the Methods Total
Apache 1.3 11 (5/5) + 17 (5/3) + 28 (3/3) + 24 (3/1) + 19 (3/1) + 13 (3/1)= 35.3
Apache 2.2 6 (5/5) + 23 (5/3) + 23 (3/3) + 28 (3/1) + 7 (3/1) = 207.3
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5.7 Observations
The total numbers of vulnerabilities as well as vulnerability density for Apache HTTP Server
version 1.3 and its attack surface (Entry/Exit points along the method dimension) have been found
to be more than those in Apache HTTP Server version 2.2. This result suggests that the number of
vulnerability and vulnerability density seems to have correlation with that attack surface. Besides,
knowing the type and severity of vulnerabilities could guide and simplify the process of the attack
surface measurement. Moreover, knowing the attack points of a system could help developers to
verify that those parts of the code have no exploitable vulnerabilities. This result also suggests that
a framework that combines these two metrics together is visible and should be further investigated.
However, further experiments with different software systems should be conducted so the result of
this study can be further consolidated.
5.8 Conclusion & Future work
This chapter examines the relationship between the attack surface and vulnerability density
metrics. It also investigates the visibility of how the two metrics can be used to guide each other.
There is an increase demand from developers, managers and users on controlling activities
such as resource allocation, program planning, risk assessment and product and service selection.
Software Security metrics are supposed to fulfill this need. However, as making decisions relies
heavily on the accuracy of these metrics, validating and comparing them to each other is considered
as a very significant step.
Attack surface measures system attackability, probability of a system to be attacked, of a soft-
ware system while vulnerability density metric measures the density of the known vulnerability of
a system per thousand line of code. Both metrics have been applied to major software systems and
they have been found useful. However, both have not been compared to one another.
In this study, we have measured the attackability and the vulnerability density of two versions
of the Apache HTTP server 1.3 and 2.2 using the two metrics. Apache web server has been chosen
because of its highest marked share among its competitors and availability of source code. Results
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have shown that attackability and vulnerability of the two selected systems imply the same idea.
That is, the attackability along the method dimension and the vulnerability density measures of the
Apache HTTP Server version 1.3 are greater than the version 2.2. It has been also observed that
not only the number of vulnerability or vulnerability density that is related to attack surface but
also the type and the severity of vulnerabilities are of degree of importance.
While only new vulnerabilities were considered in this study, considering the inherited vul-
nerabilities could also be helpful. Moreover, identifying the vulnerable component of a software
system by applying a metric that can define the most vulnerable modules can be very useful for
both vulnerability density metric as well as attack surface metric.
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Chapter 6
Assessing The Risk of Vulnerabilities
Exploitation
This chapter introduces a novel measure, Structural Severity, which is based on software prop-
erties, namely attack entry points, vulnerability location, the presence of the dangerous system
calls, and reachability analysis. These properties represent metrics that can be objectively derived
from attack surface analysis, vulnerability analysis, and exploitation analysis. To illustrate the pro-
posed approach, 25 reported vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server and 86 reported vulnerabilities
of Linux Kernel have been examined at the source code level. The results show that the proposed
approach, which uses more detailed information, can objectively measure the risk of vulnerability
exploitability and results can be different from the CVSS base scores.
6.1 Introduction
Security of the computer systems and networks depend on the security of software running on
them. Many of the attacks on computer systems and networks are due to the fact that attackers try
to potentially compromise these systems by exploiting vulnerabilities present in the software. Re-
cent trends have shown that newly discovered vulnerability still continues to be significant and so
does the number of attacks (+37 million attacks in 2012-2013) [82]. Studies have also shown that
the time gap between the vulnerability public disclosure and the release of an automated exploit is
getting smaller [3]. Therefore, assessing the risk of exploitation associated with software vulnera-
bilities is needed to aid decision-makers to prioritize among vulnerabilities, allocate resources, and
choose between alternatives.
A security metric is a quantifiable measurement that indicates the level of security for an at-
tribute of a system [67]. Security metrics give a way to prioritize threats and vulnerabilities by
considering the risks they pose to information assets based on quantitative or qualitative measures.
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The metrics proposed include: vulnerability density, attack surface, flaw severity and severity-to-
complexity, security scoring vector for web applications, and CVSS metrics, etc. Each of them
is based on specific perspectives and assumptions and measures different attributes of software
security. They are intended to objectively help decision makers in resource allocation, program
planning, risk assessment, and product and service selection.
CVSS is the de facto standard that is currently used to measure the severity of individual vul-
nerabilities [4]. CVSS Base Score measures severity based on the exploitability (the ease of
exploiting a vulnerability) and impact (the effect of exploitation). The base score is rounded to
one decimal place and it is set to zero if the impact is equal to zero regardless of the formula.
Exploitability is assessed based on three metrics: Access Vector (AV), Authentication (AU), and
Access Complexity (AC) as shown by the following:
Exploitability = 20× AV × AU × AC
The AV metric reflects how the vulnerability is exploited in terms of local (L), adjacent network
(A), or network (N). The AC metric measures the complexity of the attack required to exploit
the vulnerability (once an attacker has gained access to the target system) in terms of High (H),
Medium (M), or Low (L). The AU metric counts the number of times an attacker must authenticate
to reach a target (in order to exploit a vulnerability) in terms of Multiple (M), Single (S), or None
(N).
However, CVSS exploitability metrics have the following limitations. First, they assign static
subjective numbers to the metrics based on expert knowledge regardless of the type of vulnera-
bility. For instance, they assign AV 0.395 if the vulnerability requires local access, 0.646 if the
vulnerability requires adjacent network access, and 1 if the vulnerability requires global network
access. Second, two of its factors (AV and AU) have the same value for almost all vulnerabilities
[83]. Third, there is no formal procedure for evaluating the third factor (AC) [4]. Consequently, it
is unclear if CVSS considers the software structure and properties as a factor.
On the other hand, the impact sub-score measures how vulnerability will directly affect an IT
asset as the degree of losses in Confidentiality (IC), Integrity (II), and Availability (IA). The impact
sub-scores are all assessed in terms of None (N), Partial (P), or Complete (C) by security experts
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and assigned one of the mentioned qualitative letter grades. Thus, there is a need for an approach
that can take into account detailed information about the access complexity and the impact factors
for less subjective exploitability measures.
6.1.1 Problem Description and Research Motivation
The risk of vulnerability exploitability is dependent upon two factors: Exploitability and Im-
pact, as expressed in:
Exploitationrisk = f(Exploitability × Impact)
The first factor, Exploitability, is the likelihood that a potential vulnerability can be successfully
exploited. This factor concerns the question Is the vulnerability exploitable? The other factor,
Impact, measures the losses that occur given a successful exploitation. This factor is related to the
question Which is the most exploitable vulnerability?
There are challenges in assessing the exploitation risk that are needed to be addressed. In
this work, we look into the major challenges in assessing the exploitability factor, and identify
key questions that need to be addressed. Then, we discuss the challenges in assessing the impact
factor and also identify a key question that is required to be tackled. To guide our analysis of the
problem and to ensure that our solution is guided by recognized criteria, we used two guides from
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) namely: the Risk Management Guide for
Information Technology Systems [84] and Directions in Security Metrics Research Report [67].
Exploitability Factor
There are three main challenges when it comes to assessing the exploitability factor. They are
explained as follows.
a) Exploitability Estimators:
The main challenge is determining the estimator (attribute) to be used in assessing exploitability
factor. There are a number of estimators such as: existence of exploits, existence of patches,
number of vulnerabilities, number of attack entry points, exploit kits in the black market, and
proof of concept. Which one of those makes a good estimator of exploitability? To answer this
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Table 6.1: Limitations of exploitability estimators
Exploitability Estimator Limitations
1. Existence of an exploit
The data required to measure this attribute is not
always available.
2. Existence of a patch
The existence of a patch does not tell whether it has
been applied or not because the study
(Arbaugh et al. 2000) shows patches application
depends on the administrators behavior.
3.Number of vulnerabilities
and number of attack entry points
These estimators are not informative as they do not
specify which vulnerability is exploitable and rather
they estimate the exploitability of the whole system.
4. Exploit Kit in the black market
This approach requires a vulnerability intelligence
provider, as the information about the attacks and
tools are dynamic in nature. Moreover, if the
vulnerability right now is not used by a tool or it
is not a target of an attack, it does not mean that
it is going to be so continually.
5. Proof of concept
It is difficult and time consuming to generate a reliable
exploit.
question, lets look at every one of those estimators. As is summarized in Table 6.1, each of the
estimators assesses exploitability from a specific perspective and has its own limitations. Thus, a
good estimator should have the following characteristics: it should be measurable, it should not be
expensive to obtain, and it should be obtained objectively.
b) Evaluation of the Measures:
The next challenge is evaluating the exploitability estimators. Obtaining the measures can be
achieved by using security expert opinions, one of the estimators mentioned above, or the software
structure. Relying on expert opinions leads to subjectivity and can potentially hinder the accuracy
of the assessment. The challenge is: How can we reduce subjectivity and minimize human involve-
ment in exploitation assessment? On the other hand, the data regarding reported vulnerabilities or
exploits is not always available especially for newly released software. Thus, the question is: How
can the risk of exploitation be assessed in the absence of historical data? The alternative could be
using the software code. However, in that case the challenges would be: What type of features
can be used as an indicator of vulnerability exploitability? How can these features be objectively
derived? These questions are addressed in this paper.
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c) Level of Assessment:
A further challenge is deciding on the level of assessment that the exportability should be assessed
at. Should we assess exploitability for each individual vulnerability or the whole software? As-
sessing the vulnerability exploitability at the software level is not informative as it assumes that
all vulnerabilities have the same risk of exploitation. This is unrealistic as different vulnerabilities
have different risk of exploitation. Thus, assessing the exploitation risk at the individual vulner-
ability level needs to be done first. Thereafter, we can combine risk value of each individual
vulnerability and get the total risk of exploitation for the whole system.
Impact Factor
Estimating the impact factor is challenging because it is context dependent. For instance, a
shutdown of a mission critical server may be more severe than a print server. Manadhata and Wing
[69] introduced two types of impacts: Technical impact (e.g., privilege elevation) and Business
impact (e.g., monetary loss). While the latter depends on the mission and the priority of the given
context, the former can be estimated at a function level. For the technical impact the key question
is: What estimators should be used to determine the technical impact? The answer could be
any one of these estimators: function privilege, existence of dangerous system calls, presence of
authentication, or presence of exploit mitigation. These estimators are explained as follows:
• The higher the privilege of a function (e.g. root) the more damage is going to be.
• Having a dangerous system call (e.g. open) in an entry point can help the attackers escalate
their privileges and hence can cause more damage to the compromised system.
• An authentication procedure along the attack path to the vulnerable location makes exploit-
ing a vulnerability harder and hence reducing the impact.
• Exploit mitigation reduces the impact of a vulnerability exploitation.
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6.1.2 Research Objectives and Contribution
The main objective of this research is to propose an approach that can address the challenging
questions discussed in the problem description. We mainly focus on reducing subjectivity in as-
sessing vulnerability exploitation risk. To that end, we base our analysis on software properties.
These properties represent measures that can objectively be derived from the source code using the
attack surface analysis, the vulnerability analysis, and the exploitation analysis irrespective of the
level of security knowledge one has. Our proposed measure evaluates vulnerability exploitability
based on the presence of a function call connecting attack surface entry points to the vulnerability
location within the software under consideration. If such a call exists, we estimate how likely an
entry point is going to be used in an attack based on the presence of the dangerous system calls.
The dangerous system calls paradigm has been considered because they allow attackers to escalate
a function privilege and hence cause more damage.
To determine the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the Apache HTTP server and Linux
Kernel were selected as a case study. The two software systems have been selected because
of: their rich history of publicly available vulnerabilities, availability of an integrated repository
(which enables us to map vulnerabilities to their location in the source code), availability of the
source code (which enables us to collect the measures of the proposed metrics), and their diversity
in size and functionalities.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background. In section 3, the key
steps of our approach are introduced. In section 4, the evaluation and the results of the proposed
approach are shown. In the following section, some observations and threats to validity are pre-
sented. Section 6 presents the related work. Finally, concluding comments are given along with
the issues that need further research.
6.2 Related Concepts and Terminology
In this section, we describe the concepts and terminology related to the vulnerability exploita-
tion risk. This section provides a brief introduction to software vulnerabilities, the attack surface
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metric used in the proposed approach, the system dependence graph used for reachability analysis,
and the exploit databases used to validate the analysis.
6.2.1 Software Vulnerabilities
A software vulnerability is defined as a defect in software systems that presents a considerable
security risk [2]. A subset of the security related defects, vulnerabilities, are to be discovered and
become known eventually [2]. The vulnerabilities are thus a subset of the defects that are security
related. The finders of the vulnerabilities disclose them to the public using some of the common
reporting mechanisms available in the field. The databases for the vulnerabilities are maintained
by several organizations such as National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [16], Open Source Vul-
nerability Database (OSVDB) [17], etc., as well as the vendors of the software. Vulnerabilities are
assigned a unique identifier using MITRE Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) service.
6.2.2 Attack Surface Metric
A systems attack surface is the subset of the systems resources that are used by an attacker to
attack the system [69]. This includes the functions that serve as the entry points and exit points,
the set of channels (e.g. sockets), and the set of untrusted data items [69]. Entry and Exit points
can be used by an attacker to either send or receive data from the system. Channels are the means
that are used by an attacker to connect to the system. Untrusted data items are the data that an
attacker can either send or receive from the system. In this study, we consider the entry points and
the potential paths leading to the functions containing the vulnerabilities.
6.2.3 System Dependence Graph
A system dependence graph (SDG) introduced by [85] is an extension of the Program depen-
dence graph (PDG) [86, 85, 87]. PDG is a directed graph representation of a program, where
vertices represent program points (e.g., assignment statements, call-sites, variables, control predi-
cates) that occur in the program and edges represent different kinds of control or data dependen-
cies. An SDG consists of interconnected PDGs (one per procedure in the program) and extends
the control and data dependencies with interprocedural dependencies. An interprocedural control-
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dependence edge connects procedure call sites to the entry points of the called procedure and an
interprocedural data-dependence edge represents the flow of data between actual parameters and
formal parameters (and return values). A system dependence graph can be used for purposes such
as code optimization, reverse engineering, program testing, program slicing, software quality as-
surance, and software safety analysis. This work employs SDG to determine the call sequence
among functions in a source code which may lead to a potential exploitation.
6.2.4 Exploit Database (EDB)
EDB records exploits and vulnerable software [22]. It is used by penetration testers, vulner-
ability researchers, and security professionals. It reports vulnerabilities for which there is at least
a proof-of-concept exploit. EDB is considered as a regulated market for the exploits. EDB con-
tains around 24075 exploits as the time of writing this paper. Most of its data are derived from
Metasploit Framework, a tool for creating and executing exploit code against a target machine. It
provides a search utility that uses a CVE number to find vulnerabilities that have an exploit.
6.3 Approach
Figure 6.1 shows an overview of our approach for assessing vulnerability exploitability risk. It
is based on combining the attack surface analysis, the vulnerability analysis, and the exploitation
analysis.
Figure 6.1: Overview of the proposed approach
We start by identifying the attack entry points and a vulnerability location from the source code.
Next, we apply the reachability analysis to the identified attack entry points and the vulnerability
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Table 6.2: Structural Severity Measure
Metric 1 Metric 2 Measure
Reachability Dangerous System Call (DSC) Structural Severity
Not Reachable No DSC exist Low
Not Reachable DSC exist Low
Reachable No DSC exist Medium
Reachable DSC exist High
location. The outcome of this step is to determine whether a vulnerability is reachable from any of
the identified attack entry points (R) or it is not reachable (NR). After that, we verify whether any
of the identified attack entry points has dangerous system calls. The result of this step is either the
attack entry point has a dangerous system call (DSC) or it does not have a dangerous system call
(NDSC). Then, we assess vulnerability exploitability based on the results of the steps three and
four. The outcome of this step is a vulnerability is reachable with DSC, reachable with NDSC, or
not reachable. Based on the result of this step, the risk of exploitation of a given vulnerability is
assigned as shown in Table 6.2. The following subsections will explain these steps in detail.
6.3.1 Identify Attack Entry Points
We define the attack entry points using the systems attack surface entry point framework pro-
posed by [69]. Entry points are the functions that an attacker uses to send data to the system. In
this paper, we used only the entry points because they are the main target of malicious attacks.
A function is a direct entry point if it receives data directly from the environment; read function
defined in unistd.h in C library is an example [69]. Figure 6.2 shows how the entry points are
identified. The required steps are as follows:
a) Obtain the source code
b) Identify all functions that receive data from the user environment (C/C++ Library functions)
c) Verify whether these functions are used by any of the user functions
• Identify all functions called by the main function using cflow
• Use python script to verify whether any of these functions has one of the C/C++ input func-
tions
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• If you find any, then consider that function as an EP
• Get the list of all entry points
Figure 6.2: Identification of attack entry points
6.3.2 Find Vulnerability Location
The vulnerability location can be found by looking at the report in the vulnerability database
or by using a static code analyzer such as Splint [88]. Figure 6.3 shows the way vulnerabilities
are mapped to their locations.
a) Mapping vulnerabilities using databases:
• From the vulnerability database, identify the Vulnerability.
• From the Bug Repository and Version Archive:
– Identify the vulnerable Version (e.g. Apache 1.3.0)
– Identify files by mapping Bug ID to CVE number
– Identify the vulnerable function
• For the selected vulnerable version:
– Search inside all folders in the main folder and find all .c files and store them in a list
– From the list, select the .c files that contain the vulnerabilities
– For every selected file find the vulnerable function(s)
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b) Mapping vulnerabilities using a static code analyzer Finding a vulnerability location can also
be determined by using static code analyzers when the report does not finalize such information.
The static code analyzers are tools that are used to find common bugs or vulnerabilities in the code
base without the need to execute the code. Splint (Secure Programming Lint) is an example. It is a
tool that uses static analysis to detect vulnerabilities in programs [88]. However, in this paper the
vulnerability report was used to find the location of the vulnerability. The use of static tools were











Map Vulnerabilities to their Locations (Functions)
Vulnerable Functions
Figure 6.3: Vulnerability location identification
6.3.3 Apply Reachability Analysis
Reachability means the analysis of the call relationships between the entry points and the vul-
nerability locations (vulnerable functions). We employed a system dependence graph (SDG) pro-
posed by Horwitz et al. [85] to determine the calls from an entry point function to a vulnerability
location (vulnerable function). There are many tools available for automatically generating SDG
from the source code. We have selected Understand. Understand is a static analysis tool for main-
taining, measuring, and analyzing critical or large source code. We have used the Understand tool
[89], to generate this graph from the source code. This tool has been chosen because it is user-
friendly and it has a good set of APIs that allows interaction with programming languages such as
Python, Perl, and C++. Figure 6.4 shows how reachability analysis is used.
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Figure 6.4: Reachability analysis
After identifying the entry points and the vulnerable functions, the reachability analysis was
conducted as follows:
• Generate a (called by) graph that captures all functions that call the vulnerable function
directly or indirectly
• Verify whether any of these functions is
– directly calling the vulnerable function and an entry point
– indirectly calling the vulnerable function and an entry point
• If so, the vulnerable function is recognized as reachable
• If not, the vulnerable function is recognized as not reachable.
6.3.4 Find Dangerous System Calls
System calls are the entry points to privileged kernel operations [90]. Calling a system call
from a user function in a program can violate the least privilege principle. Massimo et al. [91]
define DSCs as specific system calls that can be used to take complete control of the system, cause
a denial of service, or other malicious acts. These system calls have been identified and classified
into four levels of threats. Level one allows full control of the system while level two is used for
denial of service attack. On the other hand, level three is used for disrupting the invoking process
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Table 6.3: Dangerous system calls
Threat Level Dangerous System Calls
1. Full control of the system
chmod, fchmod, chown, fchown,
lchown, execve, mount, rename, open, link,
2. Denial of service
umount, mkdir, rmdir, umount2, ioctl,
nfsservctl, truncate, ftruncate,
quotactl, dup,
dup2, flock, fork, kill, iopl, reboot, ioperm, clone
3. Used for subverting
the invoking process
read, write, close, chdir, lseek, dup, fcntl,
umask, chroot, select,
fsync, fchdir, llseek,




getpid, getppid, getuid, getgid, geteuid, getegid,
acct, getpgrp,
sgetmask, getrlimit, getrusage,
getgroups, getpriority, sched getscheduler,
sched getparam, sched get
and level four is considered harmless. Table 6.3 shows some of the DSCs as classified by Massimo
et al. [91]. There are 22 system calls of the threat level one and 32 of the threat level two.
We used the existence of DSCs as an estimate of the impact of exploitation. This is because
having DSCs in a user function helps the attackers escalate their privileges and hence causing more
damage to the compromised system. As the attack entry points are the main entries for the attacker
to the system, we verify whether these points have DSCs. We do that by looking at the list of the
identified attack entry points and verify whether each entry point contains DSCs by using a python
script. If any DSCs are found, we annotate that function as an entry point with DSCs.
6.3.5 Assess Vulnerability Exploitability
An individual vulnerability exploitability risk is assessed using the measures obtained from
step 1 to 4. Thus, a vulnerability can be classified as one of the following:
• Reachable with Dangerous System Calls.
• Reachable with No Dangerous System Calls.
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Table 6.4: Apache HTTP server and Linux Kernel vulnerabilities dataset
Software Exploit Exist No Exploit Exist Total Each
Apache HTTP Server 11 14 25
Linux Kernel 64 22 86
Total All 75 36 111
• Not reachable.
6.4 Evaluation and Results
This section presents the results of the evaluation of the proposed measure and assesses its
performance. To implement our approach, 111 vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server and Linux
Kernel have been chosen as shown in Table 6.4. These vulnerabilities have been collected from
the National Vulnerability Database [16]. They have been selected based on the availability of
information about their locations and their exploits. It should be noted that we have considered all
Apache HTTP server vulnerabilities that have an exploit. Out of the 73 Linux Kernel vulnerabilities
that have an exploit, we only examined 64 vulnerabilities. This is because seven out of the nine
vulnerabilities depends on a configuration property and not a user input. In addition, we could not
find information about the location of the other two vulnerabilities. Further, as the main focus of
this research is to evaluate the capability of the proposed measure, we have only considered a few
of the vulnerabilities that have no exploit. We also tried to select the vulnerabilities that are at least
three or four years old, so that their lack of exploit is not due to their recent discovery.
Our approach in assessing software vulnerability exploitability is based on the sequential steps
that have been discussed in section 3. As applying the steps of our approach are the same for
Apache HTTP server and Linux Kernel, we are only including the detailed explanation for Apache
HTTP server here. However, the final results of the investigation are going to be presented in two
separate tables.
6.4.1 Define Attack Entry Points
Identifying the attack surface entry points requires looking at the code base and finding all
entry points which could be a part of the attack surface. After finding such points, we then classify
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Table 6.5: Entry points and Dangerous System Calls
File Name
Entry Points Dangerous System Calls
C/C++
Input Functions
Entry Point Function Denial of Service Full Control
protocol.c
read ap get mime headers - -
read ap read request - -
get ap set sub req protocol - -
http filter.c scanf ap http filter - -
http core.c scanf register hooks - -
mod usertrack.c get spot cookie - -
mod proxy.c scanf register hooks - link
mod rewrite.c scanf
register hooks, - -
hookuri2file
mod proxy ajp.c read ap proxy ajp request - -




Stream reqbody cl, - -
Ap proxy http reques, dup -
proxy http handler dup -
mod proxy ftp.c read packets Proxy send dir filter dup -
mod proxy balancer.c get balance handler dup -
mod status.c get Ststus handler - -
core.c get include config - -
main.c get main, exit open
mod autoindex read index directory dup open
proxy http.c read socket ap proxy http handler dup -
proxy util.c read buffer ap proxy send fb - -
mod include.c getc get tag - -
mod imap.c getline imap handler - open
mod negotiation.c get do negotiation dup open
each one of them into an attack class. The code bases of the chosen version were obtained from
[79].
The entry points along the method dimension were defined using the cflow tool and a python
script. The cflow tool analyzes a code base written in C programming language and produces a
graph charting dependencies among various functions [81]. Using the python script, we iden-
tified the entry points for the whole system and selected the ones that are related to the chosen
vulnerabilities location. These entry points are shown in Table 6.5.
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CVE-2012-0053
protocol.c in,the Apache HTTP Server 2.2.x through 2.2.21
does not properly,restrict header information during construction
of Bad Request (aka 400),error documents, which allows remote
attackers to obtain the values of HTTP Only,cookies via vectors
involving a (1) long or (2) malformed header in,conjunction
with a crafted web script.
6.4.2 Find Vulnerability Location
The vulnerability location was determined by mapping information from NVD, Apache Http
server bug repository [92] and Apache SVN archive databases [93]. Vulnerabilities are either lo-
cated in one of the entry points or are located in a function that is called by the entry points directly
or indirectly. By performing the following steps, we identified the location of the vulnerabilities.
a) From the NVD, we selected the vulnerability. The following report shows one of the selected
vulnerabilities. As can be seen, the vulnerable file and Apache version can be easily determined
from the following report description.
b) Using Bugzilla, we mapped the CVE number to the Bug id. Bugzilla is a bug- or issue-
tracking system. Figure 6.5 shows the mapping step.
Figure 6.5: Mapping from CVE number to Bug ID
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c) From Bugzilla, we accessed the Apache SVN to determine the vulnerable code. Apache
SVN is a software used to maintain the current and historical versions of files: such as source code,
web pages, and documentation. We used diff link, which is shown circled at the bottom of Figure
6.5, to access the source code and identify the vulnerable code (function). Basically, the diff link
shows the difference between before the code has been changed and after the code has been modi-
fied. The diff page is shown in Figure 6.6 where the vulnerable function ap get mime headers core
has been circled with red color. The diff link shows the code for a bug fix, which corresponds to
a vulnerability fix. Using the (—) symbol indicates the part of the code that has been removed
whereas (+++) symbol shows the code that has been added.
Figure 6.6: Identifying vulnerable code (Function)
Once the vulnerable function name is identified, we look at the source code and identify the
.c file name that contains the function and annotate its location. We followed the same steps to
identify the location of the remaining vulnerabilities. Table 6.6 shows the locations of the chosen
vulnerabilities. It has been noticed that some of the vulnerabilities have been located in more than
one function.
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Table 6.6: Vulnerabilities locations (functions)
Vulnerability File Name Vulnerable Function Name
CVE-2012-0053 protocol.c ap get mime headers core
CVE-2011-4415 util.c ap pregsub
CVE-2011-4317 mod proxy.c proxy handler
mod rewrite.c hook fixup
CVE-2011-3192 byterange filter.c parse byterange
CVE-2010-0434 protocol.c clone headers no body
CVE-2010-0408 mod proxy ajp.c ap proxy ajp request
CVE-2009-1891 mod deflate.c deflate out filter
CVE-2009-1890 mod proxy http.c Stream reqbody cl
CVE-2008-2939 mod proxy ftp.c Proxy send dir filter
CVE-2007-6420 mod proxy balancer.c balance handler
CVE-2006-5752 mod status.c Ststus handler
CVE-2009-1195 config.c
process resource config nofnmatch,
ap process config tree
CVE-2007-5000 mod imagemap.c menu header
CVE-2007-4465 mod autoindex index directory
CVE-2010-0010 Proxy util.c ap proxy send fb
CVE-2004-0940 mod include.c get tag
CVE-2007-6388 mod status.c status handler
CVE-2005-3352 mod imap.c read quoted
CVE-2004-0488 ssl util.c ssl util uuencode binary
CVE-2008-0455 mod negotiation.c make variant list
CVE-1999-0107 http request.c process request internal
CVE-2004-0493 protocol.c ap get mime headers
CVE-2006-3747 mod rewrite.c apply rewrite rule
CVE-2013-1896 mod dav.c dav method merge
CVE-2006-3918 http protocol.c get canned error string
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6.4.3 Apply Reachability Analysis
Once the vulnerable functions and the entry points were identified, reachability analysis can
be achieved using the Understand tool. This tool automatically generates a graph contains a chain
of all functions that can call the selected function. This graph is known as Called By graph. It
shows what calls the selected function. Each line connecting an entity is read as x is called by
y. It should be noted that this graph is read from the bottom up. When x is called by y, x is in
the bottom and y is in the top. We have added to the generated graph the entry point (EP) label,
and vulnerability CVE number to make the graph easily viewable asier. Shown the reachability
analysis for all selected vulnerabilities can make the length of the chapter more than it should be,
therefore only five vulnerabilities were selected. Those vulnerabilities are representative of the
common trends among the studied vulnerabilities.
a) CVE-2012-0053 Looking at Table 6.6, it can be verified that this vulnerability is located in
the function ap get mime headers core which in turn resides in the file protocol.c. To determine
whether this vulnerability is reachable from an entry point, we performed the following:
• Generate a called by graph that captures all functions that call the vulnerable function di-
rectly or indirectly. Figure 6.7 shows the generated graph with the function name at the top
of the rectangle and .c file name in the bottom.
• Verify whether any of these functions is an entry point. Using the entry points in Table 6.5,
the attacker can have an access to the vulnerability by two ways:
– Directly: The protocol.c component has two entry points namely: ap get mime headers
and ap read request that directly can call the vulnerable function. These two entry
points are located in the protocol.c file where the vulnerable function is located. None
of these entry points have a dangerous system call.
– Indirectly: The component core.c has an entry point function register hooks that indi-
rectly can call the vulnerable function in the component protocol.c from multiple paths.
This entry point does not have a dangerous system call.
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As a result, it can be concluded that there is a call relationship between the entry points and the
vulnerable functions. The vulnerable function is also indirectly reachable from an entry point
located in a different component. Neither of these entry points has DSCs.
Figure 6.7: Direct and indirect call sequences from the EP to the vulnerable function
b) CVE-2004-0488 Looking at Table 6.6, it can be shown that this vulnerability is located in
the function ssl utill uuencode binary which lives in the file ssl util.c. To determine whether this
vulnerability is reachable from an entry point, we performed the following:
• Generate a called by graph that captures all functions that call this function directly or indi-
rectly. Figure 6.8 shows the generated. graph.
• Verify whether any of these functions is an entry point. Using the entry points in Table 6.5,
the attacker has no way of manipulating this vulnerability because there are no entry points
found in any of these functions including the vulnerable function
As a result, it can be concluded that this vulnerable function is not reachable from an entry
point.
c) CVE-2007-4465 From Table 6.6, it can be verified that this vulnerability is located in the
function index directory which resides in the mod autoindex.c. To determine whether this vulner-
ability is reachable from an entry point, we performed the following:
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Figure 6.8: No call sequence that reaches the vulnerable function in sll util.c.
• Generate a called by graph that captures all functions that call this function directly or indi-
rectly. Figure 6.9 shows the generated graph.
• - Verify whether any of these functions is an entry point. Using the entry points in Table
6.5, it has been found that the vulnerable function itself is also an entry point. Besides,
register hooks is an entry point too. Thus, the attacker has an access to this vulnerability by
invoking the vulnerable function directly. This entry point has a DSC.
As a result, it can be concluded that this vulnerability is reachable by directly calling the vul-
nerable function. Besides, this function has a DSC.
d) CVE-2010-0434 From Table 6.6, it can be confirmed that this vulnerability is located in
the function clone headers no body which resides in the file protocol.c. To determine whether this
vulnerability is reachable from an entry point, we performed the following:
• Generate a called by graph that captures all functions that call the vulnerable function di-
rectly or indirectly. Figure 6.10 shows the generated graph.
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Figure 6.9: Direct call sequence from the EP to the vulnerable function in mod autoindex.c
• Verify whether any of these functions is an entry point. Using the entry points in Table 6.5,
it has been found that the attacker can reach the vulnerable function in two ways:
– Directly: The component protocol.c has an entry point: ap set sub req protocol that
can directly call the vulnerable function. This entry point has no DSCs.
– Indirectly: The component mod rewrite.c has two entry points namely: register hooks
and hookuri2file. Thus, the attacker has an access to this vulnerability from multiple
paths as shown in Figure 6.10. This entry point has NDSCs.
As a result, it can be concluded that this vulnerability is reachable by directly and indirectly
calling the vulnerable function from multiple paths. Besides, these functions have NDSCs.
e) CVE-2009-1195 From Table 6.6, it can be decided that this vulnerability is located into two
functions namely: ap process cnfig tree and process resource config nofnmatch which both live
in the file config.c. To determine whether this vulnerability is reachable from an entry point, we
performed the following:
• Generate a called by graph that captures all functions that call the vulnerable function di-
rectly or indirectly. Figure 6.11 shows the generated graph.
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Figure 6.10: Direct and indirect call sequences from the EP to the vulnerable function in proroto-
col.c.
• Verify whether any of these functions is an entry point. Using the entry points in Table 6.5,
the attacker has an access to this vulnerability by invoking the vulnerable function in two
ways:
– Indirectly: The main.c component has an entry point namely: main that can indi-
rectly call the vulnerable function process resource config nofmatch throughout the
path: main, ap read config, and ap process resource config as shown on the left side
of the graph. The entry points have a DSC.
– Directly: There are two ways the vulnerable function can be directly called. First,
the main.c component has an entry points namely: ap process resource config that can
directly call the vulnerable function. Second, throughout the same entry point main, the
vulnerable function ap process resource config tree can be directly called as shown on
the right side of the graph. The entry points have a DSC.
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Figure 6.11: Direct and indirect call sequences from the EP to the vulnerable function in config.c
As a result, it can be concluded that there is a call relationship between the entry points in the
component main.c and the two vulnerable functions in the component config.c. The vulnerable
function is also indirectly reachable from an entry point located in a different component. The
entry point has DSCs.
6.4.4 Find Dangerous System Calls
For the identified attack entry points, we have checked whether an entry point has dangerous
system calls. These dangerous system calls are shown in Table 6.5.
6.4.5 Assessing Vulnerability Exploitability
After tracing the call sequence from the entry points to the vulnerability location and identi-
fying the DSCs, the individual vulnerability Structural Severity can be evaluated using the results
included in Table 6.7. Looking at Table 6.7, a vulnerability is either:
1. Reachable with Dangerous System Calls.
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2. Reachable with No Dangerous System Calls.
3. Not reachable.
Table 6.7 gives the structural severity measures of the Apache HTTP Server vulnerabilities
using the proposed method. Every vulnerability has its own location and the availability of the
path from the entry point next to it. If a path from an entry point to a vulnerable function is found,
the vulnerability considered to be reachable; otherwise, it is considered not reachable. Besides, the
existence of the DSCs for every entry point has been specified.
6.4.6 Assigning a Vulnerability Structural Severity Value
The Structural Severity is measured using the reachability and DSCs metrics. It is then as-
signed one of the three values: high, medium, and low as described in section 3. Based on these
three values, the chosen vulnerabilities were assessed and compared to the CVSS overall severity
scores. In following subsections, we will show the Structural Severity values for the selected vul-
nerabilities of Apache HTTP server and Linux Kernel datasets respectively. It should be noted that
we have used the exploit database (EDB), Open Source vulnerability database, and the Meta ex-
ploit Database ?? for gathering the exploits for the chosen vulnerabilities. Besides, the authors are
not aware of a database that reports the impact of vulnerabilities exploitation and hence comparing
those factors is not visible. The abbreviations used in the tables are explained as follows:
• DSC: Dangerous System Call.
• NDSC: No Dangerous System Call.
• AC: Access Complexity Metric. Its values are Low (L), Medium (M), and High (H).
• AV: Access Vector Metric. Its values are Network (N), Local (L), and Adjacent Network
(A).
• AU: Authentication Metric. Its values are None (N), Single (S), and Multiple (M).
• The CVSS impact metrics use C for Confidentiality, I for Integrity, A for Availability. These
metrics takes the following values: None (N), Partial (P), and Complete (C).
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Table 6.7: The Obtained metrics of the proposed measure





CVE-2004-0488  ssl_util_uuencode_binary no path NDSC NR 
CVE-2004-0940  get_tag get_tag NDSC R 
CVE-2005-3352 read_quoted imap_handler DSC R 
CVE-2006-5752 Ststus_handler ststus_handler NDSC R 
CVE-2007-6420 balance_handler balance_handler DSC R 
CVE-2007-5000 menu_header no path NDSC NR 
CVE-2007-4465 index_directory index_directory DSC R 
CVE-2007-6388 status_handler status_handler NDSC R 































CVE-2010-0434 clone_headers_no_body ap_set_sub_req_protocol NDSC R 
CVE-2010-0408 ap_proxy_ajp_request ap_proxy_ajp_request NDSC R 






proxy_handler register_hooks DSC 
R 





















R: Reachable, NR: Not reachable, DSC: Dangerous System Call, NDSC: No  Dangerous System Call 
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• SS: Total Subscore
Apache HTTP Server
Table 6.8 shows the Structural Severity and the CVSS Metrics values for the Apache HTTP
server dataset. The table also shows the availability of an exploit for every vulnerability. The
following has been observed from Table 6.8:
• Two out of the 25 vulnerabilities are not reachable and have no exploits.
• Thirteen out of the 25 vulnerabilities are reachable with no existing exploits. More than half
of these vulnerabilities have DSCs and hence have been assigned a high Structural Severity
value.
• The remaining 11 vulnerabilities are reachable and have exploits. Four out of them have
DSCs and thus have been assigned a high Structural Severity value.
• The majority of the vulnerabilities have been assigned high exploitability value by both
metrics.
• More than half of the vulnerabilities have been found to have a low impact value by both
metrics (CVSS impact SS, and Structural Severity DSC). This could be attributed to the type
of software.
• More than half of the vulnerabilities have been assigned a medium severity value by the two
metrics.
• It should be noted that all the vulnerabilities require no Authentication whereas only three
vulnerabilities require a Local Network Access Vector (L). The majority of the Access Com-
plexity metric values are low and medium and these values have no significant effect on the
overall CVSS exploitability subscore.
• The exploitability total subscore is significantly changed only when the Access Complexity
metric value is high. Nonetheless, there are only two vulnerabilities that have a high Access
Complexity metric value.
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• Out of the 11 vulnerabilities that have an exploit, only two vulnerabilities have been assigned
a low CVSS exploitability subscore.
It should be notated that the vulnerabilities in Table 6.8 have been grouped into five groups
based on their similarity with regard to their reachability, DSCs and availability of exploit. This
demonstrates their relationship. The following explains these groups.
a) CVE-2004-0488 and CVE-2007-5000:
According to the CVSS metrics, the CVE-2004-0488 have a low Access Complexity value and
a high overall severity, whereas CVE-2007-5000 have a low Access Complexity and a medium
overall severity. Considering the network accessibility factor is useful but not sufficient. In order
for a vulnerability to be exploited it first has to be reachable regardless of the access conditions.
However, based on the software structure analysis, we did not find any call relationship between
the vulnerable function and any of the entry point functions. Additionally, no exploit was found
for these vulnerabilities in any of the exploit databases. Thus, based on the proposed metrics, they
have been assigned a low Structural Severity. Having just a potential vulnerability does not mean
that it is going to be exploited.
b) CVE-2008-0455, CVE-2009-1890, CVE-2010-0010, and CVE-2013-1896:
As stated by the CVSS metrics, the CVE-2008-0455, CVE-2010-0010, and CVE-2013-1896
have a medium Access Complexity value and a medium overall severity, whereas CVE-2009-
1890 have a medium Access Complexity and a high overall severity. Based on software structure
analysis, we found the two vulnerabilities to be reachable and to have a DSC. Additionally, there
exists an exploit for these vulnerabilities. However, based on the proposed metrics, they have been
assigned a high Structural Severity.
c) CVE-2012-0053, CVE-2004-0940, and CVE-2011-3192:
Based on the CVSS metrics, both CVE-2012-0053 and 2004-0940 have a medium Access
Complexity value and a medium overall severity. On the other hand, CVE-2011-3192 have a low
Access Complexity value and a high overall severity. Based on software structure analysis, we
found these three vulnerabilities to be reachable and to have no DSC. Additionally, there exist an
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Table 6.8: The Obtained Structural Severity Metrics Compared to CVSS Metrics of Apache HTTP
Server Dataset
No Vulnerability 














AC AV AU SS C I A SS 
1 CVE-2004-0488  NR NDSC L L N NR 10 P P P 6.4 H NEE 
2 CVE-2007-5000 NR NDSC L M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
3 CVE-2008-0455 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M EE 
4 CVE-2009-1890 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N N C 6.9 H EE 
5 CVE-2010-0010 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 P P P 6.4 M EE 
6 CVE-2013-1896 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N N P 2.9 M EE 
7 CVE-2004-0940 R NDSC M M L NR 3.4 C C C 10 M EE 
8 CVE-2011-3192 R NDSC M L N NR 10 N N C 6.9 H EE 
9 CVE-2012-0053 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 P N N 2.9 M EE 
10 CVE-1999-0107 R NDSC M L N NR 10 N N P 2.9 M EE 
11 CVE-2004-0493 R NDSC M L N NR 10 N P P 4.9 M EE 
12 CVE-2006-3747 R NDSC M H N NR 4.9 C C C 10 H EE 
13 CVE-2006-3918 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M EE 
14 CVE-2006-5752 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
15 CVE-2007-6388 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
16 CVE-2009-1891 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 N N C 6.9 H NEE 
17 CVE-2010-0434 R NDSC M M N NR 8.6 P N N 2.9 M NEE 
18 CVE-2010-0408 R NDSC M L N NR 10 N N P 2.9 M NEE 
19 CVE-2011-4415 R NDSC M H L NR 1.9 N N P 2.9 L NEE 
20 CVE-2005-3352 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
21 CVE-2007-6420 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
22 CVE-2007-4465 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
23 CVE-2008-2939 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
24 CVE-2009-1195 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M NEE 
25 CVE-2011-4317 R DSC H M N NR 8.6 N P N 2.9 M NEE 
EE: Exploit Exist; NEE: No Exploit Exist; SS: Subscore 
 
91
exploit for these vulnerabilities. Thus, based on the proposed metrics, the vulnerabilities have been
assigned a medium Structural Severity.
d) CVE-2006-5752, CVE-2007-6388, CVE-2009-1891, CVE-2010-0434, CVE-2010-0408,
CVE-2011-4415:
Consistent with the CVSS metrics, the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2006-5752, CVE-2007-
6388, and CVE-2010-0434 have a medium Access Complexity and a medium overall severity.
Besides, CVE-2009-1891 hve a medium Access Complexity and a high overall severity. Addition-
ally, CVE-2010-0408 have a low Access Complexity and a medium overall severity. Moreover,
CVE-2011-4415 have a medium Access Complexity and a high overall severity. However, based
on software structure analysis, we found that all of the vulnerabilities are reachable and have no
DSC. Furthermore, no exploit was found for these vulnerabilities. Based on the proposed metrics,
these vulnerabilities have been assigned a medium Structural Severity.
e) CVE-2005-3352, CVE-2007-6420, CVE-2007-4465, CVE-2008-2939, CVE-2009-1195,
CVE-2010-0010, and CVE-2011-4317:
According to the CVSS metrics, all the above vulnerabilities have a medium Access Complex-
ity value except for CVE-2009-1195 which have a low Access Complexity sub-score. Besides, all
of them had a medium overall severity. However, based on software structure analysis, we found
that all of them are reachable and have a DSC. Additionally, there was no exploit found for these
vulnerabilities. Based on the proposed metrics, these vulnerabilities have been assigned a high
Structural Severity.
Linux Kernel
Table 6.9 in the Appendix shows the Structural Severity and the CVSS Metrics values for
Linux Kernel. The table also shows the availability of an exploit for every vulnerability. The
following can be observed from Table 6.9.
• Three out of the 86 vulnerabilities are not reachable and have no exploits. Two of them have
DSCs.
92
• Nineteen out of the 86 vulnerabilities are reachable with no exploit exist for them. More
than half of these vulnerabilities have DSCs and hence have been assigned a high Structural
Severity value.
• All 64 vulnerabilities that have an exploit have been found to be reachable. More than half
of these vulnerabilities have a DSC and thus have been assigned a high Structural Severity
value.
• The majority of the vulnerabilities have been assigned a high exploitability value by the
Structural Severity Reachability metric. On the other hand, most of the vulnerabilities have
been assigned a low exploitability value by the CVSSS exploitability metrics. This could be
attributed to the fact that most of the vulnerabilities are accessed locally.
• The majority of the vulnerabilities have been found to have a high impact value by both
metrics (CVSS impact SS and Structural Severity DSC).
• More than half of the vulnerabilities have been assigned a high severity value by the Struc-
tural Severity metrics whereas only a few have been assigned a low severity value. This can
be explained by the previous two observations. On the other hand, the CVSS severity metrics
do not have noticeable variation among their values except for a slightly larger number of
medium severity values.
• It should be noted that most of the vulnerabilities require no Authentication except for two,
which required only a Single System Authentication (SS). The majority of the vulnerabili-
ties requires a Local Network Access Vector (L). However, there are 14 vulnerabilities that
require a Network Access Vector (N) and there are only two vulnerabilities that require an
Adjacent Network Access Vector (A). The majority of the Access Complexity metric values
is low.
• Neither the low nor the medium Access Complexity metric values have a significant effect
on the overall CVSS exploitability subscore. The exploitability total subscore is significantly
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changed only when the Access Complexity metric value is high. Nonetheless, there are only
five vulnerabilities that have a high Access Complexity value.
• Out of the 64 vulnerabilities that have an exploit, seven vulnerabilities have been assigned
a high CVSS exploitability subscores and 12 vulnerabilities have been assigned low CVSS
exploitability subscores.
It should be notated that the vulnerabilities in Table 6.9 have been grouped into two groups
based on the availability of exploit. As the number of the vulnerabilities of Linux Kernel is large,
we will only discuss some noteworthy vulnerabilities.
a) CVE-2003-0462, CVE-2004-1235, CVE-2006-2629, CVE-2006-5757, and CVE-2010-4258:
According to the CVSS metrics, these vulnerabilities have a high Access Complexity value and
hence low overall exploitability subscore. Four of them have a medium overall severity and only
one (CVE-2003-0462) has a low overall severity. Based on software structure analysis, we found
that these vulnerabilities are reachable and three of them have a DSC. The other two vulnerabilities
(CVE-2003-0462 and CVE-2006-5757) do not have a DSC. Additionally, there exists an exploit
for these vulnerabilities. Thus, based on the proposed metrics, the three vulnerabilities that have
a DSC have been assigned a high Structural Severity value while the other two vulnerabilities that
do not have DSCs have been assigned a medium Structural Severity value.
b) CVE-2003-0619, CVE-2004-1137, CVE-2006-2444, CVE-2007-1357, CVE-2009-0065,
CVE-2009-3613 and CVE-2010-1173:
According to the CVSS metrics, these vulnerabilities have a network Access Vector value and
thus have been assigned a high overall exploitability subscore. Six vulnerabilities have been as-
signed a high overall severity and only one vulnerability, CVE-2003-0619, that has been assigned
a medium overall severity. Based on the software structure analysis, these vulnerabilities have
been found reachable and three of them have a DSC. The other four vulnerabilities (CVE-2003-
0619, CVE-2009-0065, CVE-2009-3613, and CVE-2010-1173) do not have a DSC. Besides, there
exists an exploit for these vulnerabilities. Thus, based on the proposed metrics, the three vulner-
abilities that have DSCs have been assigned a high Structural Severity value while the other four
vulnerabilities that do not have DSCs have been assigned a medium Structural Severity value.
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Table 6.9: The Obtained Structural Severity Metrics Compared to CVSS Metrics of Linux Kernel
Dataset
No Vulnerability 














AC AV AU SS C I A SS 
1 CVE-2002-0499 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N P N 2.9 L EE 
2 CVE-2003-0462 R NDSC M H L NR 1.9 N N P 2.9 L EE 
3 CVE-2003-0619 R NDSC M L N NR 10 N N P 2.9 M EE 
4 CVE-2003-0961 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
5 CVE-.2003-0985 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
6 CVE-2004-0424 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
7 CVE-2004-1016 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N P 2.9 L EE 
8 CVE-2004-1073 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 P N N 2.9 L EE 
9 CVE-2004-1137 R DSC H L N NR 10 C C C 10 H EE 
10 CVE-2004-1235 R DSC H H L NR 1.9 C C C 10 M EE 
11 CVE-2004-1333 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N P 2.9 L EE 
12 CVE-2005-0736 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N P N 2.9 L EE 
13 CVE-2005-0750 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
14 CVE-2005-1263 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
15 CVE-2005-1589 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C C C 10 H EE 
16 CVE-2005-2709 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 P P P 6.4 M EE 
17 CVE-2005-2973 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 P N N 2.9 L EE 
18 CVE-2005-3257 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 P P P 6.4 M EE 
19 CVE-2005-3807 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
20 CVE-2005-3808 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
21 CVE-2005-3857 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
22 CVE-2006-2444 R DSC H L N NR 10 N N C 6.9 H EE 
23 CVE-2006-2451 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 P P P 6.4 M EE 
24 CVE-2006-2629 R DSC H H L NR 1.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
25 CVE-2006-5757 R NDSC M H L NR 1.9 N N P 2.9 L EE 
26 CVE-2007-1000 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 N N C 10 H EE 
27 CVE-2007-1357 R DSC H L N NR 10 N N C 6.9 H EE 
28 CVE-2007-1388 R NDSC M M L SS 2.7 N N C 6.9 M EE 
29 CVE-2007-1730 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 C N C 9.2 M EE 
30 CVE-2007-1861 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
31 CVE-2008-4113 R DSC H M L NR 3.9 C N N 6.9 M EE 
32 CVE-2008-4302 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
33 CVE-2008-5713 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
34 CVE-2009-0065 R NDSC M L A NR 10 C C C 10 H EE 
35 CVE-2009-0676 R NDSC M L L NR 3.9 P P N 2.9 L EE 
36 CVE-2009-0746 R DSC H L L NR 3.9 N N C 6.9 M EE 
37 CVE-2009-1337 R DSC H M L NR 3.4 P P P 6.4 M EE 
38 CVE-2009-1897 R DSC H M L NR 3.4 C C C 10 M EE 
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c) CVE-2005-0124, CVE-2005-2492, and CVE-2005-2500:
According to the CVSS metrics, these vulnerabilities have a low Access Complexity value.
Two of them (CVE-2005-0124 and CVE-2005-2492) have been assigned a low overall exploitabil-
ity subscore and a low overall severity and this is because they are locally accessed. On the other
hand, CVE-2005-2500 has been assigned a high overall exploitability subscore and a high overall
severity and this is because it is accessed via a network. Based on software structure analysis, these
vulnerabilities have been found not reachable and one of them, CVE-2005-0124, does not have a
DSC. Moreover, no exploit was found for these vulnerabilities in any of the exploit databases.
Hence, based on the proposed metrics, they have been assigned a low Structural Severity value.
d) CVE-2002-0499, CVE-2003-0462, CVE-2004-1016, CVE-2004-1073, CVE-2004-1333,
CVE-2005-0736, CVE-2005-2973, CVE-2006-5757, CVE-2009-0676, CVE-2009-1961, CVE-
2010-1636, and CVE-2010-4073:
According to the CVSS metrics, these vulnerabilities have a local Access Vector value and
thus have been assigned a low overall exploitability subscore and a low overall severity. All of
these vulnerabilities require no authentication. Besides, eight out of these vulnerabilities have a
low Access Complexity value. Out of the remaining four vulnerabilities only two vulnerabilities
(CVE-2003-0462 and CVE-2006-5757) have a high Access Complexity value whereas the other
two have a medium access complexity (CVE-2009-1961 and CVE-2010-4073). Based on the
software structure analysis, we found that these vulnerabilities are reachable and seven of them
have a DSC. Besides, there exists an exploit for all of them. Hence, based on the proposed metrics,
the vulnerabilities that have a DSC have been assigned a high Structural Severity value while the
vulnerabilities that do not have DSCs have been assigned a medium Structural Severity value.
6.4.7 Performance Evaluation of the Proposed Metric
Since data is available about the existence of exploits, we can compare the Structural Severity
Reachability metric with the CVSS exploitability metrics based on the availability of exploits.
To evaluate the performance of these two metrics, we used sensitivity, precision, and F-measure
measures. These performance measures are explained using a confusion matrix as shown in Table
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Table 6.10: Confusion matrix
Prediction
Actual Exploitable Not exploitable
Exploitable TP= True Positive FN= False Negative
Not exploitable FP= False Positive TN= True Negative
6.10. The confusion matrix table shows the actual vs. the predicted results. For the two class
problem (a vulnerability is either exploitable or not exploitable), the following is defined based on
Table 6.10.
• True Positive (TP): the number of the vulnerabilities predicted as exploitable, which do in
fact have an exploit.
• False Negative (FN): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as not exploitable, which turn
out to have an exploit.
• False Positive (FP): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as exploitable when they have
no exploit.
• True Negative (TN): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as not exploitable when there is
no exploit.
The selected performance measures can be derived as follows.
Sensitivity (Recall)
Sensitivity, which also termed recall, is defined as the ratio of the number of vulnerabilities
correctly predicted as exploitable to the number of vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable as





Precision, which is also known as the correctness, is defined as the ratio of the number of
vulnerabilities correctly predicted as exploitable to the total number of vulnerabilities predicted as
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For convenient interpretation, we express these two measures in terms of percentage, where a
100% is the best value and 0% is the worst value. Both precision and sensitivity should be as close
to the value 100 as possible (no false positives and no false negatives). However, such ideal values
are difficult to obtain because sensitivity and precision often change in opposite directions. There-
fore, a measure that combines sensitivity and precision in a single measure is needed. Hence, we
will introduce the F-measure in the following section. We believe that it is more important to iden-
tify exploitable vulnerabilities even at the expense of incorrectly predicting some not exploitable
vulnerabilities as exploitable vulnerabilities. This is because a single exploitable vulnerability may
lead to serious security failures. Having said that, we think more weight should be given to sensi-
tivity than precision. Thus, we include F2-measure, which weights sensitivity twice as precision,
to evaluate the two metrics.
F-measure
F-measure can be interpreted as the weighted average of sensitivity and precision. It measures
the effectiveness of a prediction with respect to a user attaches the times as much importance to
sensitivity as precision. The general formula for the F-measure is shown by the following:
Fβ −Measure =
(1 + β2)× Precision× Senetivity
(β2 × Precision) + Senetivity
β is a parameter that controls a balance between sensitivity and precision. When β = 1, F-measure
becomes to be equivalent to the harmonic mean, whereas when β <1 it becomes more precision
oriented. However, when β >1, F-measure becomes more sensitivity oriented. In this paper β has
been chosen to be 2.
Comparison of the Performance Evaluation Results
Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 report the total subscore (SS column) for the CVSS exploitability
metrics, the values of the Structural Severity Reachability metric, and the availability of the ex-
ploits for the Apache HTTP Server and Linux Kernel datasets respectively. The ranges of CVSS
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exploitability metrics subscores are 1 to 10, whereas the values of the Structural Severity Reacha-
bility metric are R or NR. Figure 6.12 shows the distribution of the CVSS Exploitability subscore
for Apache HTTP server and Linux Kernel datasets. Here, the population is split into two: vul-
nerabilities with CVSS Exploitability subscore >6 are considered exploitable (positive test) and
those <6 are considered not exploitable (negative test). The minimum and maximum exploitability
subscores for Apache and Linux are 1.9 and 10 respectively, whereas the mean and the standard
deviation for Apache are 8.3 and 1.9 respectively. However, the mean and the standard deviation






































(a)                                                              (b)
Figure 6.12: Distribution of CVSS Exploitability Subscores for Apache HTTP Server and Linux
Kernel
As can be seen from Figure 6.12, most of the vulnerabilities do turn out to have a high Ex-
ploitability subscore for Apache whereas a low Exploitability subscore for Linux. This is because
of the Access Vector metric. The majority of the vulnerabilities in Apache is remotely accessed
and hence has been assigned a high exploitability subscore (8 out of 10). On the other hand, most
of the vulnerabilities in Linux are locally accessed and thus have been assigned a low exploitability
subscore (3.9 out of 10). It should be noted that neither the Authentication metric nor the Access
Complexity metric values (Low and Medium) have a significant effect on the exploitability total
subscore for both datasets. However, when the Access Complexity metric value is high it notably
affects the exploitability total subscore. Nonetheless, only two out of 25 vulnerabilities in Apache
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dataset and five out of 86 vulnerabilities in Linux dataset have been found to have a high value
Access Complexity.
Table 6.11 compares the two metrics using the Apache HTTP Server and Linux datasets.
From the table we can observe that the Structural Severity Reachability metric performs better in
terms of all measures than CVSS exploitability metrics for the Apache dataset. However, in the
Linux dataset the Structural Severity Reachability metric performs much better than the CVSS ex-
ploitability metrics. It has been observed that when the software and the dataset size were changed,
the Structural Severity Reachability metric performs better than CVSS exploitability metrics in
terms of precision, F1 and F2-measures. This can be attributed to the fact that most of the vul-
nerabilities in the Linux Kernel require an attacker to have a Local access to exploit them and
that makes their exploitation harder, and hence they have been assigned a low exploitability sub-
score. For the Apache dataset, the false positive rate for the two metrics is 85.71% whereas the
false negative rate is 0% for the Structural Severity metric and 0.09% for the CVSS exploitability
metrics. Having the 0.09% false negative rate is because the vulnerability CVE-2006-3747 has
an exploit and the CVSS exploitability metrics predicted it as being not exploitable. On the other
hand, for the Linux Kernel dataset the false positive rate slightly fell for the Structural Severity
metric (82%), whereas it notably reduced for the CVSS exploitability metrics (41%). This can
be explained by the increase in the false negative rate (89%). This can be attributed to the fact
that there are 86 vulnerabilities with an exploit in Linux Kernel that have been assigned a low
exploitability subscore.
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We argue that it is better to have more nonexploitable vulnerabilities inspected than to have one
exploitable vulnerability being left unchecked. It should be noted that the Structural Severity mea-
sure captures the exploitability factor by using only one attribute, reachability, whereas the CVSS
exploitability metrics uses three attributes, Access Complexity, Access Vector, and Authentication.
6.5 Discussion and Threats to Validity
6.5.1 Discussion of the Case Study Results
Having an approach that does not depend on the availability of the security experts can be
of great value. The proposed measure is based on software properties that reflect exploitability
factors. We have observed that the proposed approach has not been found to be less restrictive
than its counterpart, CVSS, except in two cases, when the vulnerabilities (CVE-2004-0488 and
CVE-2007-5000) were found not reachable.
We have also observed that identifying critical functions can be accomplished by looking at the
number of functions that are called by the vulnerable function. The more functions called by the
vulnerable function, the higher the effect if the vulnerable function is exploited. Figure 7.12 shows
the call graphs of the vulnerability CVE-2009-1195. This graph shows the number of functions
that are called by the vulnerable function. This vulnerability impacts two functions as explained in
subsection 5.3. Figure 7.12 (a) shows the vulnerable function process resource config nofmatch
directly calls 10 functions, whereas the other vulnerable function ap process config tree directly
calls only two functions as shown in Figure 7.12 (b). Bhattacharya et al. [94] introduced a bug
severity metric called Node-Rank. It measures the relative importance of a function or module in
the function call or module graphs. It could be interesting if the same can be done for vulnerability
severity so the risk of exploitation can be further illustrated.
Sparks et al. [95] studied the penetration depth of reaching a node in a Control Flow Graph.
They found that the nodes at greater depths (>10 edges) become increasingly difficult to reach.
In other words, it is hard to craft an input that can lead to such a node at a particular depth. If
crafting an input that can reach a vulnerable statement for a single method is difficult, we believe




Figure 6.13: Functions that are called by the vulnerable functions (Calls Graph)
be even harder. If we further assume that the target system is a closed system, it gets even harder
for the attackers to figure out the sequences of calls and inputs that are needed to trigger them.
However, it has been also observed that the degree of a call depth of vulnerable functions varies
among vulnerabilities. Some of the vulnerabilities have only one degree of depth while others
have 13. Figure 7.13 shows the degree of depth of the vulnerability CVE-2010-0434. Due to page
size limitation, we have only showed the depth up to level 5. We believe that the depth degree
of a vulnerable function can inform us about the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability, because
the more functions an attacker has to invoke to reach a vulnerable function the harder to get it
exploited.
Even though most of the property extraction has been automated, it has been noticed that per-
forming vulnerability exploitation assessment remained dependable on the human. For instance,
looking at a table with 25 vulnerabilities and comparing the selected properties to decide the risk of
a given vulnerability is fairly attainable. However, having a larger dataset can be challenging and
error-prone. It would be helpful if this part of the process can be automated by using some tech-
niques from machine learning. Having the exploitability properties extracted from the source code,
the machine learning model can automatically assess the exploitability risk based on the data. This
idea could also help in managing scalability as machine learning techniques have shown success
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Figure 6.14: Depth of a vulnerable function calls (Called By Graph)
in dealing with sizable data sets. Moreover, it also makes adding added number of exploitability
properties (features) handy.
It has also been noted that even though a vulnerability reachability is an important factor of
exploitation, considering the exploit mitigation guards at the function level could be a great addi-
tion. For instance, having an exploit guards such as GuardStack (GS) can prevent exploits from
exploiting a vulnerability even if the exploit has called the vulnerable function. Sparks et al. [95]
stated that it is possible to identify functions that have not been compiled to use GS through the
use of simple static analysis tools. This can be used as an estimator of exploitation impact. Thus,
vulnerabilities (vulnerable functions) with exploit mitigation guards could be considered of a low
risk.
6.5.2 Threats to Validity
External validity: The main threat to external validity is choosing two datasets, the Apache
HTTP server and Linux Kernel. However, Apache HTTP server, since its release in 1995, has
gone through a number of improvements which led to the release of several versions: 1.3.x, 2.0.x,
2.2.x, 2.3.x, and 2.4.x. For the release 1.3.x alone there are 47 versions whereas for the release
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2.2 there are 23 versions. The Apache HTTP server has a richer history of public available vul-
nerabilities, more than 169. Besides, its line of code varies between 50,712 LOC to 358,633 LOC.
Moreover, Apache HTTP server has varieties of vulnerabilities: Denial of Service (69), Execute
Code (24), Overflow (16), XSS (21), Bypass Something (14), Gain Information (13), Directory
Traversal (4), Gain Privilege (6), Memory Corruption (1), Http Response Splitting (1), and CSRF
(1) (National Vulnerability Database 2013). Even though Apache HTTP server has mainly been
developed using C/C++, languages like HTML, Java script, Python, and XML have been used too.
Web servers form a major component of the Internet and they are targeted by attackers (more than
1,000 malicious HTTP requests in six months (Imperva 2012)). According to Usage Statistics and
Market Share(2013), Apache web server is used by over 64% among most commonly used web
servers. On the other hand, Linux Kernel has larger number of vulnerabilities, more than 1200. Its
size in line of code has ranged from 10,239 LOC to 15,803,499 LOC. It also has a greater variety
of vulnerabilities: Denial of Service (750), Execute Code (58), Overflow (213), Bypass Something
(67), Gain Information (197), Directory Traversal (2), Gain Privilege (149), Memory Corruption
(68), and Gain Privilege (149).
Internal Validity: The main threat to internal validity is the chosen factors for measuring the
risk of vulnerability exploitation: reachability and DSCs. As an exploit in its basic form is an
input, a vulnerability has to be reachable in order for the input to be able to trigger it. Therefore,
reachability can be considered as a major contributor. However, not all vulnerabilities that are
reachable are exploitable and that is because of the degree of difficulty of reaching vulnerabilities.
For instance, vulnerabilities that are hard to reach are also hard to exploit and should be given
less priority. This could introduce false positive results. Nevertheless, the degree of difficulty is
dependent on whether a vulnerability is reachable or not. Once that is decided, we need to assess
whether the code path to the vulnerable location is hard to reach or not. We recognize this threat and
we are investigating the possibility of objectively measuring the difficulty of reachability using the
following: 1) the number of function calls an attacker has to invoke to reach the vulnerable code,
2) an authentication verification mechanisms along the path to the vulnerable location, and 3) the
privilege required to invoke the vulnerable function.
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Even though using DSCs help in eliminating subjectivity, we recognize that capturing the tech-
nical impact by only considering the existence of a DSC might not be sufficient. Factors such
as privilege of the vulnerable function, exploit mitigation, and authentication could be a major
contributor too. However, measuring these factors can introduce subjectivity. Ensuring objective
measurements of these factors requires further research.
Construct Validity: We used a commercial tool named Understand to automatically generate
call graph between the functions. We also used SVN provided by the Apache project foundation
to identify the vulnerabilities location. Moreover, we used the cflow and a python script to identify
attack entry points. Usage of the third party tools and a python script represent potential threats to
construct validity. We verified the results produced by these tools by manually checking randomly
selected outputs produced by each tool.
Part of our measurement of exploitability uses the attack entry points as an estimate of the at-
tack resources that an attacker can use to exploit vulnerabilities. Even though a significant concern
resides in areas where the system obtains external data, there are vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited without sending data to the system. This represents a threat to construct validity. However,
our vulnerabilities datasets have been collected from NVD that provides a list of the types of vul-
nerabilities that it uses. There are 19 types of vulnerabilities in the NVD. Based on their Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) number and the description provided by the CWE and the NVD,
we verified that the selected vulnerabilities are directly influenced by a user input.
6.6 Related Work
In this section, we review the work related to vulnerability exploitation risk assessment. We
organize this section based on the method used to assess exploitation risk into: measurement-based,
model-based, test-based, and analysis-based approaches.
6.6.1 Measurement-Based Approaches
Attack Surface Metric: The attack surface notion was first introduced by Howard in his
Relative Attack Surface metric [96]. It was later formally defined by Manadhata and Wing [69].
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They proposed a framework that included the notion of Entry and Exit Points and the associated
damage potential-effort ratio. They applied their formally defined metric to many systems and the
results show the applicability of the notion of the attack surface. Their new metric has been adapted
by a few major software companies, such as Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and SAP. Manadhdata
et al. [72] related the number of reported vulnerabilities for two FTP daemons with the attack
surface metric along the method dimension. Younis and Malaiya [8] compared the vulnerability
density of two versions of Apache HTTP server with the attack surface metric along the method
dimension. However, attack surface metric does not measure the risk of exploitation of individual
vulnerabilities. Rather, it measures the exploitability for the whole system and as a result it cannot
help in prioritizing among vulnerabilities. Besides, neither Manadhata et al. [72] nor Younis and
Malaiya [8], however, related entry points with the location of the vulnerability to measure its
exploitability.
CVSS Metrics: CVSS metrics are the de facto standard that is currently used to measure the
severity of vulnerabilities [4]. CVSS Base Score measures severity based on the exploitability (the
ease of exploiting vulnerability) and impact (the effect of exploitation). Exploitability is assessed
based on three metrics: Access Vector, Authentication, and Access Complexity. However, CVSS
exploitability measures have come under some criticism. First, they assign static subjective num-
bers to the metrics based on expert knowledge regardless of the type of vulnerability, and they do
not correlate with the existence of known exploit [97]. Second, two of its factors (Access Vector
and Authentication) have the same value for almost all vulnerabilities [83]. Third, there is no for-
mal procedure for evaluating the third factor (Access Complexity) [4]. Consequently, it is unclear
if CVSS considers the software structure and properties as a factor.
6.6.2 Model-Based Approaches
Probabilistic Model: Joh and Malaiya [49] formally defined a risk measure as a likelihood of
adverse events and the impact of this event. On one hand, they utilized the vulnerability lifecycle
and applied the Markov stochastic model to measure the likelihood of vulnerability exploitability
for an individual vulnerability and the whole system. On the other hand, they used the impact re-
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lated metrics from CVSS to estimate the exploitability impact. They applied their metric to assess
the risk of two systems that had known unpatched vulnerabilities using actual data. However, the
transition rate between vulnerability lifecycle events has not been determined and the probability
distribution of lifecycle events remains to be studied. Moreover, the probability of being in an
exploit state requires information about the attacker behavior which might not be available. Addi-
tionally, the probability of a patch being available but not applied requires information about the
administrator behavior which has not been considered by the proposed model and also hard to be
obtained. In contrast, we assess vulnerability exploitability for individual vulnerabilities based on
the source code properties regardless of the availability or unavailability of a patch.
Logistic Model:Vulnerability density metric assesses the risk of potential exploitation based on
the density of the residual vulnerabilities [71]. The density of residual vulnerabilities is measured
based on the number of known reported vulnerabilities and the total number of vulnerabilities.
However, the total number of vulnerabilities is unknown but can be predicted using vulnerability
discovery models (VDMs). Alhazmi and Malaiya [28] proposed a logistic vulnerability discovery
model, termed the AML model. AML examines the reported known vulnerabilities of a software
system to estimate the total number of vulnerabilities and their rate of discovery. However, con-
sidering the number of vulnerabilities alone is insufficient in assessing the risk of an individual
vulnerability exploitation. Because different vulnerabilities have different opportunity of being
exploited based on their properties such as reachability.
Machine Learning based Metric: Bozorgi et al. [97] aimed at measuring vulnerability sever-
ity based on likelihood of exploitability. They argued that the exploitability measures in CVSS
Base Score metric cannot tell much about the vulnerability severity. They attributed that to the fact
that CVSS metrics rely on expert knowledge and static formula. To that end, the authors proposed
a machine learning and data mining technique that can predict the possibility of vulnerability ex-
ploitability. They observed that many vulnerabilities have been found to have a high severity score
using CVSS exploitability metric although there were no known exploits existing for them. This
indicates that the CVSS score does not differentiate between exploited and non-exploited vulner-
abilities. This result was also confirmed by [83, 98]. However, unlike their work, ours relies
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on software properties such as the attack surface entry points, the source code structure, and the
vulnerabilities location to estimate vulnerability exploitability. This is particularly important for
newly released applications that do not have a large amount of historical vulnerabilities.
6.6.3 Test-Based Approaches (proof of concept)
Automated exploit-generation system (AEG): Avgerinos et al. [99] proposed an automated
exploit-generation system (AEG) to assess the risk of vulnerability exploitation. AEG rst uses the
static analysis to nd a potential bug locations in a program, and then uses a combination of static
and dynamic analysis to nd an execution path that reproduces the bug, and then generates an exploit
automatically. AEG generates exploits, which provides an evidence that the bugs it nds are critical
security vulnerabilities. However, generating an exploit is expensive and does not scale. AEG has
only been applied to a specific type of vulnerabilities and software.
Black Box Fuzz Testing: Sparks et al. [95] extended the black box fuzzing using a genetic
algorithm that use the past branch proling information to direct the input generation in order to
cover specied program regions or points in the control ow graph. The control ow is modeled
as Markov process and a tness function is dened over Markov probabilities that are associated
with a state transition on the control ow graph. They generated inputs using the grammatical
evolution. These inputs are capable of reaching deeply vulnerable code which is hidden in a hard
to reach locations. In contrast to their work, ours relies on the source code analysis, a link between
vulnerability location and attack surface entry points, and the DSC analysis that were specifically
intended for measuring vulnerability exploitability.
6.6.4 Analysis-Based Approaches
Black Market Data Analysis: Allodi and Massacci [83, 98] proposed the black market as
an index of risk of vulnerability exploitation. Their approach assesses the risk of vulnerability ex-
ploitation based on the volumes of the attacks coming from the vulnerability in the black market.
It first looks at the attack tools and verifies whether the vulnerability is used by such tool or not. It
also analyzes the attacks on the wild to verify whether the vulnerability has been a target of such
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attacks or not. If the vulnerability is being used by one of the attack tools or being a target of real
attacks, they consider this vulnerability as a threat for exploitation. This approach has introduced a
new view of measuring the risk of exploitation by considering the history of attacks at the vulnera-
bilities. This approach does not require spending large amount of technical resources to thoroughly
investigate the possibility of vulnerability exploitation. However, this approach requires a vulner-
ability intelligence provider as the information about the attacks and tools are dynamic in nature.
Moreover, if the vulnerability right now is not used by a tool or it is not a target of an attack, it
does not mean that it is going to be so continually. Our approach, on the other hand, relies only on
software properties and does not make any assumption about the attacks and attackers resources.
Source Code Analysis: Brenneman [100] introduced the idea of linking the attack surface
entry point to the attack target to prioritize the effort and resource required for software security
analysis. Their approach is based on the path-based analysis, which can be utilized to generate
an attack map. This helps visualizing the attack surfaces, attack target, and functions that link
them. This is believed to make a significant improvement in software security analysis. In contrast
to their work, we do not only utilize the idea of linking the attack surface entry point with the
reported vulnerability location to estimate vulnerability exploitability, but also check for the DSCs
inside every related entry point to estimate the impact of exploitation. The use of the DSCs is
helpful for inferring an attackers motive in invoking the entry point method.
System Calls Analysis: Massimo et al. [91] presented a detailed analysis of the UNIX system
calls and classify them according to their level of threat with respect to the system penetration. To
control these system calls invocation, they proposed the Reference Monitor for UNIX System
(REMUS) mechanism to detect an intrusion that may use these system calls which could subvert
the execution of privileged applications. Nevertheless, our work applies their idea to estimate
the impact of exploitation, as attackers usually look to cause more damage to targeted systems.
Thus, our work is not about intrusion detection but rather measuring the exploitability of a known
vulnerability.
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6.7 Conclusion and Future Work
Assessing the severity of a vulnerability requires evaluating the potential risk. Existing mea-
sures do not consider software access complexity and tend to rely on subjective judgment. In this
paper, we have proposed an approach that uses system related attributes such as attack surface
entry points, vulnerability location, call function analysis, and the existence of DSCs. This ap-
proach requires us to examine some of the structural aspects of security such as the paths to the
vulnerable code starting from the entry points. We have demonstrated the applicability of the pro-
posed approach and have compared resulting measures with overall CVSS severity metrics. Our
results show that this approach, involving assessment of the system security based on systematic
evaluation and not subjective judgment, is feasible.
While the main parts of the analysis have been automated, providing a framework that can
automate the entire analysis will be helpful in reducing the effort. We plan to develop techniques
to reduce human involvement and thus enhance scalability in assessing exploitability risk by us-
ing machine learning techniques. We plan to examine the effectiveness of machine learning for
automatically assessing the risk of vulnerability exploitation using the proposed properties as fea-
tures. Given a vulnerable function and their exploitability features the machine learning model can
predict whether it is an exploitable function and estimate the impact of its exploitation.
Even though measuring the possibility of reaching a vulnerability is important, quantifying the
degree of difficulty of reaching a vulnerability is also valuable for comparing the severity among
similar vulnerabilities, and thus needs to be examined. We plan to utilize the idea of the function
call graph depth which has been presented in the discussion section. Devising a way of estimating
the impact of reachable vulnerabilities will be valuable for estimating the overall risk of individ-
ual vulnerabilities and the whole system. We plan to further study the Node-Rank proposed by
Bhattacharya et al. [94] as an estimator of the vulnerability impact. Finally, identifying whether
a vulnerable function is guarded by security control can help better understand the impact of ex-
ploitation. We intend to study how function exploitation properties proposed by Skape [101] can




In this chapter, internal software attributes (metrics) that can be used to predict vulnerability
exploitability risk will be examined. We characterize the vulnerable functions that have no exploit
and the ones that have an exploit using eight metrics: Source Line of Code, Cyclomatic complexity,
CountPath, Nesting Degree, Information Flow, Calling functions, Called by functions, and Number
of Invocations. We first test the discriminative power of the individual selected metrics using the
Welch t-test. Then we select a combination of the metrics using three feature selection methods
and evaluate their predictive power using four classifiers.
7.1 Introduction
Identifying and addressing software vulnerabilities is important before software release be-
cause a single software vulnerability can lead to a breach with a high impact to an organization.
However, identifying and addressing potential vulnerabilities can take considerable expertise and
effort. Recently, researchers [102, 103, 104, 35] have started investigating ways to predict code
areas which are more likely to be vulnerable so security testers can focus on them.
Software vulnerabilities, pose different levels of potential risk. A vulnerability with an exploit
written for it presents more risk than the one without an exploit because the existence of an exploit
allows an attacker to take advantage of a vulnerability and potentially compromise the affected
systems. Allodi and Massacci in [83] have shown that out of the 49599 vulnerabilities reported
by the National Vulnerability Database, only 2.10% are in fact exploited. Younis and Malaiya
in [7] have also found that only 6.8% out of 486 vulnerabilities of Microsoft Internet Explorer
have reported exploits. K. Nayak et al. [105] have reported that combining all of the products
they have studied only 15% of disclosed vulnerabilities are ever exploited. Thus, identifying what
characterizes a vulnerability having an exploit is needed; it can identify code that are more likely
than others to have exploits and help security testers focus on areas of highest risk, thus saving
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limited resources and time. It should be noted that having a reported exploit does not necessarily
mean some company or individuals have suffered a real attack. It means that a proof for exploiting
a vulnerability exists. Obtaining data on real attacks is challenging because such data is gener-
ally kept confidential. Therefore, we will use the presence of an exploit as the ground truth for
characterizing exploited vulnerabilities.
Discriminating between a vulnerability that has no exploit from the one that has an exploit is
challenging because both of them have similar characteristics. Besides, the number of vulnera-
bilities with a reported exploit are few compared to the vulnerabilities without a reported exploit.
Although vulnerability exploitability can be characterized by external factors such as attacker pro-
file, software market share, etc., the focus of this study is on predicting vulnerability exploitability
using internal attributes. This can help software developers predict vulnerabilities exploitability on
the development side rather than the deployment side.
The objective of this research is to investigate what could characterize a code containing a vul-
nerability with an exploit. To address this objective, we have studied 183 vulnerabilities from the
National Vulnerability Database [16] for the Linux Kernel and Apache HTTP server. The two soft-
ware systems have been selected because of their rich history of publicly available vulnerabilities,
availability of reported exploits, the existence of an integrated repository, availability of the source
code, and their diversity in size, functionalities, and domain. For every selected vulnerability, we
verify whether it has an exploit reported in the Exploit Database or not [22]. Eighty-two vulner-
abilities have been found to have an exploit. Ten of them are for Apache HTTP server and 72 for
Linux Kernel. We then mapped these vulnerabilities to their locations at the function granularity
level.
After that, we characterize the vulnerable functions with and without an exploit using the se-
lected eight software metrics: Source Line of Code, Cyclomatic complexity, CountPath, Nesting
Degree, Information Flow, Calling functions, Called by functions, and Number of Invocations.
The reasons why these metrics have been selected are discussed in the hypotheses and methodol-
ogy section. Based on the metrics values of the vulnerable functions with and without an exploit,
we first test the individual selected metrics discriminative power using Welch t-test [106]. Next,
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we select a combination of these metric using three feature selection methods: correlation-based,
wrapper, and principal component analysis. Then, we test the predictive power of the selected sub-
set of metrics using four classifiers: Logistic Regression, Nave Base, Random Forest, and Support
Vector machine.
The results demonstrate that vulnerabilities having an exploit can be characterized. The inves-
tigation also shows that predicting exploitation of vulnerabilities is more complex than predicting
the presence of vulnerabilities and hence further research that considers metrics from security do-
main is needed to improve the predictability of vulnerability exploits.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 8.2, the background of the vulnerabilities, vulner-
ability databases, exploit database, software metrics, confusion matrix, and feature subset selection
methods are discussed. In the next section, the hypotheses are examined and the methodology of
testing them is presented. In sections 8.4, the case studies along with the results are introduced.
Section 8.5 presents the discussion whereas section 8.6 presents the related work. Finally, con-
cluding comments is given along with the issues that need further research.
7.2 Related Topics and Concepts
7.2.1 Software Metrics
A software metric is a measure of some property of a piece of software. Table 7.1 summarizes
the eight selected metrics. We have selected these metrics based on prior research on fault and
vulnerability prediction.
7.2.2 Confusion Matrix
The confusion matrix table shows the actual vs. the predicted results. For the two class problem
a vulnerability is either has an exploit or has no exploit. The following terms are defined based on
Table 7.2.
True Positive (TP): the number of the vulnerabilities predicted as having an exploit, which do
in fact have an exploit. False Negative (FN): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as not having
an exploit, which turn out to have an exploit. False Positive (FP): the number of vulnerabilities
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Table 7.1: Software Metrics
Metrics Description
Source Line of Code
SLOC measures the size of a code [107]. A higher value of SLOC
indicates that an entity is to be difficult to test.
Cyclomatic complexity
CYC measures the number of independent paths through a program
unit [108]. The higher this metric the more likely an entity is to be
difficult to test.
CountPath
CountPath measures the number of unique decision paths.
A higher value of the CountPath metric represents a more
complex code structure [107].
Nesting Degree
ND measures the maximum nesting level of control structures in
a function. The higher this metric the more likely an entity is to
be difficult to test [109].
Information Flow
”Fan-In measures information flow which represents the number
of inputs a function uses [110]. The more inputs from external
sources the harder to trace where they came from. ”
Calling Functions
”In-Degree measures the number of functions that call the function
corresponding to the node [111]. The more dependent upon a
peace of code the higher the chance it has a defect.”
Called by Functions
”Out-Degree measures the number of functions that the
function corresponding to the node calls [111]. The more
depends upon other code the higher the chance
to have a defect. ”
Number of Invocations
It measures the number of functions that needed to be called before
invoking the vulnerable function [12]. The higher this metric the
more difficult to reach the vulnerable code.
Table 7.2: Confusion matrix
Prediction
Actual Has an Exploit Has no Exploit
Has an Exploit TP= True Positive FN=False Negative
Has no Exploit FP= False Positive TN= True Negative
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predicted as having an exploit when they have no exploit. True Negative (TN): the number of
vulnerabilities predicted as not having an exploit when there is no exploit.
7.2.3 Feature Subset Selection
Two commonly known types of feature subset selection methods are the filter and the wrapper
approach. In the filter approach, the feature selection is performed independently of the learning
algorithm and it selects a subset based only on the data characteristics. The wrapper approach,
however, conducts a search for a good subset using the learning algorithm as part of the evaluation
function [65].
Correlation-based feature selection
Correlation-based feature selection (CFS) evaluates subsets of attributes instead of individual
attributes [112]. This technique uses a heuristic to evaluate subset of attributes. The heuristic
balances how predictive a group of features are and how much redundancy is among them. In this
study, CFS is used with the Greedy stepwise forward search through the space of attribute subsets.
Wrapper Subset Evaluation
The wrapper feature subset evaluation conducts a search for a good subset using a learning
algorithm (classifier) as part of the evaluation function. In this study, repeated five-fold cross-
validation is used as an estimate for the accuracy of the classifier while a greedy stepwise forward
search is used to produce a list of attributes, which are ranked according to their overall contribution
to the accuracy of the attribute set with respect to the target learning algorithm [113].
Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique that transforms a set of possibly
correlated variables into a set of linearly uncorrelated variables [114]. These linearly uncorrelated
variables are called principal components. The transformation is accomplished by first computing
the covariance matrix of the original variables and after that finding its Eigen vectors, principal
components. The principal components have the property that most of their information content
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is stored in the first few features so that the remainder can be discarded. It should be noted that
in this paper, PCA is used with the ranker search method that ranks attributes by their individual
evaluations.
7.3 Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section, we provide our hypotheses that are needed to be researched and then provide
the methods to test them.
7.3.1 Hypotheses
It should be noted that the metrics in section 2.3 have been classified into four classes: size
(SLOC), structure (CYC, CountPath, ND), ease of access (Number of Invocations), and commu-
nication (Fan-In, In-Degree, Out-degree) so to ease the analysis and observation. The rationale
behind using the selected metrics to derive our hypothesis is explained as follows.
In the software security field, experts argued that complexity is the enemy of security [102]. It
is believed that complexity can be the cause of subtle vulnerabilities that are hard to test and analyze
[115] and hence providing a chance to attackers to exploit them. However, we consider the fact
that predicting a presence of a vulnerability is different from predicting its exploitation because
the latter involves the attacker behavior. As the measures of the complexity vary, we consider
the possibility that the potential exploit writers would prefer to exploit less complex code [116].
Besides, in [117], the researchers have observed that the complexity measures for Windows 7 and
8 were negative and they argued that the reason could be that attackers favor simpler vulnerable
targets. Based on these reasons, we set up the following research hypotheses related to code
complexity (size and structure metrics):
H1: The values of the size metric for vulnerabilities with an exploit are lower than for vulner-
abilities without an exploit.
H2: The values of the structure metrics for vulnerabilities with an exploit are lower than for
vulnerabilities without an exploit.
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Sparks et al. [95] studied the penetration depth of reaching a node in a control flow graph.
They found that the nodes at greater depths (¿10 edges) become increasingly difficult to reach. If
crafting an input that can reach a vulnerable statement for a single method is difficult, we believe
that crafting an input to call a method containing a vulnerable statement from other methods could
be even harder. If we further assume the target system is a closed system, it gets even harder
for the attackers to figure out the sequences of calls and inputs that are needed to trigger them.
Younis et al. [12] observed that the degree of a call depth of vulnerable functions varies among
vulnerabilities. Some of the vulnerabilities have only one degree of depth, while others have 13.
Thus, we set up the following research hypothesis for the ease of access (Number of Invocations
metric):
H3: The values of the ease of access metric for vulnerabilities with an exploit are lower than
for vulnerabilities without an exploit.
On the other hand, Younis et al. [12] argued that the more functions are called by the vulner-
able function, the higher the effect if the vulnerable function is exploited. They have shown that
some vulnerable functions call more than 10 functions while other functions call only one or two
functions. Based on the attack surface concept [96], however, the more a function is exposed to
the outside environment the larger attack surface. Thus, we argue that the higher the communica-
tion a function has, the larger its attack surface gets. From this reasoning, we set up the following
research hypothesis for the communication (Fan-In, In-Degree, Out-degree metrics):
H4: The values of communication metrics for vulnerabilities with an exploit are higher than
for vulnerabilities without an exploit.
As argued by Manadhata and Wing [69], no single metric can be an indicator of software
quality for all types of software. Besides, according to [19], a feature (or two features) that is
completely useless by itself (themselves) can be useful when taken with others (together). There-
fore, determining the combination of multiple features (metrics) is important. Thus, we set up the
following research hypothesis:
H5: There is a combination of metrics that significantly predicts vulnerabilities with an exploit.
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7.3.2 Evaluation Strategy for the Hypotheses
We first investigate the discriminative power of the proposed individual metrics and then test
their predictive capability when they are combined. A metric has a discriminative power if it
can discriminate between high-quality software components and low-quality software components
[118]. In this reserach, a vulnerable function is classified as exploited if there exists a reported
exploit for it and as not exploited if there exists no reported exploit for it at the time of our study.
To evaluate the discriminative power of the proposed hypotheses, H1, H2, H3, and H4, we test
their null hypotheses. Because our data has unequal sample size, unequal variances and is skewed,
we used the Welch t-Test [106]. The Welch t-test is an adaptation of t-test to compare the means of
two samples when the two samples have unequal variances and unequal sample sizes and it also is
known to provide a good performance for skewed distributions. The difference between the means
of the two group is considered discriminative when the result from the Welch t-test are statistically
significant at the p <0.05 level.
However, to evaluate the predictive power of the hypothesis H5 (combined metrics), on the
other hand, two challenges have to be addressed. First, how can we select the subset metrics?
Second, how can we evaluate the predictive power of the selected subset? To address the first
challenge, we use feature subset selection methods. There are two commonly used feature subset
selection methods: the filter and the wrapper approach. In this paper, we use correlation-based
feature selection (CFS) and wrapper subset evaluation (WRP) methods. The first method has been
selected because it selects the subset features based on only the characteristics of the data while the
second method selects the features based on the learning algorithm and this can help us observe an
advantage of one method over the other. However, according to [111], combining several metrics
can be affected by the multicollinearity and that is due to the inter-correlation among metrics. To
account for the multicollinearity problem, we use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
compare its result with two selected methods.
To address the second challenge, we evaluate the performance of a binary classification tech-
nique to assess the predictive power of the selected subset metrics. A binary classifier can make
two possible types of errors: false positives and false negatives. These two types of errors are
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defined in section 2.4. To measure the performance of a classifier, we mainly use recall, precision
and false positive ratio. In addition, we also report the harmonic mean of the precision and recall,
using the F-measure, and the accuracy. It should be noted that a high recall value is required even
at the cost of the precision and that is because of the significant impact of one exploited vulnera-
bility. It is also desirable to have a low false positive rate because that helps avoiding a waste of an
inspection effort. P. Morrison et al. in [117] suggested that the value 0.7 of the recall and precision
measures are considered reasonable for the prediction models in the realm of software quality.
Recall is defined as the ratio of the number of vulnerabilities correctly predicted as having
an exploit to the number of. Apache HTTP Server Vulnerabilities Measures vulnerabilities that
actually have an exploit as shown by the following: Recall = TP / TP+FN. Precision, on the other
hand, is defined as the ratio of the number of vulnerabilities correctly predicted as having an exploit
to the total number of vulnerabilities predicted as having an exploit as shown by the following:
Precision = TP / TP+FP. False positive rate is defined as the ratio of the vulnerabilities incorrectly
predicted as having an exploit to the total number of vulnerabilities that have no exploit: FP rate =
FP / FP+TN.
We have considered four classifiers for this study and they are namely: Logistic Regression
(LR), Nave Bayes (NB), Random Forests (RF), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). LR has been
selected because it is a standard statistical classification technique whereas NB has been selected
because it is a simple classifier and it has often outperformed more sophisticated classifiers [35].
Besides, RF has been selected because it is more robust to noise such as inter-correlated features
while SVM has been selected because it is less prone to overfitting.
7.4 Experimentation
The purpose of the experiment is to investigate whether there is a difference in characteristics
between a vulnerable function without exploits and a function with exploits. We have selected
two software systems namely: Linux Kernel and Apache HTTP Server. The two software systems
have been selected because of their rich history of publicly available vulnerabilities, availability of
reported exploits, existence of an integrated repository (which enables us to map vulnerabilities to
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Table 7.3: Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Software EE NEE Total Each
Linux Kernel 72 81 153
Apache 10 20 30
Total All 82 101 183
their location in the source code), availability of the source code (which enables us to collect the
measures of the proposed metrics), and their diversity in size, functionalities, and domain.
7.4.1 Data Collection
In this study, the data about vulnerabilities and exploits of Linux kernel and Apache HTTP
Server were collected from NVD [16] and the EDB [22] respectively from the period 2002 to
2014. Table 7.3 shows the number of the selected vulnerabilities and their exploits. It should be
noted that we have considered all reported vulnerabilities that have an exploit for the two selected
software system. We only considered some of the vulnerabilities that do not have an exploit. These
vulnerabilities have been mainly selected based on their age and information about their locations.
We tried to select the vulnerabilities that are at least 3 or 4 years old, so that their lack of exploit is
not due to their recent discovery.
7.4.2 Computing the Metrics
To collect the selected metrics, we use a function as a logical unit for analysis. Before we can
take the measures of the selected metrics, the location of the vulnerable function is needed to be
identified. The location can be found by looking at the report in the vulnerability database. The
following steps have been followed to identify the location:
• From the vulnerability database, identify the vulnerability.
• From the Bug Repository (Bugzilla) and Version Archive:
– Identify the vulnerable version (e.g., Apache 1.3.0)
– Identify files by mapping CVE number to Bug ID
– Identify the vulnerable function
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CVE-2002-0839 2 2 3 2 3 7 2 8 NEE
CVE-2003-0016 1 10 9999 6 63 35 3 318 NEE
CVE-2004-0492 4 8 146 4 11 16 4 48 NEE
CVE-2004-0488 1 0 10 2 5 5 3 22 NEE
CVE-2004-0940 12 4 134 5 35 17 2 63 EE
CVE-2006-3747 2 2 12 4 16 5 3 34 EE
CVE-2009-1890 1 8 158 4 15 21 3 60 EE
CVE-2009-1891 1 9 9000 6 68 45 2 211 NEE
CVE-2010-0010 4 9 145 4 11 16 4 38 EE
CVE-2013-1896 26 5 8 1 5 37 3 29 EE
Once the vulnerable version and the vulnerable function have been identified, we can now
compute the metrics at the function level from the source code [79] and [119].There are different
tools that can be used to compute these metrics. We have chosen the commercial tool Understand
[89]. This tool has been chosen because it is user-friendly and it has a good set of APIs that
allows interaction with programming languages such as Python, Perl, and C++. For the selected
vulnerable version we have performed the following using our own python script:
• Search inside all folders in the main folder and find all .c files and store them in a list
• From the list, select the .c files that contain the vulnerabilities
• For every selected file, find the vulnerable function(s)
• Using the commercial tool Understand, compute the selected metrics.
Showing the whole measures for the selected software is limited by the number of pages, thus
Table 7.4 shows the measures of the selected metrics for some of Apache HTTP Server vulnera-
bilities. As can be seen, the measures of the vulnerabilities are distinguished by the availability of
exploit as either an exploit exist (EE) or no exploit exist (NEE).
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7.4.3 Discriminative Power Test
Apache Dataset
Table 7.5 shows the results of testing the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 for the discriminative
power of the individual metrics for the Apache HTTP Server dataset. It should be noted that we
have performed an outliers test for all computed metrics to avoid their effect on the mean. Only
one metric, calling functions, has been found to have outliers.
H1: As can be seen, the size metric has shown to have smaller values for vulnerabilities with
exploits than those without an exploit and this difference is statistical significant at p-value 0.021.
Therefore, the Welch t-test result suggests that the vulnerabilities with an exploit tend to have a
smaller size than the vulnerabilities without an exploit.
H2: Looking at the structure metrics values, however, only the CountPath metric has shown
statistical significant difference, the p-value is 0.011, for vulnerabilities with exploits compared to
those without an exploit. Thus, the Welch t-test result implies that the vulnerabilities with an ex-
ploit tend to have smaller CountPath than the vulnerabilities without an exploit. On the other hand,
while the Cyclomatic complexity values are smaller for vulnerabilities with an exploit, though the
difference is not significant, Nesting Degree values are higher for vulnerabilities with an exploit
and this is a contrary to what we anticipated. However, according to [120], the recommended
maximum for Nesting Degree is 5 and those two values are less than this number. This suggests
that Nesting Degree is smaller for both vulnerabilities with an exploit and those without an exploit.
H3: The ease of access metric has shown slightly higher values for vulnerabilities with exploits
which is not what we anticipated. The median for the vulnerabilities with and exploits and without
an exploit is 3.0 and 2.5 respectively. Therefore, the Welch t-test result suggests that the vulnera-
bilities with an exploit tend to have a slightly more number of invocations than those without an
exploit but this difference is not significant. However, Sparks et al. in [95] found that the nodes
at greater depths (>10 edges) become increasingly difficult to reach. Therefore, we conclude that
the degree of depth (around 3.0) for both groups is smaller.
H4: As can be seen from the communication metrics values, only calling functions metric has
shown to have higher values for vulnerabilities with exploits than for the vulnerabilities without
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Table 7.5: Result of Discriminative Power Test for Apache HTTP Server Dataset
 
  EE (Observations = 10) NEE (Observations = 20)   
Class of Metrics Metrics Mean Variance Mean Variance t-value P-Value 
Size  SLOC 54.2 134.4 698.4 18148.2 -2.49 0.021 
Structure 
Cyclomatic  complexity 13.6 27.3 83.8 766.6 -1.95 0.063 
Nesting Degree 3.7 2.5 3.4 3.7 0.43 0.669 
CountPath 45.4 2462.3 3072 13840876.5 -2.83 0.011 
Ease of Access Number of Invocations 2.9 0.4 2.5 0.6 1.55 0.136 
Communication  
Information Flow  14.69 93.5 17.5 150.6 -0.73 0.472 
Calling 
functions 
Outliers 5.7 70.3 1.4 0.7 1.53 0.163 
No outliers  5.2 64.6 1.2 0.3 1.6 0.151 
Called by functions 4.9 9.1 8.4 37.5 -2.01 0.054 
an exploit. However, this difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, information
flow and called by functions metrics have shown a smaller values for vulnerabilities with an exploit
and that is not what we anticipated.
Linux Kernel Dataset
We also obtained the results of testing the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 for the discriminative
power of the individual metrics for the Linux Kernel dataset, as shown in Table 7.6. We have
performed an outlier test for all computed metrics so that to avoid its effect on the mean. All
metrics values have been found to have outliers except for one metric, number of invocations. We
have run the Welch t-test on both data with and without outliers.
H1: The size metric values for the data without outliers show that the size of the vulnerabilities
with an exploit and without an exploit is almost the same and this is not what we anticipated.
Therefore, based on the p-value, we accept that there is no difference between the vulnerabilities
with an exploit and without an exploit.
H2: The values of the structure metrics without outliers are smaller for vulnerabilities with an
exploit than for those without an exploit except for the CountPath metric where its values have
been found to be higher, which is not what we anticipated. However, these differences are not
statistically significant. Therefore, the Welch t-test result implies that none of these differences are
statistically significant.
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Table 7.6: Result of Discriminative Power Test for Linux Kernel Dataset
 
  EE (Observations = 72) NEE (Observations = 81)   
Class of Metrics Metrics Mean Variance Mean Variance t-value P-Value 
Size  SLOC 
Outliers 64.1 10496.8 60.7 4958.5 0.2 0.816 




Outliers 20.1 1278.5 20.3 1555.5 -0.02 0.984 
No outliers  13.3 220.1 16.3 389.4 -1.0 0.296 
Nesting Degree 
Outliers 2.3 1.8 2.6 3.3 -1.1 0.284 
No outliers  2.2 1.4 2.4 2.2 -0.9 0.377 
CountPath 
Outliers 3.3E+07 2.9E+16 2.8E+07 2.5E+16 0.2 0.851 
No outliers  4.7E+06 1.5E+15 2.7E+06 2.9E+14 0.4 0.703 




Outliers 18.3 336.1 26.3 8125.5 -0.8 0.442 
No outliers  15.4 116.3 16.4 433.5 -0.4 0.705 
Calling 
functions 
Outliers 6.5 265.5 14.4 6756.3 -0.8 0.405 
No outliers  3.4 51.8 5.5 465.0 -0.8 0.428 
Called by 
functions 
Outliers 12.4 151.1 11.8 77.2 0.4 0.707 
No outliers  11.2 96.1 11.7 76.6 -0.3 0.748 
H3: The values of the ease of access metric show that the mean of the vulnerabilities with an
exploit are almost the same compared to the vulnerabilities without an exploit and this is not what
we anticipated. Therefore, the Welch t-test result suggests that there is no significant difference
between the vulnerabilities with an exploit and those without an exploit. However, as it was dis-
cussed in section 4.3.1 under the H3 paragraph, the mean of the measures of these two groups are
considered to be small.
H4: The communication metrics have shown to have smaller values. This is not what we
anticipated. However, looking at the p-values, we can see that the differences are not statistically
significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the
vulnerabilities with an exploit and those without an exploit.
7.4.4 Predictive Power Test
To test predictive power of the metrics, we need to select a subset of the proposed metrics.
To do that, we implemented CFS, WRP, and PCA feature selections techniques using Waikato
Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [121]. WEKA is a popular open source toolkit
implemented in Java for machine learning and data mining tasks. Once the metrics subsets have
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been selected, we implemented the four selected classifiers: LR, NB, RF, and SVM using WEKA.
It should be noted that the parameters for the chosen feature selection techniques and classifiers are
initialized with the default settings of the WEKA toolkit. It should be also noted that the results are
obtained by performing 10-fold cross-validation so that the variability in prediction are reduced.
Cross-validation is a technique for assessing how accurately a predictive model will perform in
practice [122]. However, it is more important to identify exploited vulnerabilities even at the
expense of incorrectly predicting some not exploited vulnerabilities as exploited vulnerabilities.
This is because a single exploited vulnerability may lead to serious security failures. Thus, we
use recall as our main performance measure to compare among the classifiers performance. The
results of testing metrics predictive power are shown in the following two subsections.
Apache Dataset
Table 7.7 shows predictive power results for the Apache dataset. Column one and two contain
the classifiers and their performance measures respectively. We first start with testing every clas-
sifier using the whole selected metrics and collect the performance measures provided by WEKA,
as shown in column three. For convenient interpretation, we express the performance measures in
Table 6 shows predictive power results for the Apache dataset. Column one and two contain the
classifiers and their performance measures respectively. We first start with testing every classifier
using the whole selected metrics and collect the performance measures provided by WEKA, as
shown in column three. For convenient interpretation, we express the performance measures in
terms of percentage, where a 100 % is the best value and 0 %is the worst value. Then, we select a
subset of those metrics using CFS, WRP, and PCA feature selection techniques and test the chosen
classifier using the selected subsets and provide the performance measures as shown in column
four, five, and six respectively.
Considering the value 0.7 (70%) of recall and precision measures as reasonable [117], we
show for every metrics subset the highest recall for a classifier in bold. Now, we will compare
the classifiers performance measures using different subset metrics. We will first start with using
the whole metrics. As can be seen, only NB and RF report the best recall and precision value.
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Moreover their accuracy and precision performance measures are either 70 or more. Even though
NB reports the best precision, the reported harmonic mean, F-measure, by RF is better. It should
be also notated that FPR reported by NB is lower than the one reported by RF. However, when
the subset metrics selected by the correlation-based feature selection, we see that not only LR has
improved but it has done better than the other classifiers. Neither the BN nor the SVM has shown
any improvement. Table 6. Result of Predictive Power Test for Apache HTTP Server Dataset
On the other hand, when the other subset of the metrics, selected by the wrapper subset selec-
tion method was used, RF has reported the best performance compared to the other classifiers and
the best among any the other features selection technique the RF used. It should be noted that WRP
conducts a search for a good subset using a classifier. We applied the four classifiers as a part of
WRP in order to select the best combination of metrics. However, as the other classifiers, SVM and
LR, did not show better results than NB and RF, we only reported the NB and RF results. When
the subset selected by the PCA method was used, however, LR has reported the best performance.
We have observed that the feature selection technique has an impact on the classifiers perfor-
mances. More precisely, the LR has its best performance when PCA technique has been used while
the NB, RF, and SVM has their best performance when the WRP has been applied. In addition, we
have observed that the RF recalls value did not score below 70%. Besides, even though the SVM
recall value has improved when the metrics subset selected by the WRP was used, its FPR remains
above 50. Moreover, when the PCA technique was used, only LR reports a good performance and
the other three classifiers either remained the same (RF and SVM) or performed their worst (NB).
H5: It can be concluded that there is a combination of metrics that significantly predicts vul-
nerabilities that have an exploit using Apache dataset.
Linux Kernel Dataset
The metrics predictive power results for the Linux Kernel dataset show that none of the classi-
fiers has a 70 % recall value. However, let us investigate if any of the classifiers has a recall score
of at least 50%. When the whole metrics have been used, none of the classifiers has a recall score
of 50%. However, when the CFS feature selection technique has been used, RF has a 50% recall
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Table 7.7: Result of Predictive Power Test for Apache HTTP Server Dataset
score. It should be noted that while the NB and LR have improved when the CFS was used, com-
pared when using the whole metrics, SVM performed worse than when it used the whole metrics.
On the other hand, when the WRP has been used, only NB and RF has their recall score improved.
When the PCA technique has been used, however, only NB and SVM have shown a recall score
above 50%. Though using the feature selection techniques has slightly improve the performance
of the chosen classifiers, their FPRs have a score close to or greater than 50%. This shows that the
classifiers have difficulty to learn from this dataset and hence behaved almost randomly. It should
be noted that the SVM, when the PCA was used, has performed the best compared to the other
classifiers. H5: We can conclude that there is a combination of metrics that significantly predicts
vulnerabilities that have an exploit using Linux Kernel dataset but at low recall score.
7.4.5 Threats to Validity
In this paper we have considered the datasets for only two products, the Apache HTTP server
and Linux Kernel. However, they are both very significant examples. The Apache HTTP server
has more than 169 belonging to different categories. Besides, its line of code varies between
50,712 LOC to 358,633 LOC. We recognize that the number of vulnerabilities that have an exploit
reported for them in Apache HTTP server is low. However, we are just scratching the surface
based on what is available. On the other hand, Linux Kernel has larger number of vulnerabilities,
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more than 1200. Its size in line of code has ranged from 10,239 LOC to 15,803,499 LOC. It also
has a greater variety of vulnerabilities. As there are other potential factors that can influence the
probability of development of an exploit for a vulnerability that have not been examined in this
study. Finally, exploits that have not yet been publically reported were not considered in our study.
7.5 Discussion
One of our main observations is that some metrics have a good discriminative and predictive
power for Apache dataset. However, they do not have significant discriminative and predictive
power for the Linux Kernel dataset. Moreover, we also observed that, unlike in Apache dataset,
some metrics such as CountPath, values have been found to be higher for vulnerabilities with ex-
ploit in Linux dataset. One possible reason could be the value of the target. The exploits developers
may be willing to exploit vulnerabilities in an operating system even if it requires more effort be-
cause having a root access could be worth the effort. Besides, when compared to Apache, Linux
Kernel has more exploits. This shows that this might be because Linux Kernel is a more valuable
target for the attackers. To verify this, we looked into the initial release dates of the both products
and we found that the difference in age is not very significant (Linux is 23 years old and Apache
20 years old), and also looked into the usage statistics and market share data and we found Apache
market share is around 57% [123] whereas Linux Kernel is about 52.4 % [123].
Based on the Apache dataset, we have also observed that when a function is vulnerable and has
an exploit, its SLOC, CYC, and CountPath values have been found to be lower than the vulnerable
functions without an exploit. A similar result has been observed by [117] when they try to predict
the existence of a vulnerability. It seems that the attackers favoring simpler vulnerable targets,
especially when the goal is to deny a service, such as the one provided by Apache, using the least
effort. Using the WRP as a method to select a combination of metrics has the best impact on
the classifiers performance. However, in [117], security domain knowledge metrics have to be
considered in order for the vulnerability prediction performance to be enhanced.
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7.6 Related Work
In this section, we summarize related works based on their approach: works that address vul-
nerabilities exploitability, the studies that use software metrics to predict vulnerability location and
existence, and works that use the graph-based metrics.
CVSS Metrics: CVSS metrics are the de facto standard for measuring the severity of vulner-
abilities [4]. CVSS Base Score measures severity based on exploitability (the ease of exploiting
vulnerability) and impact (the effect of exploitation). However, CVSS exploitability measures
have some limitations. First, they assign static subjective numbers to the metrics based on expert
knowledge. In contrast, we focus on reducing subjectivity in assessing vulnerability exploitation
by basing our analysis on software attributes that can be objectively derived from the source code.
Second, two of CVSSs factors (Access Vector and Authentication) have the same value for almost
all vulnerabilities [83]. Third, there is no formal procedure for evaluating the third factor (Ac-
cess Complexity) [ [4]. Consequently, it is unclear if CVSS considers the software structure and
properties as a factor.
Assessing vulnerability exploitability: Gegick et al. [124] argued that vulnerabilities that are
located in low risk areas of the code should be prioritized differently from the ones that are located
in high risk areas of the code. Their results show that the combined usage of the internal metrics
has predicted the attack-prone components with a high accuracy and zero false negative rates.
While the authors granularity analysis was at the component level ours is at the function level,
which might reveal some more important information [125]. Moreover, we used different internal
code-level metrics. In addition, they used reported security failures to identify a component as an
attack prone and a non-attack-prone. In contrast, we used the availability of exploit to identify a
vulnerable function as either exploited or not exploited function.
Bozorgi et al. [97] proposed a Machine Learning and Data mining technique that uses features
mined from known vulnerability reports to predict the possibility of vulnerability exploitability.
They compare their results with the CVSS Exploitability metrics and found that their approach can
classify vulnerability exploitability better than the CVSS. We consider the relationship between
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some software internal metrics, which are extracted from the source code, and the availability of
exploits. This is particularly important for newly released software where vulnerability reports are
not available.
Allodi and Massacci in [83, 98] have proposed the black market as an index of risk of vul-
nerability exploitation. Their approach assesses the risk of vulnerability exploitation based on
the volumes of the attacks due to the vulnerability exploits sold in the black market. In contrast,
in this paper we try to investigate the relationship between software metrics and the availability
of exploits, as data about vulnerabilities attacked in the wild is not always available. This could
help software developers predict vulnerabilities exploitation on the development side instead of the
deployment side.
Using software metrics: Several researchers have studied the possibility of using software
metrics to predict vulnerable entities (components, classes, modules, files, and functions/methods)
or the existence of vulnerabilities. Shin and Williams [102, 103] investigated the possibility of
using complexity metrics as predictors for the location of security problems. Chowdhury and Zulk-
ernine [104] investigated the usability of complexity, coupling and cohesion metrics as predictors
of vulnerabilities location. However, in [35], Zimmermann et al. studied several software metrics
including code complexity and dependency as predictors for the existence of vulnerabilities. Our
work, on the other hand, focuses on predicting the exploitability of a vulnerability.
Using Graph-based Metrics: Bhattacharya et al. [94] studied the possibility of applying
graph-based approaches to software engineering tasks. Using the source code, they construct a
graph model and use graph metrics to measure some properties. Their results show that graph
metrics can detect significant structural changes, and can help estimate bug severity, prioritize
debugging efforts, and predict defect-prone releases. In this paper, we use different graph metrics
and investigate whether they are correlated with a vulnerability severity rather than a bug severity.
Besides, we use the availability of an exploit to identify the severity of a vulnerability.
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7.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this study, we investigated the possible relationship between the metrics and the existence
of a vulnerability exploit. We studied 183 vulnerabilities and mapped them to their locations
at the function level. We then characterized these functions using eight software metrics. The
metrics have been evaluated for their discriminative and predictive power. The results show that
the difference between a vulnerability that has no exploit and a vulnerability that has an exploit can
be characterized to some extent using software metrics known for characterizing the presence of
vulnerabilities for some of the products. However, the study shows that predicting exploitation of
vulnerabilities is more complicated than predicting the presence of vulnerabilities and thus using
metrics that consider security domain knowledge is important for enhancing the performance of a
vulnerability exploitation prediction effort.
Even though the two selected applications have a rich history of reported vulnerabilities, con-
sidering software with a different Even though the two selected applications have a rich history
of reported vulnerabilities, considering software with a different domain, such as an open source
browser like Firefox, increases the size of the dataset and that might reveal significant information.
Improving the classifiers performance and capturing vulnerabilities exploitability may require fur-
ther empirical investigations of software metrics specifically applicable to the security realm. Thus,
further research is needed which considers the metrics related to attack surface [69], reachability
and dangerous system calls metrics [12, 9], graph-based metrics [94], and static analysis tool
warnings metrics [124]. Moreover, using an alternative approach such as a text mining technique
[126] to predict vulnerability exploitability might lead to an interesting results.
Identification of previously unknown (i.e. zero-day) vulnerability take considerable expertise
and effort using fuzzers, and many of the resulting vulnerabilities may pose little risk if no exploits
are written for them. If the methods considered here can be extended for identifying code which is
more likely to have an exploited vulnerability, the vulnerability testers can save considerable time.
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Chapter 8
Validating CVSS Using Availability of
Exploits
In this chapter, the exploitability factor of CVSS Base metrics and Microsoft Rating system will
be studied. Using the presence of actual exploits, the two exploitability metrics performance has
been compared and evaluated. The results show that exploitability metrics in CVSS and Microsoft
do not correlate strongly with the existence of exploits (ground truth), and have a high false positive
rate. The high false positive rate (many number of high severity vulnerabilities without a reported
exploits or attacks) could be a result of applying defensive mechanism such as Vulnerability reward
programs or exploit mitigation techniques.
8.1 Introduction
Evaluating the risk associated with software vulnerabilities is crucial. Risk evaluation involves
assessment of appropriate metrics. A security metric is a quantifiable measurement that indicates
the level of security for an attribute of a system [67]. In addition to FIRST, an international
confederation, some of the major software developers have developed rating systems for assessing
the risk of software vulnerabilities. The rating systems include: CVSS [4] by FIRST, Microsoft
[127], IBM ISS X-Force [128], Symantec [129], etc. Each one of them rates vulnerabilities risk
(severity) based on varieties of metrics and obtain a single overall score by assessing these metrics.
The accuracy of such rating systems is very important as they are intended to help decision
makers in resource allocation, patch prioritization, program planning, risk assessment, and product
and service selection. According to Verendel [70], the lack of validation and comparisons among
such metrics makes their usability risky. To that end, in this study, we compare and evaluate
the performance of the CVSS Base metrics and Microsoft Rating systems. The system using the
CVSS Base metrics has been selected because it is the de facto standard that is currently widely
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used to measure the severity of individual vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the latter has been
chosen because Microsoft software vulnerabilities have been evaluated using both Microsofts own
metrics and CVSS Base metrics and that makes their comparison feasible. Besides, it performs in-
depth technical analysis of the vulnerabilities and this helps in comparing the effectiveness of the
technical analysis approach (Microsoft) with the expert opinions approach (CVSS). The presence
of actual exploits is used for their comparison.
In this study, we have examined 813 vulnerabilities of Internet Explorer browser and Windows
7 operating system. The two software systems have been selected because their vulnerabilities
severity has been measured using the two selected rating systems, their rich history of publicly
documented vulnerabilities, and their diversity in size and functionality.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 presents the related work. In Section 9.3, the
background of the vulnerabilities, vulnerability databases, and the exploit database are discussed.
In the following section, the selected vulnerabilities rating systems are discussed. In sections 9.5,
the selected datasets are presented. In section 9.6, the applicability of CVSS and MS-Exploitability
metrics is examined. Section 9.7 presents the discussion. Finally, concluding comments are given
and the issues that need further research are identified.
8.2 Related Work
A few researchers have started to examine CVSS critically. Bozorgi et al. [97] have studied
the exploitability metrics in CVSS Base Score metric. They have argued that the exploitability
measures in CVSS Base Score metric cannot tell much about the vulnerability severity. They at-
tributed that to the fact that CVSS metrics rely on expert knowledge and static formulas. They
have proposed a machine learning and data mining technique that attempts to predict the possi-
bility of vulnerability exploitation. Bozorgi et al. have used the distributions resulting from the
two approaches for evaluation. In contrast, in this paper, we evaluate the performance of CVSS
exploitability metrics using well defined performance measures and using the presence of actual
exploits to compare it with the performance of MS-Exploitability metric. In addition, we take into
133
consideration the type of software when comparing the performance of the two metrics, as that
might reveal some significant insight.
Allodi and Massacci in [ [83, 98] have proposed the black market as an index of risk of vul-
nerability exploitation. Their approach assesses the risk of vulnerability exploitation based on the
volumes of the attacks due to the vulnerability exploits sold in the black market. In their study, they
conducted a thorough analysis of the CVSS Base metrics: exploitability and impact metrics. They
compared CVSS metrics performance against the existence of exploits in the EDB, Symantecs At-
tack Signature (wild), and OSVDB by using sensitivity and specificity measures. In contrast, in
this paper, we compare CVSS exploitability metrics performance with MS-Exploitability metric.
Eiram in [130] has reviewed the value of the rating systems of the Microsoft Exploitability
Index, Adobe Priority Rating system, and CVSS exploitability Temporal metric. The aim was de-
termining if these rating systems are meeting the goal of easing prioritization of applying security
updates. To evaluate the rating systems, Eiram counted the number of vulnerabilities that have a
high severity value (1) and used it as a method of evaluation. He has suggested that this number
should not be high. He only used vulnerabilities that were reported in 2012. In this paper, however,
we choose to evaluate CVSS exploitability metrics instead of CVSS exploitability temporal metric
because the former is the one that is always reported in well-known vulnerability databases such
as NVD. Moreover, we do not only use a larger dataset, but also use well defined performance
measures. Moreover, we are using the existence of the exploit as a method of evaluation instead of
counting the vulnerabilities that have a high severity value.
8.3 Vulnerability Rating Systems
Recently, several rating systems for assessing the severity of computer system security vulner-
abilities have been developed. The rating systems include: CVSS [4], Microsoft [127], IBM ISS
X-Force [128], Symantec [129], etc. Each one of them rates vulnerabilities severity based on va-
rieties of metrics and assigns a single overall score by assessing these metrics. They are intended
to help decision makers to patch prioritization and risk assessment. In this section, CVSS Base
metrics and Microsoft Rating systems that are selected for this study are briefly introduced. The
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two approaches differ significantly. CVSS depends on the opinions of experts whereas Microsofts
approach depends on the technical factors it considers significant.
8.3.1 CVSS Base Metrics
CVSS Base Score measures severity based on exploitability (the ease of exploiting a vulnera-
bility) and impact (the effect of exploitation) as shown by the following [4]:
Base score = Roundto1decimal[(0.6Impact) + (0.4Exploitability)− 1.5]f(Impact)
The formula for the base score, as well as for the exploitability and impact sub-scores are
based on expert opinion and are not based on formal derivations. The constants are chosen to
yield the maximum values of 10. The base score is rounded to one decimal place and it is set
to zero if the impact is equal to zero regardless of the formula. The CVSS scores for known
vulnerabilities are readily available in the majority of public vulnerability databases. The CVSS
score is a number in the range [0.0, 10.0]. This score represents the intrinsic and fundamental
characteristic of a vulnerability and thus the score does not change over time. The two CVSS
sub-scores exploitability and impact also range between [0.0, 10.0]. CVSS score from 0.0 to 3.9
corresponds to Low severity, 4.0 to 6.9 to Medium severity and 7.0 to 10.0 to High severity.
The impact sub-score measures how a vulnerability will directly affect an IT asset as the degree
of losses in Confidentiality (IC), Integrity (II), and Availability (IA) as is shown by the following:
Impact = 10.41× (1− (1− I C)× (1− I I)× (1− I A))
The impact sub-scores, on the other hand, are all assessed in terms of None (N), Partial (P),
or Complete (C) by security experts and assigned one of the mentioned qualitative letter grades.
Exploitability, on the other hand, is assessed based on three metrics: Access Vector (AV), Authen-
tication (AU), and Access Complexity (AC) as is shown by the following:
Exploitability = AV × AU × AC
The AV reflects how a vulnerability is exploited in terms of local (L), adjacent network (A),
or network (N). The AC measures the complexity of an attack required to exploit the vulnerability
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(once an attacker has gained an access to a target system) in terms of High (H), Medium (M),
or Low (L). The AU counts the number of times an attacker must authenticate to reach a target
(in order to exploit a vulnerability) in terms of Multiple (M), Single (S), or None (N). The CVSS
system uses lookup tables to provide the numerical values needed for the subscores.
8.3.2 Microsoft Rating System
Microsoft (MS) rating system measures vulnerabilities risk based on two variables: Impact and
Probability [127]. The latter means the potential effect of a vulnerability being exploited, and the
former means the likelihood of that exploitation taking place. These two variables are assessed
using severity rating and Exploitability Index.
The impact factor, on one hand, is captured using the severity rating that indicates the ”worst
case” scenario of an attack that exploits a vulnerability. The Impact factor can take one of the
following values: Critical (A vulnerability whose exploitation could allow code execution without
user interaction), Important (A vulnerability whose exploitation could result in compromise of the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of user data, or of the integrity or availability of processing
resources), Moderate (Impact of the vulnerability is mitigated to a significant degree by factors
such as authentication requirements or applicability only to non-default configurations), and Low
(Impact of the vulnerability is comprehensively mitigated by the characteristics of the affected
component).
On the other hand, the probability factor is assessed using the Exploitability Index that mea-
sures the likelihood that a specific vulnerability would be exploited within the first 30 days after
bulletin release. The Exploitability Index can be assigned a score 1, 2, and 3 for any vulnerability
with a severity rate of Important or Critical. Here, 1 means Consistent exploit code is likely, 2
means Inconsistent exploit code is likely, and 3 means Function exploit code unlikely.
8.4 Datasets
In this study, the data about vulnerabilities and exploits of Microsoft Windows 7 and Internet
Explorer (IE) during the period January 2009 to October 2014 were collected. The reason why
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Table 8.1: Internet Explorer and Windows 7 Vulnerabilities
Software Exploit Exist No Exploit Exist Total Each
IE 33 436 459
Windows 7 52 302 354
Total All 85 738 813
Table 8.2: Unselected Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer
CVE-2010-0808 CVE-2010-3327 CVE-2010-3342 CVE-2010-3348
CVE-2012-0010 CVE-2011-1244 CVE-2011-1246 CVE-2011-1258
CVE-2011-1962 CVE-2011-2383 CVE-2011-3404 CVE-2011-0038
CVE-2012-0168 CVE-2012-1872 CVE-2012-1882 CVE-2013-3126
CVE-2013-3186 CVE-2013-3192 CVE-2014-2817 CVE-2014-4123
we considered collecting data starting from 2009 is because the Microsoft Exploitability Index is
introduced in October 2008 and has been included in Microsoft Bulletin starting 2009. This data
was collected as follows. First, the vulnerabilities and their metrics’ values were collected from
NVD [16] and Microsoft Security Bulletin [131]. Second, the exploits were collected from EDB
[22]. Table 8.1 shows the number of the selected vulnerabilities and their exploits.
It should be noted that the total number of the IE vulnerabilities is 482. However, out of the
482, 23 vulnerabilities were not selected because we could not find information about their CVSS
Base metrics values or MS Exploitability Index values.
• Three out of the 23 vulnerabilities (CVE-2014-4066, CVE-2014-4112, and CVE-2014-
4145) could not be found in the NVD even though they have CVE number.
• For the remaining 20 vulnerabilities, we could not find their MS Exploitability Index values.
These vulnerabilities are shown in Table 8.2.
• None of these unselected vulnerabilities has an exploit.
It should also be noted that the total number of vulnerabilities of Windows 7 is 380. However,
out of the 380 vulnerabilities, 26 vulnerabilities were unselected because we could not find their
MS Exploitability Index values. Out of the 26 vulnerabilities, four vulnerabilities that have an ex-
ploit were removed (CVE-2010-1890, CVE-2010-1887, CVE-2010-2554, and CVE-2010-3227).
Table 8.3 shows these 26 vulnerabilities.
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Table 8.3: Unselected Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows 7
CVE-2010-0252 CVE-2010-0481 CVE-2010-0811 CVE-2010-1890
CVE-2010-1887 CVE-2010-2554 CVE-2010-3227 CVE-2010-0811
CVE-2011-1971 CVE-2011-1978 CVE-2011-2002 CVE-2011-2004
CVE-2011-3415 CVE-2012-0156 CVE-2012-0174 CVE-2012-1850
CVE-2012-1851 CVE-2012-2531 CVE-2013-0013 CVE-2013-1291
CVE-2013-1293 CVE-2013-1336 CVE-2013-1337 CVE-2013-3172
CVE-2013-2556 CVE-2014-0295
The attributes of every selected vulnerability were collected using the following steps.
1. From Microsoft Security Bulletin, the vulnerabilities CVE numbers for Windows 7 and IE
were collected.
2. Next, for every existed CVE number in Microsoft Security Bulletin, we collected the vulner-
ability severity rating and Exploitability Index values.
3. Then, we searched for the same vulnerabilities CVE numbers found in Microsoft Security
Bulletin in the NVD.
4. After that, for every vulnerabilitys CVE number found in the NVD, the CVSS impact Sub-
score and exploitability Subscore values were collected.
5. Lastly, for every selected vulnerability we used the CVE number to verify whether it has an
exploit reported in the EDB or not.
Table 8.4 shows a part of the selected vulnerabilities because showing the whole datasets is
limited by the number of pages allowed. Unlike CVSS Base Score, Microsoft rating system does
not provide the total value of a vulnerability risk, but rather it provides an individual value and let
the person in charge to make the decision based on the provided values. It has been noticed that
for some vulnerabilities the severity rating and the Exploitability Index are assigned a combina-
tion of values instead of one value, for example Critical/Moderate or Important / Low, or, 1/2 or
1/3. This is because some vulnerabilities exist in older versions of Microsoft products that are no
longer supported by Microsoft security updates, and hence are assigned a higher severity rating
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Total Severity Rating Exploitability Index 
CVE-2009-1547 MS09-054 Critical 2 10 8.6 9.3 EE 
CVE-2010-0492 MS10-018 Critical/Moderate 1 10 8.6 9.3 NEE 
CVE-2011-1992 MS11-099 Important /Low 3 2.9 8.6 4.3 NEE 
CVE-2012-1858 MS12-037 Important /Low 3 2.9 8.6 4.3 EE 
CVE-2013-1312 MS13-037 Critical/Moderate 2 10 8.6 9.3 NEE 
CVE-2014-4141 MS14-056 Critical/Moderate 1 10 8.6 9.3 NEE 
or Exploitability Index values. On the other hand, the new releases of Microsoft products have
a regular security updates and hence are assigned a lower severity rating or Exploitability Index
values.
8.4.1 Analysis of Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Internet Explorer Dataset
Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of the vulnerabilities and their exploits of IE from 2009 to
2014. As can be seen, the year 2010 has the highest percentage of exploit, which is a result of
dividing the number of reported exploits per year by the total number of vulnerabilities reported
in that year. Besides, a noticeable increase in the number of reported vulnerabilities has been
noticed in 2013 and 2014. This could be attributed to Microsoft Bounty Programs that has started
in 2013. It should be noted that there are more vulnerabilities than exploits. According to [132],
Cybercriminals are more likely to exploit vulnerabilities that dont need any special conditions, or
that offer particularly dangerous opportunity to execute malware on the compromised computer.
The total percentage of the exploits in relation to the number of reported vulnerabilities is 6.8.
To evaluate this number based on IE counterparts web browsers, we collected the vulnerabilities
and exploits from 2009 to 2014 for Google Chrome, Firefox, and Apple Safari from NVD and
EDB and the result is shown in Figure 8.2. As can be seen from Figure 8.2, the total number of
reported vulnerabilities in Chrome and Firefox are the highest and this could be attributed to their
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
%	of	Exploit 15.2 20.6 8.1 12.5 7.3 1.9 6.8
Number	of	exploit 5 7 3 5 9 4 33
Number	of	Vulnerabilities 33 34 37 40 123 215 482
Microsoft	Internet	Explorer
Figure 8.1: Distribution of the number of reported vulnerabilities and exploits and percentage of
exploits.
vulnerability Bounty Program. Even though Chrome has the highest number of vulnerabilities, it
has the lowest exploit percentage. This could be attributed to the quick patching, which in turn
complicate the exploitation process. Although investigating this observation is really important, it
is considered beyond the scope of this research.
IE Chrome Firefox Safari
%	of	Explit 6.8 2.3 6.5 6.0
Number	of	Exploits 33 23 55 22
Number	of	Vulnerabilities 482 991 852 369
Figure 8.2: Web Browsers distribution of the number of reported vulnerabilities and exploits and
the percentage of exploits.
Windows 7 Dataset
The distribution of the vulnerabilities and exploits for Windows 7 is shown in Figure 8.3. As
can be seen, 2010 has the most number of exploits, 31. We did some investigation and found out
that some of the vulnerabilities that were discovered in Windows Vista are inherited by Windows
7 and this is because of the code reuse concept. Hence, Windows Vista vulnerabilities exploit can
also be used to exploit the inherited vulnerabilities in Windows 7. However, more vulnerability
was reported in 2011 and 2013. According to [133], the reason behind the increase in 2011 is
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an effort of one researcher who looked at win32k.sys and discovered 20 vulnerabilities in 2010
and 59 in 2011. On the other hand, the increase in 2013 could be explained by Microsoft Bounty
Programs.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
%	of	Exploits 25.00 44.29 7.62 8.33 6.42 11.36 14.74
Number	of	Exploits 1 31 8 4 7 5 56
Number	of	Vulnerabilities 4 70 105 48 109 44 380
Windows	7
Figure 8.3: Windows 7 distribution of the number of reported vulnerabilities and exploits and the
percentage of exploits.
The total percentage of the exploits in Windows 7 is 14.74. To evaluate this number, we
collected the reported vulnerabilities and exploits from 2009 to 2014 for the Mac OS X from
NVD and EDB databases. The reason why we selected Mac OS X is because of its market share
and popularity. Figure 8.4shows that even though the number of the reported vulnerabilities in
Mac OS X is more than Windows 7, the former has a higher number of exploit percentages. One
possible explanation could be that Windows 7 has larger market share (40.81%) than Mac OS X
(6.64%) in Desktop and Laptop computers [134], which could cause more impact and in turn





Figure 8.4: Microsoft Windows 7 and Mac OS X number of reported vulnerabilities and exploits
and the percentage of exploit.
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8.4.2 Analysis of Vulnerabilities’ Rating Systems
The selected rating systems, CVSS Base Score and Microsoft Rating system, measure vulner-
ability severity based on two factors the impact of exploitation and the possibility of exploitation.
In this section we will first explore their exploitability values and then investigate their impact
measures using the two selected datasets.
Exploitability Factor
Figure 8.5 shows the distribution of the exploitability values for CVSS and Microsoft for
the IE dataset. For CVSS exploitability score, almost all vulnerabilities have a value between
eight and nine (0.97, relative frequency), whereas for Microsoft Exploitability Index the values are
almost one (0.82, relative frequency). Even though Microsoft Exploitability Index shows some
variations, looking at the boxplot in Figure 8.5, it is clear that the distribution of the two metrics
is indistinguishable for IE dataset. The median is 8.6 for CVSS and 1 for Microsoft. This shows
that the exploitability factor for both metrics is almost a constant and not a variable. It should be
noted that in the CVSS boxplot the minimum and maximum points are plotted as outliers by the
software we used to create them (XLSTAT) whereas in Microsoft boxplot only the maximum point





























































Figure 8.5: The histograms on the top represent the frequency distribution of the CVSS and Mi-
crosoft Exploitability values. The boxplots on the bottom describe the distribution of values around
the median, which represented by a horizontal line.
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Figure 8.6 illustrates the distribution of the exploitability values for CVSS and Microsoft for
Windows 7 dataset. Unlike IE dataset, the distribution varies for the two metrics. For the CVSS
Exploitability scores, almost half of vulnerabilities have a Low (0 to 3.9) exploitability values,
whereas the other half has a High (7 to 10) exploitability values. Only a few vulnerabilities have
a Medium (4 to 6.9) exploitability values. On the other hand, for the Microsoft Exploitability
Index almost all vulnerabilities have an exploitability value between 1 and 2, which means exploit
is likely. Only a few have an exploit value 3 (around 59), which means exploit is unlikely. The




















































Figure 8.6: The histograms on the top represent the frequency distribution of the CVSS and Mi-
crosoft Exploitability values. The boxplots on the bottom describe the distribution of values around
the median, which represented by a horizontal line.
To understand why the two metrics show completely different results when applied to different
software types datasets, we decompose the CVSS exploitability metrics. As can be seen in Table
8.5, we find that almost half of the vulnerabilities (172) in the Windows 7 dataset have a Local
AV value and that has led to a Low CVSS exploitability subscore. On the other hand, there are
only three vulnerabilities in the IE dataset that have a Local AV value. It has also been noted that
the AV has a significant effect on the CVSS exploitability subscore, regardless of the values of
the AU and AC. This can be clearly observed from IE dataset where almost all the vulnerabilities
have a Network AV value and hence have been assigned High CVSS exploitability Subscore. It
has also been observed that almost all the vulnerabilities in Windows 7 (94.19%) that have a Local
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Table 8.5: CVSS Exploitability Metrics Subscore for IE and Windows 7
Exploitability
Metrics













AV value also have a Low AC value. This explains the increase in the number of vulnerabilities
(60.45%) that have a Low AC.
Impact Factor
Figure 8.7 shows the distribution of the Impact values for CVSS and Microsoft for the IE
dataset. For CVSS Impact score, almost all vulnerabilities have a value between nine and ten (0.90,
relative frequency). On the other hand, Microsoft Impact rating score values are one for almost
all vulnerabilities (0.87, relative frequency). It should be noted that, for the sake of comparison,
Microsoft Impact values have been mapped into numbers as follows: Critical=1, Important=2,
Moderate=3 and Low=4. The medians as shown in boxplot are ten for the CVSS impact values
and one for Microsoft Impact values. This shows that the impact values for both metrics for almost
all vulnerabilities are high. This can be explained by the fact that 428 (93.24%) vulnerabilities are
of the type Execute Code.
As it can be seen from Figure 8.8, more than half of the vulnerabilities have been assigned a
high (10) CVSS impact values (0.72, relative frequency), whereas more than half of the vulnera-
bilities have been assigned an Important (2) Microsoft impact values (0.68, relative frequency). To
understand the difference in the impact values between the two metrics, we decomposed the CVSS
impact Metrics as shown in Table 8.6. The CIA values are dominated by the value complete for the
majority of vulnerabilities especially for IE. We also find that around 270 vulnerabilities (76.27%)


























































Figure 8.7: The histograms on the top represent the frequency distribution of the CVSS and Mi-
crosoft Impact values. The boxplots on the bottom describe the distribution of values around the
median, which represented by a horizontal line.
that there are 180 vulnerabilities of the type Gain Privilege and 169 of them have Microsoft impact
value 2 (93.89%). The reason why Microsoft has relaxed the impact value of this type of vulner-
abilities is possibly because this type of vulnerabilities depends on user configurations, which is





















































Figure 8.8: The histograms on the top represent the frequency distribution of the CVSS and Mi-
crosoft Impact values. The boxplots on the bottom describe the distribution of values around the
median, which represented by a horizontal line.
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Table 8.6: CVSS Impact factor Metrics for IE and Windows 7
Software Value Complete % Partial % None %
IE
Confidentiality (C) 92.81 5.66 1.53
Integrity (I) 92.59 3.05 4.36
Availability (A) 92.81 1.96 5.23
Windows 7
Confidentiality (C) 87.29 3.67 8.19
Integrity (I) 76.27 2.54 20.34
Availability (A) 81.92 2.54 14.69
8.5 Validation of CVSS and MS-Exploitabilty Metrics
Since data is available about the existence of exploits, we can only evaluate the Microsoft
Exploitability Index metric with the CVSS exploitability metrics based on the availability of ex-
ploits. Figure 8.9 shows the CVSS and Microsoft Exploitability measures for IE and Windows 7
vulnerabilities against the Existence of Exploit (EE) and No-Exploit Existence (NEE). For the IE
dataset, the CVSS exploitability median is 8.6 for both vulnerabilities with EE and for those with
NEE. Besides, the median for the Microsoft Exploitability Index is 1 for both classes (EE, NEE).
On the other hand, for the Windows 7 dataset, the CVSS exploitability median is 3.9 for vulner-
abilities with NEE and 8.6 for vulnerabilities with EE. Moreover, the median for the Microsoft
Exploitability Index is 1 for both classes (EE, NEE).
8.5.1 Methodology
To evaluate the performance of these two metrics, we used statistical measures termed sensitiv-
ity, precision, and F-measure. These measures are explained using a confusion matrix as shown in
Table 8.7. The confusion matrix table shows the actual vs. the predicted results. It should be noted
that a vulnerability is considered exploitable if it has a reported exploit, but that does not mean the
otherwise. For the two class problem (a vulnerability is either exploitable or not exploitable), the
following is defined based on Table 8.7.
• True Positive (TP): the number of the vulnerabilities predicted as exploitable, which do in
































































Figure 8.9: Vulnerability Exploitability measures using CVSS in the Left column and MS-
Exploitability Index in the right Column compared to Exploit Exist (EE) and No-Exploit Exist
(NEE) for IE and Windows 7 datasets.




Exploitable TP= True Positive FN= False Negative
Not Exploitable FP= False Positive TN= True Negative
• False Negative (FN): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as not exploitable, which turn
out to have an exploit.
• False Positive (FP): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as exploitable when they have
no exploit.
• True Negative (TN): the number of vulnerabilities predicted as not exploitable when there is
no exploit.
The selected performance measures can be derived as follows.
Sensitivity (Recall)
Sensitivity, which also termed recall, is defined as the ratio of the number of vulnerabilities
correctly predicted as exploitable to the number of vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable as
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Precision, which is also known as the correctness, is defined as the ratio of the number of
vulnerabilities correctly predicted as exploitable to the total number of vulnerabilities predicted as




For convenient interpretation, we express these two measures in terms of percentage, where a
100% is the best value and 0% is the worst value. Both precision and sensitivity should be as close
to the value 100 as possible (no false positives and no false negatives). However, such ideal values
are difficult to obtain because sensitivity and precision often change in opposite directions. There-
fore, a measure that combines sensitivity and precision in a single measure is needed. Hence, we
will introduce the F-measure in the following section. We believe that it is more important to iden-
tify exploitable vulnerabilities even at the expense of incorrectly predicting some not exploitable
vulnerabilities as exploitable vulnerabilities. This is because a single exploitable vulnerability may
lead to serious security failures. Having said that, we think more weight should be given to sensi-
tivity than precision. Thus, we include F2-measure, which weights sensitivity twice as precision,
to evaluate the two metrics.
F-measure
F-measure can be interpreted as the weighted average of sensitivity and precision. It measures
the effectiveness of a prediction with respect to a user attached times as much importance to
sensitivity as precision. The general formula for the F-measure is shown by the following:
Fβ −Measure =
(1 + β2)× Precision× Senetivity
(β2 × Precision) + Senetivity
β is a parameter that controls a balance between sensitivity and precision. When β = 1, F-
measure becomes to be equivalent to the harmonic mean, whereas when β <1 it becomes more
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Exploitable TP= 32 FN= 1





Exploitable TP= 28 FN= 5






Exploitable TP= 34 FN= 18





Exploitable TP= 43 FN= 9
Not Exploitable FP= 253 TN= 49
precision oriented. However, when β >1, F-measure becomes more sensitivity oriented. In this
paper β has been chosen to be 2.
8.5.2 Results
To calculate the above mentioned performance measures we need to obtain the confusion ma-
trix for the two datasets. Using the data about the availability of exploits and the exploitability
measures for CVSS exploitability metrics and Microsoft Exploitability Index, the confusion ma-
trix was determined as shown in Table 8.8. Using the values in this matrix, the performance
measures have been calculated as shown in Table . It should be noted that there is an imbalance in
the two datasets. For instance, there are 33 vulnerabilities with an exploit compared to 436 vulner-
abilities without an exploit in the IE dataset, whereas there are 52 vulnerabilities with an exploit
and 302 vulnerabilities without an exploit in the Windows 7 dataset. We considered this imbalance
in our performance analysis.
For every dataset, we selected all vulnerabilities that have an exploit and at the same time we
randomly (using random with replacement technique) selected the same number of vulnerabilities
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Sensitivity 97 97 85 85
Precision 7 50 7 57
F1-Measure 13 33 12 34
F2-Measure 27 82 25 77
False Positive Rate 99.3 97 92.7 64
Windows 7
Sensitivity 65.38 65 82.69 82
Precision 19.43 50 14.53 50
F1-Measure 29.96 29 24.71 31
F2-Measure 44.39 62 42.66 73
False Positive Rate 46.69 62 83.77 81
from those that have no exploit and calculated the performance measures and the results are shown
in Table 8.9.
From the IE dataset and when the whole sample is considered, it is clear that the two metrics
have a high sensitivity values and that comes at the cost of having a very low precision. It is also
apparent that the false positive rate is very high, which is almost a 100% for CVSS exploitability
metrics and around 93% for Microsoft Exploitability Index. This makes the two metrics behave
like a random predictor. Looking at CVSS exploitability metrics values, the high positive rate can
be explained by the fact that almost all the vulnerabilities in IE dataset have a Network AV value
and hence have been assigned a high CVSS exploitability value and that has led to assessing those
vulnerabilities as exploitable. On the other hand, when the imbalanced sample is considered, it
can be seen that the precision of the two metrics has dramatically changed and that is in turn has
changed the F1 and F2 measures too, which expected as both of them rely on the precision value.
Besides, the false positive rate for Windows Exploitability Index has noticeably reduced.
Looking at the performance of the two metrics using the whole sample of Windows 7 dataset,
it is clear that both metrics performed differently when compared to their performance using IE
dataset. This difference is more apparent in CVSS exploitability metrics. First, the false positive
rate has significantly dropped to less than 50%. This could be explained by the fact that (unlike
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the IE dataset where almost all the vulnerabilities have a Network AV value and hence have been
assigned a high exploitability value) in Windows 7 almost half of the vulnerabilities have been
assigned Local AV values and hence have been assigned a low exploitability value. In other words,
CVSS exploitability factor is highly influenced by the AV values. Second, the sensitivity has
noticeably dropped and this is 6because there are 18 vulnerabilities that have been assessed as not
exploitable and they turn out to have an exploit. However, when the imbalanced sample is taken
into account, it can be seen that the precision of the two metrics has noticeably changed and that is
in turn has also changed F2 measure. Besides, F1 measure slightly decreased and that is because
of the drop in the sensitivity of the CVSS.
From the performance analysis, 6the following has been observed.
• The sensitivity measure of the Microsoft Exploitability Index has not been affected by the
change of the type of software.
• The sensitivity measure of CVSS exploitability measure has been noticeably affected by the
change of software type. This has led to a change in AV values and that in turn has made
CVSS exploitability measure predicts 18 vulnerabilities as not exploitable where is in fact
there are exploits for those vulnerabilities.
• Both metrics are very sensitive and that has led to a lower precision and a high false positive
rate and this could lead to a waste of resources and effort.
• CVSS exploitability factor is highly influenced by the AV values regardless of the other two
factors, AC and AU.
• Taking into consideration the imbalance in the datasets between the number of vulnerabilities
with an exploit and those without an exploit has shown an improvement in the precision and
F2 measures for the two metrics.
• It is unclear how the Microsoft Exploitability Index is assessed.
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8.5.3 Threats to Validity
In this chapter, we have considered the datasets for only two products, Internet Explorer and
Windows 7. However, the two selected software have a rich history of reported vulnerabilities
and exploits (IE has 436 reported vulnerabilities, 33 with reported exploits, and Windows 7 has
354 reported vulnerabilities, 52 with reported exploits). One of our observations is that the false
positive rate is high for both metrics. This could be a result of other factors that have not been
considered in this study. Only publicly reported vulnerabilities and exploits have been considered
here.
8.6 Discussion
An important question that arises from the results of this study is why both the technical ap-
proach (Microsoft) and the expert opinion approach (CVSS) did not perform well? One possible
reason could be that some of the chosen metrics do not correlate well with the factors that con-
tribute to vulnerability exploitability in actual reality and hence new metrics are needed to be iden-
tified and added to the two rating systems. It will require extensive investigations to identify new
metrics that well correlated. There may be some randomness in how potential exploit developers
identify the vulnerabilities for which exploit development may be worthwhile. It is also possible
that the software developers may work more aggressively towards developing patches for highly
exploitable vulnerabilities making it less attractive for external exploit developers to develop ex-
ploits. However the results suggest that these may not provide the complete explanation for why
the exploitability measures have not performed well. Another possible reason could be that the two
metrics did not carefully consider the threat (the external factor) and mainly focus on the internal
factors, which are alone not enough to capture the whole risk presented by a vulnerability. Looking
at the formal theory of risk, we find that risk is defined as [84]:
Risk = Likelihoodofanadverseevent× Impactoftheadverseevent
LikelihoodofanAdverseEvent = ThreatR V ulnerability
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Risk = Threat×R V ulnerability × Impact
What the two rating systems have considered are the R vulnerability (in the risk theory the term
vulnerability is a number given by the probability of an attacks success or an ease of exploitation)
and the impact (losses that occur given a successful exploitation) and they assume the threat as
either there or not adaptive, whereas a threat (an adversary), unlike accidents or acts of nature, is
intelligent and may dynamically adapt to the used defensive measures. Therefore, vulnerabilities
are dangerous if and only if someone (adversary) is interested in exploiting them (motive) and has
the means (capability) to do it and that is shown by [135].
Threat(attacker) = Motive× Capability
A motive is a measure of how far an adversary is willing to go and what he is willing to
risk to reach his objectives. A motive can be influenced by the sensitivity of data, desire for
monetary gain, or the potential publicity effects of an attack. One way of measuring a motive in
cyber security is based on the following factors [136]: a cost of attempting an attack, a payoff
of a successful attack, a probability of successfully completing an attack, and a probability of
detection. A capability, on the other hand, is the degree to which an adversary is able to execute an
attack. To execute an attack, the skills, knowledge, tools, and techniques should be possessed by
an adversary. According to [137], the following factors are a key in measuring a capability of a
hacker or cracker: group size, history of relevant activity, technical expertise, and target selection.
Some of the capability factors have been considered to a limited extent, especially by MS rating
system. Quantifying and including the attackers motive and some other capability factors as a part
of the two studied rating systems may significantly advance the vulnerability risk assessment by
increasing the accuracy and reducing the false positive rate.
8.7 Conclusion and Future Work
This study compares and evaluates the performance of the CVSS Base metrics and Microsoft
rating system using 813 vulnerabilities of IE and Windows7. The results show that the two mea-
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sures have a very high false positive rate. It was observed that the sensitivity measure of CVSS
exploitability metrics is noticeably affected by the software type. Besides, CVSS Exploitabil-
ity factor is highly influenced by the AV values regardless of the other two factors (AC and AU).
However, unlike the CVSS Base metrics where the metrics (factors) used for measuring vulnerabil-
ities risk are provided, Microsoft rating system does not provide such metrics but rather provides
the values and their definition. Hence it was hard to conduct a thorough investigation trying to
correlate the two sets of metrics.
Even though the two selected software have a rich history of reported vulnerabilities, consider-
ing other Microsoft products could increase the size of the dataset and that might reveal significant
information. The study suggests that a simple measure of vulnerabilities exploitability using few
metrics may not be sufficient. Hence, identifying new metrics that capture attributes that have not
been yet considered and adding them to the two rating systems is needed. Younis et al. in [12]
have proposed some distinctive metrics based on the software structure. In addition, identifying
and including the external factors, such the attacker behavior, to the two selected rating system
could improve their precision and reduce their false positive rate.
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Chapter 9
Validating CVSS Using Vulnerability
Rewards Program
This chapter introduces the vulnerability reward programs (VRPs) as a novel ground truth
to evaluate the CVSS Base scores. Having more eyes on the code means that VRPs uncovered
many more vulnerabilities and that makes finding and exploiting vulnerabilities more difficult for
malicious actors. The results show that the fact that there are more number of vulnerabilities with
a high CVSS scores and have no exploits or attacks is because vulnerabilities that are discovered
by VRPs result in prioritized fixing.
9.1 Introduction
Vulnerability rewards programs (VRPs) are programs adopted by software vendors to pay se-
curity researchers, ethical hackers and enthusiasts for exchange of discovering vulnerabilities in
their software and responsibly disclosing the findings to the vendors [52]. Having more eyes on
the code means that VRPs uncovered many more vulnerabilities and that makes finding vulner-
abilities more difficult for malicious actors and hence ensure the security of software. Besides,
vulnerabilities found by VRPs results in a coordinated disclosure and patch that minimizes the risk
of vulnerabilities discovery and exploitation [138]. Our approach is inspired by the economics of
exploitation model proposed by Miller et al. in [139]:
AttackerReturn = (Gain per use×Opportunity to use)−
(Cost to acquire vulnerability + Cost to weaponize)
The authors argue that an attacker must invest resources to acquire vulnerabilities and develop
weaponized exploit for it. While mitigation techniques have shown to increase the cost and com-
plexity of developing an exploit and hence cost of weaponize [97], we argue that VRPs can also
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be an important factor in this equation. As software vendors invest significantly to find vulnerabil-
ities the cost of an attacker acquiring a vulnerability is going to be increased and that reduces the
likelihood of vulnerabilities discovery and exploitation. Many software vendors such as Google,
Mozilla, Facebook, PayPal, and recently Microsoft have adopted using VRPs. They realized that
attackers are finding vulnerabilities faster and thus adapting VRPs will help put more sets of eyes
looking for vulnerabilities and that makes all vulnerabilities shallow.
There are a number of VRPs and each one of them have their rules and criteria. Among
these programs are Mozilla Firefox VRP [140] and Google Chrome VRP [64]. Mozilla Firefox
and Google Chrome VRPs determine the reward amount of a vulnerability based on its severity
and proof of its exploitation. Both VRPs classify the severity of vulnerabilities as critical, high,
medium and low. The details about the description of every severity level for Firefox and Chrome
VRPs can be found respectively in [141] and [142] respectively. While Firefox VRP rewards
amount ranges from 500 - 10,000, Chrome VRP rewards ranges from 500 - 60000. Firefox VRP
pays only for vulnerabilities that has been rated by VRP Commit- tee as a critical or a high and
some moderate vulnerabilities, while Chrome VRP rewards critical, high, medium, and some low
vulnerabilities.
Recently, there have been efforts to validate CVSS Base score. Some of the researchers have
evaluated CVSS Base score using reported exploits [7] and [98] and attacks [143]. The results
show that CVSS Base score has a poor correlation with the reported exploits [7, 98] and with the
reported attacks [143]. Thus, CVSS Base scores have been considered not a good risk indicator
[143] because the majority of vulnerabilities have high scores and have no reported exploits or
attacks. Hence, it is hard to use those scores to prioritize among vulnerabilities. However, the lack
of exploits or attacks may be a result of prioritized fixing of vulnerabilities that are uncovered by
VRPs and that makes finding vulnerabilities more difficult for malicious actors.
In this research, we propose using independent scales used by VRPs to evaluate CVSS Base
score. VRPs use their own vulnerability severity rating systems that use a very thorough technical
analysis and security experts opinions to assign a severity to vulnerabilities. The severity ratings
are then used to pay money ranging from 500$ to 60,000$ or even more. Hence, comparing CVSS
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Base score with VRPs severity ratings could explain whether CVSS high scores are reasonable,
and why having many high sever vulnerabilities with no reported exploit or attacks.
To conduct this study, we examine 1559 vulnerabilities of Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome
browsers. The two software has been selected because of their rewarding programs maturity and
their rich history of publicly documented rewarded vulnerabilities. Besides, the examined vulner-
abilities have been assessed by both VRPs rating systems and the CVSS Base score which makes
their comparison feasible.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. In Section 3, the
selected datasets are presented. In section 4, the validity of CVSS Base score is examined. Section
5 presents the discussion. In section 6, concluding comments are given and the issues that need
further research are identified.
9.2 Related Work
Bozorgi et al. [97] have studied the exploitability metrics in CVSS Base metrics. They argued
that the exploitability measures in CVSS Base metrics do not differentiate well between the ex-
ploited and not exploited vulnerabilities. They attributed that to the fact that many vulnerabilities
with a CVSS high score have no reported know exploit and many vulnerabilities with low CVSS
scores have a reported know exploit. However, in this paper, we evaluate the performance of CVSS
Base score considering both the exploitability and the impact factors using vulnerability rewards
programs and we provide an insight into why many vulnerabilities with a high CVSS score and
have no exploits.
Allodi and Massacci in [98] have used a case-control study methodology to evaluate whether
a high CVSS score or the existence of proof of concept exploit is a good indicator of risk. They
use the attacks documented by Symantecs AttackSignature as the ground truth for the evaluation.
Their results show that CVSS Base score performs no better than randomly picking vulnerabilities
to fix. Besides, they also show that there are many vulnerabilities that have a high CVSS score and
are not attacked. However, in this paper, we seek to find an explanation of why the majority of
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vulnerabilities have a high CVSS score and have no reported exploits. Thus, we use VRPs instead
of an attack in the wild to conduct this study.
Younis and Malaiya in [7] have compared Microsoft rating systems with CVSS Base metrics
using the availability of exploits as a ground truth for the evaluation. In addition to finding that
both rating systems do not correlate very well with the availability of exploit, they also find that
many vulnerabilities have a high CVSS score and have no reported exploits. However, in this
study we try to use different ground truth for the evaluation so that an explanation for why many
vulnerabilities have a high CVSS scores and have no reported exploits may be provided.
Finifter et al. in [52] have examined the characteristics of Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox
VRPs. The authors find that using VRPs helps improving the likelihood of finding latent vulnera-
bilities. They also find that monetary rewards encourage security researchers not to sell their result
to the underground economy. Besides, they find that patching vulnerabilities found by the VRPs
increases the difficulties and thus the cost for the malicious actors to find zero-day vulnerabilities
or exploit them. However, in this study, we examine using VRPs as ground truth to evaluate CVSS
Base score.
Swamy et al. in [97] at the Microsoft Security Response Center examine the impact of using
exploit mitigation techniques that Microsoft has implemented to address software vulnerabilities.
One of their result shows that stack corruption vulnerabilities that were historically the most com-
monly exploited vulnerability class are now rarely exploited. However, in this research, we focus
on the impact of using VRPs on the availability of exploits and on the relationship between VRPs
measures and CVSS Base score.
9.3 Datasets
In this section, we first provide the source of the data. Then we show how the data were col-
lected and analyzed. In this research, the data about vulnerabilities, exploits, and vulnerabilities
rewards program data have been collected from the National Vulnerability Database [16], Ex-
ploit Database (EDB) [22], and Mozilla Firefox [144] and Google Chrome bug databases [63]
receptively. Table 9.1 shows the number of the examined vulnerabilities and their exploits.
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Table 9.1: Firefox and Chrome Vulnerabilities
Software Vulnerabilities Exploit Exist
Firfox 547 22
Google Chrome 1012 5
It should be noted that the total number of the Firefox vulnerabilities is 742. Out of this number,
a 195 vulnerabilities were not examined because we could not find information about them and
that is explained as follows. First, 71 vulnerabilities have no direct mapping between the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number and the Firefox Bug ID. Second, a 122 vulnerabilities
could not be accessed due to the unauthorized access permission (You are not authorized to access
this data); Third, two vulnerabilities have no data recorded in the Firefox bug database. We found
that the VRP data in the Firefox bug database have started to be recorded starting 2009. Thus, all
vulnerabilities and exploits of Firefox during the period 2009 to October 2015 were collected. On
the other hand, it should also be noted that the total number of vulnerabilities of Chrome is 1084.
A 72 vulnerabilities were not examined because we could not find information about them because
of the unauthorized access permission”You are not authorized to access this data”. We also found
that the VRP data in the Chrome bug database have started to be recorded starting 2010. Therefore,
all vulnerabilities and exploits of Chrome during the period 2010 to October 2015 were collected.
The data of every examined vulnerability of Firefox and Chrome were collected using the following
steps. First, from NVD, the vulnerability is first identified. Next, for every existing link in NVD to
vendors’ bug database, we collected the vulnerability’s severity rating and rewards data assigned
by the VRPs. After that, for every vulnerabilitys CVE number found in the vendors bug database,
the CVSS scores and severity values were collected. Lastly, for every examined vulnerability we
used the CVE number to verify whether it has an exploit reported in the EDB or not.
9.3.1 Firefox Vulnerabilities Analysis.
Table 9.2 shows only three of the Firefox vulnerabilities because showing the whole vulnera-
bilities is limited by the number of pages allowed. Firefox VRP does not provide data about the
amount of the reward paid and rather it uses: 1) + symbol to indicate the bug has been accepted and
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Table 9.2: The obtained measures of Firefox and CVSS Base Score
Mozilla Firefox VRP CVSS Base Score
CVE
Reward VRP Severity Severity Score
Exploit Existence
CVE-2011-2371 3000-7500 sec-critical High 10 EE
CVE-2013-1727 500-2500 sec-moderate Medium 4 NEE
CVE-2015-0833 3000-5000 sec-high Medium 6.9 NEE
payment will be made, 2) - symbol to indicate the bug does not meet the criteria and payment will
not be paid, and 3) ? symbol to indicate the bug is nominated for review by the bounty committee
[141].
The CVSS Base score assigns a score in the range [0.0, 10.0]. This score represents the intrinsic
and fundamental characteristic of a vulnerability and thus the score does not change over time.
CVSS score from 0.0 to 3.9 corresponds to Low severity, 4.0 to 6.9 to Medium severity and 7.0 to
10.0 to High severity. Mozillas security ratings are see-critical: vulnerabilities allow arbitrary code
execution, sec-high: vulnerabilities allow obtain confidential data, sec-moderate: vulnerabilities
which can provide an attacker additional information, sec-low: minor security vulnerabilities such
as leaks or spoofs of non-sensitive information. We have found that 13 vulnerabilities did not meet
the criteria for rewarding and hence have been assigned ”–” symbol. We have also found that 11
of them have a low and a moderate severity (five are low and six are moderate) and two are high
and critical.
Table 9.3 shows the number of the rewarded and not rewarded vulnerabilities and their sever-
ity values for Firefox dataset. It should be noted that the Not Rewarded vulnerabilities are most
likely have been discovered by internal discoverers (41.13%) whereas Rewarded vulnerabilities
have been discovered by external discoverers (58.87%) [52]. While the Firefox bug database
does not clearly provide information about whether the vulnerabilities have been discovered inter-
nally or externally, this was very clear in the Chrome bug database where the name and the team
the discoverer works with is provided. 9.3 also shows the severity values and their frequency
for rewarded and on rewarded data. It should be noted that the majority of the medium severity
vulnerabilities and all low severity vulnerabilities were discovered internally.
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Table 9.3: Firefox Dataset
Vulnerabilities Rewarded Not Rewarded
547 225 322
VRP Severity Rewarded Not Rewarded
Critical & High 210 202
Medium 15 89
Low 0 31
Figure 9.1 shows the vulnerabilities severity values of CVSS Base score and Firefox VRP
ratings of Firefox dataset. There are 412 vulnerabilities that have been assessed as critical or high
severity by VRP rating system whereas there are 312 vulnerabilities that have been assessed as
high severity by CVSS Base score. It should be notated that Firefox VRP severity rating is the
baseline that we are comparing CVSS scores with. It should also be noted that Shared means the
same vulnerabilities, which have the same CVE number, that have been assigned the same severity
value by Firefox VRP rating system and CVSS Base score. On the other hand, Not Shared means
the same vulnerabilities, but have been assigned different severity values by CVSS Base score.
Critical	&	High Medium Low
VRP 412 104 31
CVSS 315 220 12
Shared 288 81 1
Not	Shared 124 24 30
Figure 9.1: Comparing Firefox VRP and CVSS Severity Values
Almost 70% (69.9) of the vulnerabilities that have been assessed by Firefox VRP as critical
or high severity have also been assessed as high severity by CVSS. Using Common Weakness
Exposure (CWE) [20], which is used to identify vulnerabilities types, we have found that the
majority of the Shared vulnerabilities are of the vulnerabilities that execute code. However, the
124 vulnerabilities that are Not Shared have all been assigned a high or critical severity by VRPs
rating system, whereas CVSS Base score has assigned to 7 of them a low severity and to 117 of
them a moderate severity.
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Table 9.4: Vulnerabilites Mismatched by CVSS Base score
VRP Crtical High Moderate Low
CVSS Low Medium Low Medium Low Medium High
Total 3 24 4 93 4 22 8
On the other hand, almost 78% (77.88) of the Shared vulnerabilities that have been assessed
by Firefox VRP as a medium severity have also been assessed as a medium severity by CVSS.
However, there are 24 Not Shared vulnerabilities that have been assigned a medium severity by
the VRP rating system. Out of these, 19 vulnerabilities have been assigned a high severity and five
have been assigned a low severity. However, only one vulnerability that has been assessed as a
low severity by CVSS base score and VRP rating system. While 30 vulnerabilities that have been
assessed as a low severity by the VRP rating system, eight have been assessed as a high severity
and 22 as a medium severity.
Table 9.4 shows the vulnerabilities that have been mismatched by CVSS Base score. As can
be seen, seven vulnerabilities have been assessed as low severity by CVSS whereas three of them
have been assessed as critical and four of them has been assessed as high severity by the VRP.
It has noticed that those seven vulnerabilities have been assigned critical and high severity values
by the Firefox VRP during the debate time, but the vulnerabilities severity first assignments were
later changed [24]. We have found that the majority of those vulnerabilities requires unusual users
interactions. We have also noticed that CVSS version 3, which has not been used yet, have consider
using user interaction factor when assessing exploitability factor [144]. It is clear that the medium
range of CVSS scores makes the main part of the mismatch compared to the high and low ranges.
9.3.2 Chrome Vulnerabilities Analysis.
The Chrome vulnerabilities have been examined similar to the Firefox vulnerabilities as shown
in Table 9.2. The only difference is that Chrome bug database provides the amount rewarded.
Chrome security ratings are similar to that of Mozilla. Unlike Firefox where low severity vulnera-
bilities are not rewarded, seven low severity vulnerabilities have been rewarded by Chrome VRP.
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Table 9.5: Chrome Dataset
Vulnerabilities Rewarded Not Rewarded
1012 584 428
VRP Severity Rewarded Not Rewarded
Critical & High 441 175
Medium 136 137
Low 7 116
The seven low severity vulnerabilities have been found to effect non-critical browser features, crash
inside the sandbox, or hang the browser.
Table 9.5 shows the number of the rewarded and not rewarded vulnerabilities and their severity
values for Chrome dataset. We have found nine vulnerabilities have been classified as TBD (To
Be Determined) and thus considered them as not rewarded. It should be noted that the majority
of the Not Rewarded vulnerabilities have been discovered by Google internal discoverers and they
represent around 41.4%, whereas the Rewarded vulnerabilities have been discovered by external
discoverers and represents around 57.7%. Table 9.5 also shows the severity values and their
frequency for the rewarded and not rewarded data. It should be noted that while the majority
of the critical and high vulnerabilities have been discovered externally, the majority of the low
vulnerabilities have been discovered internally.
The frequency of the amount paid is shown in Figure 9.2. As can be seen, the majority of the
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Figure 9.2: Rewarded Amount of Chrome Rewarded Vulnerabilities
We have noticed that 70.79% (286) of those vulnerabilities have been assigned a high severity,
27.47% (111) have been assigned a medium severity, and only 1.73% (7) have been assigned a
low severity by VRP. Looking at the point number 3-5 under the Reward amounts section in [7],
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we can see that establishing exploitability or providing a Proof of Concept (PoC) or with a poor
quality of PoC could be the reason for paying less for many severe vulnerabilities.
Figure 9.3 shows the vulnerabilities severity of CVSS Base score and Chrome VRP rating
system of Chrome dataset. Almost 82% (81.65) of the vulnerabilities that have been assessed
by Chrome VRP as critical or high severity have also been assessed as high severity by CVSS.
However, the 113 vulnerabilities that are Not Shared have all been assigned a high severity by
CVSS, whereas VRPs rating system have assigned to 35 of them a low severity and to 78 of them
a medium severity.
Critical	&	High Medium Low
VRP 616 273 123
CVSS 611 398 3
Shared 503 199 2
Not	Shared 113 74 121
Figure 9.3: Comparing Chrome VRP and CVSS Severity Values
On the other hand, almost 73% (72.89) of the Shared vulnerabilities that have been assessed
by Chrome VRP as a medium severity have also been assessed as a medium severity by CVSS.
However, there are 74 Not Shared vulnerabilities that have been assigned a medium severity by
CVSS. Out of these, 73 vulnerabilities have been assigned a high severity and only one has been
assigned a low severity. However, only two vulnerabilities that have been assessed as a low severity
by CVSS Base score and VRP rating system, whereas out of the 121 that have been assigned a
low severity by VRP, 35 have been assigned a high severity and 86 have been assigned medium
severity by CVSS Base score. Table 9.6 shows the vulnerabilities that have been mismatched by
CVSS Base score. We have noticed that out of the 113 vulnerabilities, 75 vulnerabilities have been
assigned a high medium score 6.8.
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Table 9.6: Vulnerabilites Mismatched by CVSS Base score
VRP Crtical High Moderate Low
CVSS Low Medium Low Medium Low Medium High
Total 0 1 0 112 1 86 35
True Positive (TP)
When the CVSS Base score assigns a high severity and
VRPs assign critical or high, or, When CVSS Base
assigns medium and VRPs assign medium.
True Negative (TN)
When the CVSS Base score assigns low severity
and VRPs assign low.
False Negative (FN)
When the CVSS Base score assigns low and VRPs
assign critical or high, or, When the CVSS Base score
assigns medium and VRPs assign critical or high, or,
When the CVSS Base score assigns low and VRPs
assign medium.
False Positive (FP)
When the CVSS Base score assigns and VRPs assign
medium or low. Or when the CVSS Base score assign
medium and VRPs assign low.
9.4 Validation of CVSS Base Score
In this section, we compare CVSS Base score severity with VRPs severity ratings. We assume
that VRPs severity rating values are the ground truth because of the through technical analysis
and security experts opinions used and the fact that the severity rating are used to pay money. To
evaluate the performance of CVSS Base score, we describe when a condition (true or false) is
positive or negative as follows:
Since CVSS Base score uses an ordinal range: 0-3.9 = Low, 4 - 6.9 = Medium, and 7-10 =
High, the possibility of overlapping between the ranges could make high Low vulnerability such
as 3.9 close to medium and high Medium such as 6.9 close to high. To take this into consideration,
we used a cluster algorithm to group severity ranges based on the distance between their values.
We implemented the K-Means clustering algorithm provided by R language [145] to cluster CVSS
Base score for Firefox and Chrome dataset. The result for Firefox vulnerabilities show that Low
is in the range from 1.9-5.4, Medium from 5.8-7.6, and High from 8.3-10, whereas the results for
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Chrome vulnerabilities show that Low is in the range from 2.6-5.1, Medium from 5.8-7.1, and
High from 7.5-10.
We used statistical measures, termed sensitivity, precision, and F-measure to evaluate the per-
formance of CVSS Base score severity. Sensitivity, which also termed recall, is defined as the ratio
of the number of vulnerabilities correctly assessed as high or medium to the number of vulnera-
bilities that are actually high or medium as shown by the following: Sensitivity = TP / TP+FN.
Precision, which is also known as the correctness, is defined as the ratio of the number of vulner-
abilities correctly assessed as high or medium to the total number of vulnerabilities assessed as
high or medium as shown by the following: Precision = TP / TP+FP. For convenient interpretation,
we express these two measures in terms of percentage, where a 100% is the best value and 0%
is the worst value. Both precision and sensitivity should be as close to the value 100 as possi-
ble (no false positives and no false negatives). However, such ideal values are difficult to obtain
because sensitivity and precision often change in opposite directions. Therefore, a measure that
combines sensitivity and precision in a single measure is needed. F-measure can be interpreted
as the weighted average of sensitivity and precision. It measures the effectiveness of a prediction
with respect to a user attached β times as much importance to sensitivity as precision. The general
formula for the F-measure is shown by the following:
Fβ −Measure =
(1 + β2)× Precision× Senetivity
(β2 × Precision) + Senetivity
β is a parameter that controls a balance between sensitivity and precision. When β = 1, F-measure
becomes to be equivalent to the harmonic mean, whereas when β <1 it becomes more precision
oriented. However, when β >1, F-measure becomes more sensitivity oriented. In this paper β has
been chosen to be 2. Due to their importance, we have also used the FP rate measure: FP rate = FP
/ FP + TN and the FN rate measure: FN rate = FN / TP + FN.
9.4.1 Result
To calculate the above mentioned performance measures, we need to obtain the confusion ma-
trix for the two datasets. Using the severity ratings assigned by VRPs and CVSS Base score, the
confusion matrix was determined as shown in Table 9.7. We have also determined the CVSS Base
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Table 9.7: CVSS Base score compared to VRPs Rating Systems
Condition CVSS Vs. Actual VRPs Firefox Chrome
True Positive
When the CVSS High and VRPs Critical
or High
288 503
When CVSS Medium and VRPs Medium 81 199
True Negative When CVSS Low and VRPs Low 1 2
False Negative
When CVSS Low and VRPs Critical or High 7 0
When CVSS Says Medium and
VRPs Critical or High
117 113
When CVSS Low and VRPs Medium 4 1
False Positive
When CVSS High and VRPs Low or Medium 27 108
When CVSS M and VRPs Low 22 86











False Positive Rate 98 50






False Positive Rate 99 60
False Negative Rate 14 34
score ranges obtained by the clustering algorithm and due to the limited pages allowed we only
show the results for the CVSS Base score original ranges. It should be noted that we add up the
number of every condition, for instance True Positive for Fire fox = 369. As can be seen, CVSS
scores before the clustering have a very high FP rate. Using the values in Table 9.7, the per-
formance measures for CVSS Base score original ranges, clustering ranges and our mismatching
analysis ranges have been calculated as shown in Table 9.8. We also used Spearman correlation
measure to assess the correlation between CVSS scores before clustering and after clustering as
shown in Table 9.9. As can be seen, CVSS score correlate with VRPs rating values with p-value
less than 0.0001. Clustering score and using mismatching analysis have shown a slight improve-
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ment on the correlation value for the Chrome vulnerabilities whereas no effect have been noticed
on the correlation value for Firefox vulnerabilities. However, we also looked at the percentage of
the vulnerabilities that have been assigned high and medium severity by CVSS scores and VRPS
ratings to verify which measure is more aggressive. For the whole dataset, VRPs have assigned
66% of the vulnerabilities a high severity, whereas CVSS have assigned 59% of the vulnerabili-
ties a high severity. On the other hand, VRPs have assigned 24% of the vulnerabilities a medium
severity, whereas CVSS have assigned 46% a medium severity.
9.4.2 Threats to Validity
In this research, we have considered two datasets of two software of the same domain, internet
browsers. We consider extending our analysis as long as the data about software from different
domains are publicly available and accessible. We are also aware that there are other factors that
can affect the vulnerabilities exploitation. Thus, we in no way imply that VRPs should be the only
consideration when trying to assess CVSS Base score.
9.5 Discussion
Results have shown that CVSS scores have a higher FP rate. This is mainly because of the
number of True Negatives. Out of the 131 vulnerabilities that have been assigned as Low by
chrome VRP only two (True Negative) vulnerabilities have been assessed as Low by CVSS. We
have found that 86 of these vulnerabilities have been assigned medium and 35 have been assigned
high. On the other hand, out of the 31 vulnerabilities that have been assessed as Low by Firefox
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VRP, only one (True Negative) vulnerabilities have assessed as Low by CVSS. We have found that
22 of these vulnerabilities have been assigned medium and 8 have been assigned high.
There are more Execute Code vulnerabilities in Firefox than in Chrome. This could be ex-
plained by the effect of defensive mechanism, Sandbox, used by Chrome. Furthermore, based on
the amount paid, the data from Chrome show that proving exploitability is more valuable than
discovering vulnerabilities.
9.6 Conclusion and Future work
This study evaluates CVSS Base Scores as a prioritization metric by comparing it with VRP re-
ward levels, which are arguably more direct measures. We used 1559 vulnerabilities from Mozilla
Firefox and Google Chrome browsers to conduct this study. The performance measures and the
correlation results show that CVSS Base Score is suitable for prioritization. The fact that there are
more vulnerabilities with a high CVSS scores and have no exploits or attacks have been explained
by the effect of VRPs on vulnerabilities exploitation. Besides, considering that CVSS score assess
most of the vulnerabilities as severer, data show that VRPs have assessed even more vulnerabilities
as severe more than CVSS Base score.
Still, there appears to be a need for continued updating of the CVSS metrics and measures.
CVSS should highly consider including the Likelihood of Exploit factor (not only the availability
of exploit, but also how likely it is that functioning exploit code will be developed) as CWSS [6]
and Microsoft [146] rating systems did. Besides. The two chosen VRPs rating systems have
shown that Likelihood of Exploit is the main factor that determine the amount of the reward paid
for the discoverers and that was very evident in Chrome dataset. As the two datasets considered
represent two software of the same domain, examining data from different domains can be valuable
as long as their data is publicly available and accessible.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation has focused on the quantitative assessment of software security risk. Quanti-
tative assessment has been conducted in variety of research fields such as performance assessment,
functional evaluation, or statistical modeling. However, it has only begun recently to be applied
for software security. In this research, we have examined the following topics i) assessing vulnera-
bility discovery risk, ii) assessing vulnerabilities exploitability risk, and iii) validating CVSS Base
metrics.
10.1 Assessing Software Vulnerability Discovery Risk
In this research, we have formally defined and investigated the Folded vulnerability discovery
model based on folded normal distribution which is asymmetric by definition and can represent a
learningless discovery process. Its model fitting and prediction capabilities have been tested and
compared with the AML model for four popular software systems. While both Folded and AML
models have been found to fit the vulnerabilities datasets of Windows 7, OSX 5.x, Apache Web
server 2.0.x and Internet Explorer 8 well, they differ significantly in the prediction capability. The
short learning phase is apparently captured by the Folded model much better than the AML logistic
model for the four datasets. The folded model consistently outperforms the AML model in terms
of the prediction capabilities for the datasets with no learning phase.
The Folded model needs to be further investigated by applying it to as many software systems as
possible and comparing it with other competing models. That will allow development of guidelines
as to when this model would be most suitable. In addition, predicting the residual number of
vulnerabilities for a new released software without a historical data is a challenge. Thus, using the
source code as a source of data to predict the residual number of vulnerabilities could be effective.
Some researchers [147] have started to investigate this challenge and further research is required.
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10.2 Assessing Individual Vulnerability Discovery Risk
Assessing the risk presented by a software vulnerability is very important for decision makers to
prioritize their actions. A vulnerability may remain undiscovered, and hence unremedied, for many
successive releases of a software. Here, we proposed a metric to assess a software vulnerability
termed Time To Vulnerability Disclosure (TTVD). TTVD is the time taken from when the version
containing the vulnerability was first released until the time a vulnerability is discovered and hence
disclosed to the public. TTVD can be influenced by extrinsic factors such as discoverers’ skills and
effort and/or intrinsic attributes of a vulnerability and types. The vulnerabilities rewards program
(VRP) data of Google Chrome and the vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP server that does not use
VRP showed us the effect of effort and skills on the TTVD. Examining the relationship of TTVD
with CVSS Base metrics and vulnerabilities’ types showed us that some CVSS metrics relate to
TTVD.
Even though the vulnerabilities types have shown a great insight, finding a way to order them
in a particular manner is very important for assessing the risk of vulnerability disclosure and dis-
covery. Considering other type of software that use VRPs, such Firefox, and finding a way to
include the VRPs as an attribute is very helpful. We have also noticed that there are more types
of vulnerabilities in Chrome than in Apache HTTP server. Whether that is because of using VRP
requires a further research. Finally, looking for other attributes that can be related to the TTVD is
in the top of the list of our priority.
10.3 Assessing The Risk of Vulnerabilities Exploitation
Assessing the severity of a vulnerability requires evaluating the potential risk. Existing mea-
sures do not consider software access complexity and tend to rely on subjective judgment. In this
paper, we have proposed an approach that uses system related attributes such as attack surface
entry points, vulnerability location, call function analysis, and the existence of DSCs. This ap-
proach requires us to examine some of the structural aspects of security such as the paths to the
vulnerable code starting from the entry points. We have demonstrated the applicability of the pro-
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posed approach and have compared resulting measures with overall CVSS severity metrics. Our
results show that this approach, involving assessment of the system security based on systematic
evaluation and not subjective judgment, is feasible.
Providing a framework that can automate the entire analysis will be helpful in reducing the
effort. Thus developing techniques to reduce human involvement and thus enhance scalability in
assessing exploitability risk by using techniques such as machine learning is required. We plan to
examine the effectiveness of machine learning for automatically assessing the risk of vulnerability
exploitation using the proposed properties as features. Given a vulnerable function and their ex-
ploitability features, the machine learning model can predict whether it is an exploitable function
and estimate the impact of its exploitation.
Quantifying the degree of difficulty of reaching a vulnerability is also valuable for comparing
the severity among similar vulnerabilities, and thus needs to be examined. Utilizing the idea of
the function call graph depth which has been presented in the discussion section is important.
Devising a way of estimating the impact of reachable vulnerabilities will be valuable for estimating
the overall risk of individual vulnerabilities and the whole system. Investigating the Node-Rank
proposed by Bhattacharya et al. [94] as an estimator of the vulnerability impact is crucial. Finally,
identifying whether a vulnerable function is guarded by security control can help better understand
the impact of exploitation. Investagating the function exploitation properties proposed by Skape
[101] may be helpful in understanding the impact of exploitation when the security controls are
present.
10.4 Characterizing Vulnerability Exploitability
In this study, we investigated the possible relationship between the metrics and the existence
of a vulnerability exploit. We then characterized these functions using eight software metrics. The
metrics have been evaluated for their discriminative and predictive power. The results show that
the difference between a vulnerability that has no exploit and a vulnerability that has an exploit can
be characterized to some extent using software metrics known for characterizing the presence of
vulnerabilities for some of the products. However, the study shows that predicting exploitation of
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vulnerabilities is more complicated than predicting the presence of vulnerabilities and thus using
metrics that consider security domain knowledge is important for enhancing the performance of a
vulnerability exploitation prediction effort.
Improving the classifiers performance and capturing vulnerabilities exploitability may require
further empirical investigations of software metrics specifically applicable to the security realm.
Thus, further research is needed which considers the metrics related to attack surface [69], reacha-
bility and dangerous system calls metrics [12, 9], graph-based metrics [94], and static analysis tool
warnings metrics [124]. Moreover, using an alternative approach such as a text mining technique
[126] to predict vulnerability exploitability might lead to an interesting results.
10.5 Validating CVSS Base metrics
To validate CVSS Base metrics, this research used two approaches. First, using the availabil-
ity of exploits we evaluated the performance of the CVSS Exploitability factor and compared its
performance to Microsoft (MS) rating system measures. The results showed that exploitability
metrics in CVSS and MS do not correlate strongly with the existence of exploits (ground truth),
and have a high false positive rate. The high false positive rate result makes me think about ex-
ploring different ground truth to explain why too many vulnerabilities have no exploit for them. To
address this challenge, we introduced the vulnerability reward programs (VRPs) as a novel ground
truth to evaluate the CVSS Base scores. Having more eyes on the code means that VRPs uncovered
many more vulnerabilities and that makes finding and exploiting vulnerabilities more difficult for
malicious actors. The results show that the fact that there are more number of vulnerabilities with
a high CVSS scores and have no exploits or attacks is because vulnerabilities that are discovered
by VRPs result in prioritized fixing.
10.5.1 Validating CVSS Base metrics Using Availability of Exploits
This study compares and evaluates the performance of the CVSS Base metrics and Microsoft
rating system. The results show that the two measures have a very high false positive rate. It
was observed that the sensitivity measure of CVSS exploitability metrics is noticeably affected
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by the software type. Besides, CVSS Exploitability factor is highly influenced by the AV values
regardless of the other two factors (AC and AU). However, unlike the CVSS Base metrics where
the metrics (factors) used for measuring vulnerabilities risk are provided, Microsoft rating system
does not provide such metrics but rather provides the values and their definition. Hence it was hard
to conduct a thorough investigation trying to correlate the two sets of metrics.
The study suggests that a simple measure of vulnerabilities exploitability using few metrics
may not be sufficient. Hence, identifying new metrics that capture attributes that have not been
yet considered and adding them to the two rating systems is needed. Younis et al. in [12] have
proposed some distinctive metrics based on the software structure. In addition, identifying and
including the external factors, such the attacker behavior, to the two selected rating system could
improve their precision and reduce their false positive rate.
10.5.2 Validating CVSS Base metrics Using vulnerability rewards program
(VRP)
This study evaluates CVSS Base Scores as a prioritization metric by comparing it with VRP
reward levels, which are arguably more direct measures. The performance measures and the cor-
relation results show that CVSS Base Score is suitable for prioritization. The fact that there are
more vulnerabilities with a high CVSS scores and have no exploits or attacks have been explained
by the effect of VRPs on vulnerabilities exploitation. Besides, considering that CVSS score assess
most of the vulnerabilities as severer, data show that VRPs have assessed even more vulnerabilities
as severe more than CVSS Base score.
Still, there appears to be a need for continued updating of the CVSS metrics and measures.
CVSS should highly consider including the Likelihood of Exploit factor (not only the availability
of exploit, but also how likely it is that functioning exploit code will be developed) as CWSS [6]
and Microsoft [146] rating systems did.
Besides, the two chosen VRPs rating systems have shown that Likelihood of Exploit is the
main factor that determine the amount of the reward paid for the discoverers and that was very
evident in Chrome dataset. As the two datasets considered represent two software of the same
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